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Introduction 
 
 
Regulators’ traditional definition of banking activity distinguishes banks from other 
financial institutions and from industrial firms by highlighting the presence of a public 
interest in their core business that has to be safeguarded. Due to the fact that they operate as 
intermediaries between borrowers and savers, providing liquidity to the whole economic 
system, banks assume a prominent role on international economics development. 
Nonetheless, banks are part of a wider financial system, which continues to grow, driven by 
financial engineering and its structured financial instruments. The recent financial crisis 
showed how these instruments could function as transmission mechanisms spreading the 
negative effects all over the world. It is for this reason that regulators and supervisors are 
continually involved in the assessment of banks’ soundness and financial robustness. 
Moreover, although there have been some attempts to harmonize banks’ financial statements, 
these lasts are still less transparent then those of industrial firms considering that the largest 
part of banks’ assets and liabilities are composed of financial instruments, whose 
measurement depends on market values and complex evaluation methods. Even if 
international accounting standards require banks to provide an exhaustive disclosure of such 
information, financial statements users still have to trust on banks’ risk management 
processes and evaluation techniques.  
In this context, value relevance studies become particularly interesting. These studies 
aim to assess the presence of a significant relation between an accounting measure and 
company’s share prices. If such relation exists, the Academic literature defines the accounting 
measure as value relevant.   
This thesis is an attempt to enhance the existing literature by providing two different 
analyses: The first verifies if and in which measure the market value of a bank, measured by 
Market-to-book ratio, follows the trend of some bank’s characteristics, such as profitability, 
efficiency, riskiness, business activity and capital adequacy. The second analysis differs from 
the first one because it aims to determine which of those characteristics are reflected on 
changes in share prices. Both analyses consider Euro-Area commercial and cooperative banks 
publicly listed during the period between 2006 and 2014. 
The work is organized in four chapters. 
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The first chapter has two different objectives: first of all, it intends to draft an overview 
of the Euro Area banking system, with particular regard to reforms that regulators have 
adopted in response to threats and weaknesses arisen during the last financial crisis. Some of 
the peculiar aspects covered in this part attains: the consequences of the banking crisis and the 
provision of a European System of Financial Supervisors, as it has been proposed by the de 
Larosière group in 2009; the Euro-Area sovereign debt crisis that followed the banking crisis 
and highlights the importance of a banking union in order to complete the European monetary 
and economic union. The second object of this chapter is to give an overview of the impact 
that the introduction of international accounting standards have had on banks’ financial 
statements with special attention to managerial consequences linked to the adoption of fair 
value and amortized costs evaluation methods. 
In the second chapter, a literature review is presented. Particularly, the chapter starts 
introducing the concept of “value relevance” focusing on authors that clarify, criticize and 
discuss about the significance of such studies. Subsequently, articles that focus on the banking 
sector are reported with researches that, considering one single issue over time, try to provide 
evidence of the value relevance of fair value estimate, capital structure, diversification, rating 
changes and IFRS adoption. Finally the chapter contains articles in which banks’ Market-to-
Book ratio and banks’ stocks returns are regressed with different financial statement ratios. 
These latter are the studies that most of all approach the empirical analyses conducted in the 
last two chapters of this work.  
The third chapter aims to assess the presence of a correlation between banks’ Market-to-
Book ratio and different financial and accounting ratios. First of all are described the 
procedures followed in building up the sample and its peculiarities; financial ratios included 
in the model and the econometric methods used to develop the analysis. Then the chapter 
proceeds in exposing Fixed Effects regression findings and some heteroskedasticity controls. 
Market-to-book ratio analysis is one of the two possibilities, recognized by Barth, 
Beaver and Landsman in 2001, through which it could be assessed the value relevance of 
banks’ financial statements. The other one tries to determine what is reflected on changes in 
share prices over a specific period of time. This latter is analysed in the last chapter, following 
the structure of the previous one: first of all it describes the changes adopted in the sample 
and its new peculiarities; how financial ratios have been modified and the econometric 
methods used to develop the analysis. Finally, it focuses on Fixed Effects regression findings. 
Last but not least, in the conclusions empirical results of the two analyses are compared 
to the ones obtained by authors in previous works of the literature; moreover, the main limits 
of the work are presented together with some proposals for further developments.  
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Chapter I  
The Euro Area Banking System 
 
 
Article 4 of EU Regulation No. 575/2013 defines a bank as “an undertaking the 
business of which is to take deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to grant 
credits for its own account”. In this way, banks are defined as the joining link, the 
intermediary, between borrowers and savers, offering liquidity as a service. Taken together, 
these two businesses are the key element that distinguishes banks from all other types of 
financial firms and that determines banks’ prominent role on financial and economic systems. 
The public element recognized in banks’ services explains why banks, differently from all 
other firms, are subject to prudential regulation and are constantly in the centre of public 
debates. This study focus on these specific companies and in particular it refers to the ones 
established in the Euro Area. The empirical models developed in the following chapters are 
aimed to provide evidence of the value relevance of banks’ financial statements considering 
the time period between 2006 and 2014.  
This preparatory chapter concentrates on two main issues: considering the peculiarity of 
the nine years in the analyses, the first paragraph describes all the weaknesses and threats 
arisen during the financial crisis giving also a review of the reforms that bank’s regulators 
have adopted in response to such problems. The second paragraph is an overview of the 
impact that the introduction of international accounting standards have had on the reduction 
of banks’ financial statements with special attention to the managerial consequences of the 
adoption of fair value method for financial instrument measurement.  
1.1. Regulatory and supervisory framework 
On the 1st January 1999 eleven European Union member states1 agreed on the creation 
of a monetary union, the Euro-Area, for the adoption of a single currency, the Euro that 
officially entered into circulation on the 1st January 2002.  
                                                
1During the years, other EU member states joined the Eurozone until it the reaches the actual nineteen 
members: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain.  
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Simultaneously to the creation of the Euro Area, the central banks of the founder 
countries (National Central Banks – NCBs) agreed to transfer their powers and responsibility 
for monetary policy decision-making to a new supranational institution, the European Central 
Bank, with which they compose the European System of Central Banks. As it has been lead 
down by the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty) the primary 
objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective 
of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union. The ESCB shall act in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition, favoring an 
efficient allocation of resources. The Treaty also defines that the basic tasks to be carried out 
through the ESCB shall be: (i) to define and implement the monetary policy of the Union; (ii) 
to conduct foreign-exchange operations; (iii) to hold and manage the official foreign reserves 
of the Member States; (iv) to promote the smooth operation of payment systems. 
Furthermore, in the Euro Area the European Central Bank is the sole issuer of 
banknotes and bank reserves. In other words, National Central Banks confers to the ECB the 
role of monopoly supplier of the monetary base so as to enable it to influence money market 
conditions and steer short-term interest rates. 
1.1.1. From the Banking Crisis to the ESFS 
In the middle of 2007, the burst of the U.S. banking crisis showed all the vulnerabilities 
and instabilities that characterize the system. Before of the eruption of the crisis, no one 
seemed to be conscious of the dangers linked to the credit expansion that was being favoured 
by low interest rates, increasing housing prices and regulators’ failures. Financial engineering 
made the rest: investment banks2 began to buy loans from commercial banks3 that, in this 
way, reduced the capital amount required by regulators, gaining at the same time from the 
sales. Once having bought loans, investment banks gained from the issuance of MBSs 
(Mortgage Backed Securities) obtained by pooling and tranching loans together. MBSs were 
then pooled into CDOs (Collateralized Debt Obligations) and this latter in synthetic CDOs. 
                                                
2 Investment banks offer services such as underwriting, advice on Merger & Acquisitions, trading, 
asset management and global custody. They contribute to increased liquidity in the system by 
arranging new forms of finance for corporations, but this is quite different from meeting the liquidity 
demands of depositors for this reason, the term “bank” may be a misnomer. 
3  Commercial banks offer intermediary, liquidity and payments services to corporations and 
governments (wholesale services) as well as to banking customers and small businesses (retail 
services).  
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Moreover, derivatives market created other instruments liked to previous ones: CDSs (Credit 
Default Swaps), a form of insurance contracts, which provide protection against the default of 
MBSs and CDOs. This machine could not work without Credit Rating Agencies that assigned 
rating: (i) assuming that securitization (the process of pooling and tranching loans) creates 
safe financial products by diversifying risks; (ii) basing CDOs rating on the one that they 
assigned on the underlying collateral. In this ways, all those derivative instruments obtained a 
high rating (triple-A) even when they were composed of subprime loans4; this in turn ensured 
the presence of a liquid market for these instruments. This self-fulfilling mechanism 
implemented itself until housing prices continued to increase: When the housing bubble 
exploded, the losses reached all the members of the chain, all over the world. High-leveraged 
financial institutions, if not rescued by government, failed and panic spread out.5  
As de Larosière Group6 (2009) report, when it was already clear that the U.S. banking 
crisis reached all other countries, EU supervisors started to face some difficulties in assessing 
how subprime exposures entered into EU financial institutions and recognizing EU financial 
institutions’ degree of exposures in illiquid financial assets. Moreover, the European Union 
was not prepared for the crisis, with inadequate crisis management infrastructures that were 
not able to ensure cooperation between national supervisors and between public authorities. 
The first European Central Bank’s reaction was to provide liquidity in the inter-bank market 
while Member States’ public authorities were trying to avoid larger financial institutions 
failures. Nonetheless, due to the inadequacy of the infrastructures, the results were only 
negative consequences among Member States. The group underlines that “the interaction of 
market failures, financial and monetary imbalances, inappropriate regulation, weak 
supervision and poor macro-prudential oversight” leaded to the financial crisis and these 
problems could not be resolved only by increasing in regulation. If this is the set of rules that 
govern financial institution, the supervision, that ensures their implementation. Supervision is 
distinguished in: (i) micro-prudential, on individual financial institutions with the aim of 
                                                
4 A loan is classified as “subprime” when it is granted to borrowers that cannot be classified as 
“ordinary” because of their bad credit history. For this reason, this kind of loans are characterized by 
higher interest rates and higher degree of risk. 
5 This paragraph is an elaboration of United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) 
6  In October 2008, the President of the European Commission, J.M. Barroso mandated J. De 
Larosière to chair a High-Level Group with the aim to give advice of regulation and supervision 
changes to be adopted in order to restore the equilibrium in the European Union and to avoid future 
financial crises and contagion risks. The High-Level Group was composed of: L. Balcerowicz, O. 
Issing, R. Masera, C. Mc Carthy, L. Nyberg, J. Pérez and O. Ruding. 
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limiting their distress, preventing in these way contagion risk; and (ii) macro-prudential 
supervision that aim to protect the financial system as a whole. Although these two area are 
separated and they are in trust of different bodies, they are strongly interconnected:  macro-
supervision cannot be effective if it cannot impact on supervision at micro-level as well as the 
micro-prudential supervision is meaningless without taking into account macro-prudential 
development. 
The report recommended European institutions to create two institutions in charge of 
macro and micro prudential supervision: 
i. The European Systemic Risk Council – ESRC, in charge of the macro-prudential 
supervision, which is asked to “issue risk warnings, compare observations on 
macro-economic and prudential developments and give direction on these 
issues” de Larosière Group (2009). As the macro-prudential regulation should be 
allocated to the ECB and to the ESCB, this council should be composed of the 
members of the ESCB General Council (the President and the vice-president of 
the ECB, and Governors of the Member State central banks), the Chairpersons 
of CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR7 and by one representative of the European 
Commission. Moreover, the ECB President would be the chair of the ESRC. 
Finally, the de Larosière Group provided for the inclusion of insurance and 
securities supervisors every time that the subject of discussion justifies their 
presence. 
ii. The European System of Financial Supervision – ESFS with micro-prudential 
supervision powers. This system should be introduced in order to reform the 
three existing committees (CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR), whose structures did not 
appear to be sufficient to ensure stability in the EU. Therefore, de Larosière 
group suggested to set up three independent Authorities (European Banking 
Authority, European Insurance Authority and the European Security Authority) 
responsible for: (i) the coordination of the application of supervisory standards, 
and (ii) the guarantee of strong cooperation between the national supervisors. 
The creation of the ESFS should follow a two steps process: in the first, between 
2009 and 2010, national supervisory authorities should be strengthened in order 
to upward overall EU supervisory, the European Commission should start to 
prepare the legal proposal for the introduction of the three Authorities while the 
                                                
7  Committees of European Supervision for: banks, insurance and occupational pensions and 
securities.  
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three Committee should be immediately reinforced by more budget in order to 
upgrade the quality of their evaluation process moreover, in the first stage the 
EU should develop a more harmonized set of regulations. The second stage, 
between 2011 and 2012, attains the effective implementation of the ESFS, with 
the establishment of the three Authorities.  
Figure 1 shows the architecture of the “European Framework for the Safeguarding of 
Financial Stability” as defined by the de Larosière Group (2009). 
Figure 1: de Larosière Group’s European Framework for Safeguarding Financial Stability 
 
Source: de Larosière Group, 2009, p. 57. 
The de Larosière Group’s recommendations have been accepted by the European 
Commission that the 4th March 2009, in a communication entitled “Driving European 
Recovery” proposed to the European Council an ambitious reform program that aim to: (i) 
introduce in the EU a supervisory framework composed of a European Body for the Financial 
Supervision of the system as a whole and a European Financial Supervision System for the 
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micro-prudential activities; (ii) a set of regulations regarding hedge funds, private equity, 
tools for the intervention in case of crisis, derivative instruments, capital requirements and 
supervisory rules; (iii) measures to reinforce investors and consumers confidence; (iv) 
improve risk management; and (v) ensure more effective sanctions for market abuse 
(European Commission, COM/2009/0114 final). 
The European Financial Supervision Package has been presented, at the end of May 
2009, to the European Council that in its meeting of 18th and 19th June 2009 welcomed the 
Commission’s proposals as well as the “Commission's intention to bring forward, by early 
autumn 2009 at the latest, the legislative proposals to put in place the new framework for EU 
supervision” (Council of the European Union, 11225/2/09). 
The European System of Financial Supervision – ESFS was implemented in the autumn 
2010 through a set of European Union Regulations. Differently from the suggestions of the de 
Larosière Group (2009), the ESFS comprises all the independent and interdependent 
organizations whose mission is the supervision of the Union’s Financial System. For this 
purpose, it is composed of the European Financial Stability Board for the macro-prudential 
supervision; the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) for the micro-prudential 
supervision, the Joint Committee of the European Supervisory Authorities and the competent 
or supervisory authorities of the Member States. 
The European Financial Stability Board8, with seat in Frankfurt am Main, pursues 
objectives linked to macro-prudential supervision, preventing and mitigating systemic risk 
that could compromise the financial stability of the Union. To this aim the EFSB determines, 
collects and analyzes information in order to identify systemic risks. If these risks are 
significant, it issues warnings and recommendations and when those risks may end in an 
emergency situation, ESRB issues a confidential warning to the European Council that in this 
way could adopt decisions addressed to ESAs. The ESRB has also to: (i) monitor the follow-
up of issued warnings, (ii) cooperate closely with ESAs in particular for the developing 
qualitative and quantitative indicators for the identification of systemic risks; (iii) participate 
in the Joint Committee and (iv) coordinate actions with international financial organizations 
as the International Monetary Funds and the Financial Stability Board.  
Article 4 of the Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 defines the structure of the ESRB that 
shall comprise: a General Board, that takes necessary decisions for the performance of ESRB 
tasks; a Steering Committee, that prepares General Board meeting and assists in the decision 
                                                
8 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board 
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process; a Secretariat, responsible for the day-to-day business; an Advisory Scientific 
Committee and an Advisory Technical Committee. As suggested by the de Larosière Group 
(2009), the EFSB is chaired by the President of the ECB and it has two vice-chairs: the first 
elected by the General Council and the second that is the chair of the Joint Committee. 
Moreover, the General Council is composed of the President and the Vice President of the 
ECB, the Governors of national central banks, a Member of the commission, the chairpersons 
of the three ESAs, the chair and the vice-chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee and the 
chair of the Advisory Technical Committee. 
The three European Supervisory Authorities are: The European Banking Authority, the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and 
Market Authority. These three Authorities are designated to the micro-prudential supervision 
so as to guarantee the short, medium and long-term effectiveness of the financial system and 
contributing to improving the functioning of financial markets, ensuring their integrity and 
transparency, preventing regulatory arbitrage, ensuring that the credit is appropriately 
regulated and supervised and enhancing consumer protection.9 
The European Banking Authority10 is defined as a Union Body with legal personality 
and has its seat in London. Article 1 of the Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishes that the 
Authority supervises activities of credit institutions, financial conglomerates, investment 
firms, payment institutions and e-money institutions and that the “Authority shall pay 
particular attention to any systemic risk posed by financial institutions, the failure of which 
may impair the operation of the financial system or the real economy”. Moreover, it 
establishes that in each of its tasks the Authority shall act wit independence and impartiality 
in the interest of the Union.  
In order to allow the Authority to achieve its tasks the Article 8 expressly confers to the 
EBA the power to: (i) develop draft regulatory technical standards; (ii) issue guidelines and 
recommendations; (iii) take individual decision addressed to competent authorities or to 
financial institutions in emergency situations and in cases concerning directly applicable 
Union Law. Additionally, this article provides that the EBA shall:   
                                                
9 Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010; Article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 and Article 
1 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. 
10 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC. As 
will be clarified in next pages this Regulation has been amended by the Regulation (EU) No 
1022/2013 as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank. 
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 “(g) Issue opinions to the European Parliament, the Council, or the Commission […]; 
(h) Collect the necessary information concerning financial institutions […]; 
(i) Develop common methodologies for assessing the effect of product characteristics and 
distribution processes on the financial position of institutions and on consumer protection; 
(j) Provide a centrally accessible database of registered financial institutions in the area of its 
competence […];” Regulation EU No. 1093/2010, art. 8. 
Nevertheless, the EBA has tasks related to customer protection and financial activities 
(art. 9). The article 6 lists the component of the EBA: (i) a Board of Supervisors, that guides 
EBA’s works and that is the place of the decision making process; (ii) a Management Board, 
that ensures that the EBA achieves its mission and performs its tasks; (iii) a chairperson, that: 
represents the Authority, is responsible for the decisions and chairs the meetings of the two 
previous boards; (iv) an Executive Director, which manages the Authority and (v) a Board of 
Appeal, in common with the other two ESAs, to which any natural or legal person can appeal 
against Authorities’ decisions.  
Considering the Board of Supervisors, article 40 clarifies that it is composed of: 
“(a) the Chairperson, who shall be non-voting; 
(b) the head of the national public authority competent for the supervision of credit institutions in 
each Member State, who shall meet in person at least twice a year; 
(c) one representative of the Commission, who shall be non-voting; 
(d) one representative of the European Central Bank, who shall be non-voting; 
(e) one representative of the ESRB, who shall be non-voting; 
(f) one representative of each of the other two European Supervisory Authorities, who shall be 
non-voting.” Regulation EU No. 1093/2010, art. 40. 
Article 45 attains the Management Board composition, stabilizing that it consists of a 
Chairperson and six members of the Board of Supervisors. 
The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority11 is located in Frankfurt 
am Main and, as EBA, it is a Union Body with legal personality. Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 
No 1094/2010 expressly lists the institutions subject to the EIOPA’s supervision: insurance 
undertakings, reinsurance undertakings, insurance intermediaries and institutions for 
occupational retirement provision. With regards to the latter, the article also clarifies that the 
authority operates without “prejudice to national social and labour law”. The Authorities has 
the same tasks, powers and compositions of EBA. 
                                                
11  Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) 
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The European Securities and Market Authority12 as the two previous ones is a Union 
Body with legal personality whose seat is located in Paris. As for the other two, the first 
article of the establishing regulation enunciates that ESMA supervises: firms providing 
investment services or to collective investment undertakings marketing their units or shares 
and the competent authorities that supervise them. Moreover, the Authority can take action in 
the context of take-over bids, clearing and settlement and derivative issues. It has the same 
mission, tasks and composition of the other two ESAs. 
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the European System of Financial Supervision as it 
has been implemented in the Union.  
Figure 2 European System of Financial Supervision 
 
Source: European Commission Memo/10/434 p.2 
1.1.2. Towards a Banking Union 
In the autumn 2009, while the European Commission was committed in putting in place 
the legislative proposals for the establishment of the new European System of Financial 
Supervision, the Greek government presented a deficit budget much higher than the 
forecasted one 13 . Bond investors negatively reacted to this notice and the Euro-Area 
                                                
12  Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority) 
13 The Greek government announced in November 2009 a deficit of about the 12,8% of GDP rather 
than the 3,6%. Chang and Leblond (2015) 
2 
3. What are the key elements of the new European financial 
upervisory framework? 
This framework will consist of a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and 
three new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) for the financial services sector: 
A European Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, a European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt and a European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA) in Paris. The new authorities will be made up of the 
27 national supervisors. This framework is to give Europe the control tower and the 
radar screens it needs to detect the risks which can accumulate across the financial 
system as we witnessed in the run up to and at the height of the financial crisis.  
 
 
Figure 1: Outline of the new European supervisory framework 
4. How will the new European supervisory authorities work? 
A European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) will be established which will monitor 
and assess potential threats to financial stability that arise from macro-economic 
developments and from developments within the financial system as a whole 
("macro-prudential supervision"). To this end, the ESRB will provide an early warning 
of system-wide risks that may be building up and, where necessary, issue 
recommendations for action to d al with these risks. The crea ion of the ESRB will 
address one of the fundamental weaknesses highlighted by the crisis, which is the 
vulnerability of the financial system to interconnected, complex, sectoral and cross-
sectoral systemic risks. 
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Sovereign Debt crisis began14. The Greek government’s proposals to reduce the deficit at the 
nine percent of GDP was not enough for both bond investors and credit rating agencies; the 
latter decreased Greek’s rating to the “junk” status by April 2010. This emergency situation 
could end-up in three possible way: (i) the rest of the Eurozone helps the Member State by 
guarantying its debt; (ii) the Member State starts a fiscal and economic reform program, 
imposing austerity in order to restore its public finance status; (iii) the Member State leaves 
the Euro-area. This last scenario could be particularly dangerous for the entire monetary union 
due to the risk of contagion for other Member States (Chang and Leblond, 2015).  
Although tension increased significantly after the European Commission’s confirmation 
of the poorness and inadequacy of financial and fiscal data provided by Greek governments, 
Member States agreed to the rescue of the State and proceeded with its bailout in May. Few 
days after, following the EU Council of Economic and Financial Affairs, a temporary rescue 
mechanism was launched in May 2010: the European Financial Stability Facility15. This 
special purpose vehicle was created to help Euro Area Member States in order to safeguard 
financial stability of the entire system with a lending capacity up to euro 440 billion.  
The Greek bailout was not an isolated event: the second country that received funds was 
Ireland in the autumn 2010. Differently from Greek, whose fiscal deficit became 
unsustainable because of scarce competitiveness of its economy, Ireland’s public debt crisis 
was due to the attempt of the government to bail out the failing banks hit by the banking 
crisis.  
Following the rating downgrade of the main Portugal’s banks as well as the downgrade 
of its public debt, even this last State required financial assistance, just few months before that 
the interest rates on Ireland debt began to decrease and that a new financial assistance 
package for Greek was proposed, both in July 2011.  
The banking crisis reached also Spain’s regional savings banks so that the public debt of 
the country increased by more than doubling itself and the ten years interest rates start to 
increase in November 2010 as well as Italy’s ones. Things get worse with the exacerbating of 
the crisis and Spain accepted EU funds in 2012 to recapitalize the banking system.  
                                                
14 The reconstruction of debt crisis facts follows the work of Chang and Leblond (2015).  
15 The EFSF, whose main shareholders are the Euro Area Member States, has been conceived as a 
temporary rescue mechanism to be replaced in 2013 by the European Stability Mechanism. 
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Despite of these rescue programs, yields did not decrease until that European Central 
Bank’s President, Mario Draghi, promised to do “whatever it takes”16 to preserve the Euro 
Area stability. As a matter of fact, it was the Euro-Area instability the common driver of the 
crisis as Chang and Lebond (2015, p. 645) state:  
“Despite the different origins of the Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish crises […] they share 
their vulnerability owing to the contagion that arose as a result of investors questioning the euro 
area’s integrity. While economic fundamentals and the degree of political difficulties in 
implementing reforms varied, the key factor in calming down market expectations rested with the 
assurance of the euro area’s integrity”. 
Structural shortcomings coming from the financial crisis and the deep interdependences 
among member states have been indicated by the president of the European Council H. Van 
Rumpoy as the reasons for which the Euro Area Monetary Union needs an integrated 
financial framework composed of: (i) a single European banking supervision and (ii) a 
common deposit insurance and resolution framework (President of the European Council, 
EUCO 120/2012). The Euro Area Summit in June 2012 again reaffirmed the urgency “to 
break the vicious circle between banks and public debts” and asked the European Council to 
consider the proposal for the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism. The aim was 
to complete the monetary and economic union by the introduction of a “banking union”. 
In September 2012, the European Commission presented a communication for the 
European Parliament and the European Council concerning the steps to follow in order to 
reach the banking union. In this communication the European Commission clarified that the 
banking union is a reinforcing process of the “single market”17 since that the regulatory 
reforms program for the single market, i.e. the single rulebook, would be also the foundation 
of the banking union. Moreover, the European Commission identified three areas particularly 
relevant for the banking union, in which the single market legislative process would be 
accelerated that are: (i) banks capital requirement; (ii) deposit guarantee schemes and (iii) 
bank recovery and resolution processes. 
                                                
16 Referring to the Mario Draghi’s speech at the Global Investment Conference in London, on 26th 
July 2012 
17 “The single market for financial services is based on common rules which ensure that banks and 
other financial institutions which under the Treaty enjoy rights of free establishment and free 
provision of services are subject to equivalent rules and proper supervision across the EU” European 
Commission, COM/2012/0510 final.  
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Banks Capital Requirements. The European Commission launched a proposal for new 
bank capital requirement to be implemented in order to reach higher capital and liquidity 
standards for banks. That proposal contains a directive (CRD IV) and a regulation (CRR), 
which would substitute the previous framework for bank capital requirements18.  Following 
the Commission’s proposals, CRD IV package has been implemented in 2013 through: the 
Directive 2013/36/EU and the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.  
The main aim of the directive is the discipline of the access to the activity of credit 
institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms. To this 
purpose, it contains provisions for:  
“The authorization of the business, the acquisition of qualifying holdings, the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment and of the freedom to provide services, the powers of supervisory 
authorities of home and host Member States in this regard and the provisions governing the initial 
capital and the supervisory review of credit institutions and investment firms.” Directive 
2013/36/EU 
The European Council expressly clarified that this directive should be read together 
with the Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 which establishes prudential requirements for credit 
institutions and investment firms. As it is stated in the first article, these prudential 
requirements refer to: (i) elements of credit risk, market risk, operational risk and settlement 
risk; (ii) limits to large exposures; (iii) liquidity requirements to quantifiable, uniform 
elements of liquidity risk; (iv) reporting requirements of previous points and leverage; and (v) 
public disclosure requirements. The CRD IV package is the legislative framework through 
which the European Union has adopted the Basel III accords, which have been published in 
December 2010 by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision19. Basel III accords are 
                                                
18 Repealed legislation includes: CRD III package (Directive 2010/76/EU) on capital requirements for 
the trading book and for re-securitizations and the supervisory review of remuneration policies; CRD 
II package (Directive 2009/111/EC) in response to the financial crisis, which aimed at improving the 
management of large exposures, the quality of banks’ capital, the liquidity risk management and the 
risk management for securitized products; and CRD I package (Directive 2006/48/EC and Directive 
2006/49/EC) that aimed to improve transparency and to adopt Basel II guidelines. 
19 The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of banks. 
Its permanent secretariat is located in Basel at the Bank for International Settlements where its 
members meet. It is composed of representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks 
from: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, European Union, France, Germany, 
Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Russia, 
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based on the previous Basel II pillars (minimum capital requirements, supervisory review 
process and market strengthen market discipline) and aim to expands its provisions20. 
Particularly, through the new framework the BCBS intended to address the market failures 
revealed by the financial crisis and due to: (i) banks’ excessive on and off-balance sheet 
leverage; (ii) gradual erosion of the level and quality of banks’ capital; (iii) insufficient 
liquidity buffers; (iv) pro-cyclical deleveraging process and (v) interconnections of systemic 
institutions. The huge set of reforms has both a micro prudential and a macro prudential 
focus. The micro-prudential focus aims to strengthen bank level regulation so as to reinforce 
the resilience of individual banks while, the macro-prudential regulation intends to address 
systemic risk and their procyclical amplification. The BCBS also specified that both are 
highly interrelated due to the fact that the higher resilience of a single bank reduces also the 
risk of system-wide shocks (BCBS, 2010).  
Basel III intends to increase the resilience of the global banking system thorough two 
set of rules: the first attains the “strengthening of the global capital framework”; the second 
contains provisions for the introduction of “global liquidity standard”. Considering the first21, 
BCBS clarifies that it is “crucial” that bank’s risk exposures are backed by high quality 
capital base and for this purpose the provisions raise the quality and quantity of regulatory 
capital by giving a greater focus on common equity, the highest quality component of a 
bank’s capital (CET 1). In detail BCBS has established: 
                                                                                                                                                   
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States.  (Bank for International Settlement’s site) 
20 Basel II framework was introduced in 2004, after six years of works and researches, with the 
purpose to revise 1988 Accords (Basel I) by providing more risk-sensitive capital requirements in 
order to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking systems. Indeed, Basel II 
provided for the adoption of stronger risk management practices to better address issues arising from 
financial innovation that strongly increased during the years between two frameworks. It was based 
on three pillars: (i) minimum capital requirements for credit, market and operational risk; (ii) 
supervisory review of an institution's capital adequacy and internal assessment process; and (iii) 
effective use of disclosure as a lever to strengthen market discipline and encourage sound banking 
practices. 
21 For which regards the second set of rules on the “global liquidity standards”, Basel III has 
provided for the development of two ratios: “a minimum liquidity ratio: (i) the Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio (LCR), intended to provide enough cash to cover funding needs over a 30-day period of stress; 
and a longer-term ratio, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), intended to address maturity 
mismatches over the entire balance sheet” (BCBS, 2015). 
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i. The increase of Basel II minimum capital requirement that, after a transition 
period from 2013 to 2019, will reach the new standards of: 
a. Common Equity Tier 1 at least equal to 4,5% of risk-weighted assets; 
b. Tier 1 Capital at least equal to 6,0% of risk-weighted assets; 
c. Total Capital (Tier 1 Capital plus Tier 2 Capital) at least equal to 8,0% of 
risk- weighted assets. 
ii. The introduction of a capital conservation buffer, with the aim to ensure that 
banks build up capital buffers outside periods of stress, which can be drawn 
down as losses are incurred. The Capital conservation buffer of 2,5% of risk-
weighted assets must be composed of CET 1 elements.   
iii. A countercyclical capital buffer, in order to consider the macro-financial 
environment where banks operate. As BCBS clarified, when national 
jurisdictions judge an excess aggregate credit growth as likely to be associated 
with a build-up of a system-wide risk, these authorities can deploy this buffer to 
to protect the banking system against future losses (BCBS, 2010).  
iv. Additional capital requirements for systemically important banks. 
v. A leverage ratio: a minimum amount of loss-absorbing capital relative to all of a 
bank's assets and off-balance sheet exposures regardless of risk weighting. 
As previously stated, all these international reforms have been recognized in the EU law 
system through the adoption of the directive and the regulation that compose the CRD IV 
framework. 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes. Although these schemes protect only a fraction of banks’ 
deposits22, their provision helps to ensure financial stability by decreasing the risk of 
depositors’ panic withdrawals and bank run. With these schemes depositors are protected, up 
to a certain “coverage level”, from the participation in banks’ insolvency proceedings and this 
guarantee might increase confidence on the entire system. Even if the Directive 94/19/EC 
already provided for the creation of Deposit Guarantee Schemes, the financial crisis showed 
their inadequacy in maintaining the reliability of the banking system. As the European 
                                                
22Directive 2014/49/EU in Article 2(2) defines a deposit as: “A credit balance which results from 
funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions and 
which a credit institution is required to repay under the legal and contractual conditions applicable, 
including a fixed-term deposit and a savings deposit, but excluding a credit balance where: (a) its 
existence can only be proven by a financial instrument […]; (b) its principal is not repayable at par; 
(c) its principal is only repayable at par under a particular guarantee or agreement provided by the 
credit institution or a third party”. 
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Commission (COM/2010/0368) reported, it was their fragmentation the cause of their 
inefficiency: There were about 40 DGSs in the EU and they covered different groups of 
depositors, with different coverage levels and different duties imposed to banks. Finally, the 
European Commission claimed that all these DGSs proved to be inadequate to overcome the 
crisis because of their scarce finance.  
For these reasons, in October 2008, the Council of the European Union mandated the 
Commission to present a proposal to restore the DGSs, promoting their convergence. The 
results was the adoption of the Directive 2009/14/EC as an emergency measure that increased 
the coverage level from euro 20 thousand to euro 100 thousand (effective in December 2010). 
Moreover, this Directive contained provisions for further adjustments in Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes. To this purpose, in July 2010, the Commission presented to the European Council 
another proposal that, after the legislative procedure, has been approved by the European 
Council and adopted as the Directive 2014/49/EU. This last aimed to: (i) uniform depositors’ 
level of protection; and (ii) ensure the same level of stability of Deposit Guarantee Schemes. 
In order to fulfill its objectives, the Directive contains provisions to reach: “a broadened and 
clarified scope of coverage, faster repayment periods, improved information and robust 
funding requirements” (Directive 2014/49/EU).  
Bank Recovery and Resolution Process. The need of a more safe and reliable banking 
sector, that could be able to recognize and respond promptly to financial crisis, leads the 
Economic Union authorities to deal with bank’s crisis management. In case of a bank’s 
failure, it could not be sufficient to follow insolvency procedures because banks 
interdependencies could create the risk of a systemic crisis. For this reason, in 2012, the 
European Commission presented to the European Council a proposal for a Directive on 
Bank’s recovery and resolution with the aim of creating tools through which authorities can 
promptly handle banking crisis, avoiding contagion risks. Following this proposal, in May 
2014, the European Council adopted the Directive 2014/59/EU. Legislators intend to ensure 
creditors that in the event of a bank failure, they would bear losses only after shareholders 
and, in any case, those losses would be lower than the ones incurred under normal insolvency 
procedure. The directive also aims to uniform tools and mechanisms to resolve failing 
institutions, smoothing differences across Member States and encouraging cooperation 
between national authorities.  
Moreover, through the enforcement of this directive the European Council wished to 
curb moral hazard problems by providing for any financial institution, and without 
considering size and interconnectedness, the possibility to exit the market. In this way, 
regulators intend to delete “too big to fail” awareness that drives managers’ irresponsible 
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conducts. Nevertheless, Authorities recognize the public interest in placing a failing 
institution under resolution processes, which are able to avoid adverse effects, protecting 
covered depositors, investors, clients assets, etc. 
The directive 2014/59/EU distinguishes two different plans to be provided by financial 
institutions and controlled by competent/resolution authorities:  
i. A recovery plan, containing all the measures to be taken by institutions with a 
deteriorated financial situation in order to restore it (Article 5). 
ii. A resolution plan, which provides the action that the resolution authority may 
take for institution that are failing or likely to fail (Article 10). By the use of 
resolution tools, authorities intend to: (i) ensure the continuity of critical 
functions; (ii) avoid a significant adverse effect on the financial system; (iii) 
protect public funds, taxpayers, covered depositors and investors as well as 
client funds and client assets (Article 31). 
Considering that one of the objectives of this directive is to preserve taxpayers, both 
these plans should not assume access to extraordinary public financial support. Moreover, 
resolution plans shall assume neither central bank emergency liquidity assistance nor central 
bank liquidity assistance under non-standard collateralization (Article 10(3)). 
The Article 37 establishes that Member States ensure that resolution authorities have the 
power to apply the following resolution tools: 
i. The sale of business tool; which entitles authorities to transfer to a purchaser 
that is not a bridge institution: (a) shares or other instruments of ownership; (b) 
all or any assets, rights or liabilities (Article 38).  
ii. The bridge institution tool; which differs from the first because the purchaser 
must be a bridge institution defined as an institution that: (a) it is wholly or 
partially owned by one or more public authorities and it is controlled by the 
resolution authority; (b) it is created expressly for the purpose to receive and 
maintain instruments of ownership and/or assets, rights or liabilities (Article 40). 
iii. The asset separation tool; through which assets, rights or liabilities of an 
institution under resolution or a bridge institution can be transferred to one or 
more asset management vehicles that have the duty to manage those assets 
trying to maximize their value (Article 42). 
iv. The bail-in tool that is defined as “the mechanism for effecting the exercise by a 
resolution authority of the write-down and conversion powers in relation to 
liabilities of an institution under resolution” (Article 1 and 43). 
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Minimum capital requirements set out in the CRD IV package, the Directive 
2014/49/EU that establishes Deposit Guarantee Schemes and the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Process draft in the Directive 2014/59/EU constitute the single rulebook that all 
financial institution in EU must comply with. It is the foundation of the banking union that is 
constituted of three pillars: 
i. The Single Supervisory Mechanism; 
ii. The Single Resolution Mechanism; 
iii. The European Deposit Insurance Schemes. 
The first two have been indicated in the European Commission’s communication of 
September 2012, as the two fundamental steps to reach the banking union, together with the 
harmonization of Deposit Guarantee schemes.  
Regarding the Single Supervisory Mechanism, after the European Commission 
proposals, have been approved: 
i. The Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring 
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions; 
ii. The Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 22 October 2013 amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) as 
regards the conferral of specific tasks on the European Central Bank pursuant to 
Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013. 
Through these two regulations Authorities intend to modify the previous set of rules 
(Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010) so that supervisory powers on financial institutions are 
conferred on a Single Supervisory Mechanism composed of the European Central Bank and 
the Euro-Area member states’ National Competent Authorities (Council Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013, Article 6). In this way, it is ensured a strong and consistent supervision 
maintaining, at the same time, the local know-how of NCA. Moreover, it has been provided 
for the adoption of the Single Supervisory Mechanism also in Member States that have not 
adopted the single currency. In this case, the National Competent Authorities participate to 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism and cooperate with the ECB.  
While the first article of the Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 confers to the ECB 
specific tasks relating to prudential supervision, the article 3 provides for the strict 
cooperation between ECB and: (i) all components of the European System of Financial 
Supervision; (ii) authorities empowered to resolve credit institutions. Particular attention is 
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given to the cooperation between ECB and National Competent Authorities: article 6 
envisages “a duty of cooperation in good faith, and an obligation to exchange information”.   
Article 4 lists all the tasks that have been assigned to the ECB that, after the entry into 
force of the regulation, is entitled, among others, to: (i) give and withdraw authorizations of 
credit institutions; (ii) assess notifications of the acquisition of qualifying holdings in credit 
institutions; (iii) ensure compliance with capital requirements, large exposure limits, liquidity 
and leverage as well as for what concern risk management processes, internal control, Internal 
Risk Based models; (iv) carry out supervisory reviews, together with the EBA, such ass stress 
tests, specific additional capital requirements, publication requirements and so on. 
Nonetheless, except for the first two tasks, the article 6 provides that for financial institutions 
that are not considered “significant” all the other tasks shall be carried out by National 
Competent Authorities in accordance with regulations, guidelines and instruction provided by 
the European Central Bank. The article also establishes requisites that a financial institution 
should have to be considered “significant”. The “significance” attribute is conferred to 
financial institutions considering: (i) size; (ii) importance for the economy of their Member 
State or of the Union as a whole; and (iii) significance of cross-border activities. In any case, 
the article establishes that the ECB can consider an institution as “significant” on its own 
initiative and that in any case a financial institution cannot be considered “less significant” if: 
“(i) The total value of its assets exceeds EUR 30 billion; 
(ii) The ratio of its total assets over the GDP of the participating Member State of establishment 
exceeds 20 %, unless the total value of its assets is below EUR 5 billion; 
(iii) Following a notification by its national competent authority that it considers such an 
institution of significant relevance with regard to the domestic economy, the ECB takes a 
decision confirming such significance following a comprehensive assessment by the ECB, 
including a balance-sheet assessment, of that credit institution” Council Regulation (EU) No 
1024/2013, Article 6(4). 
With regard to the Regulation (EU) No 1022/2013, it expressly states that, even after 
the introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the European Banking Authority shall 
maintain its powers and tasks with regard to: (i) the development and the application of the 
single rulebook; and (ii) the enhancement of convergence across the Union for which regards 
supervisory practices. 
In order to deal with the misalignment between the Union supervision provided by the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism and the national treatment of resolution proceedings by 
national competent resolution authorities established in the Directive 2014/59/EU, a Single 
Resolution Mechanism has been proposed, which flowed into the Regulation (EU) No 
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806/2014. The regulation (article 1) establishes a Single Resolution Board that, together with 
the Council, the Commission and the national resolution authorities shall apply the uniform 
set of rules set out by the Single Resolution Mechanism framework. The regulation provides 
also for the constitution of a Single Resolution Fund. 
The article 42 defines the Single Resolution Board as a Union Agency with seats in 
Brussels characterized by full legal personality based on which it can “acquire or dispose of 
movable and immovable property and be a party to legal proceedings”. It is composed of a 
chairperson; four full-time members; and, a member for each state, representing their national 
resolution authorities (article 43). Provisions about the Single Resolution Fund are contained 
in the Chapter 2 of the Regulation. Article 67 establishes that it shall be composed of funds 
raised at national level and that it shall be used by the Board in order to ensure the efficient 
application of resolution tools and resolution powers. 
The last pillar to complete the banking union has been proposed by the European 
Commission in November 2015 (European Commission, COM/2015/0286). The proposal 
intends to amend the regulation EU 806/2014, without altering the rules of the Single 
Resolution Mechanism but establishing the European Deposit Insurance Scheme. Although 
the DGSs Directive already provided to the harmonization of their main features and 
functioning, some important aspects are still at the discretion of Member States. The 
European Commission states that in order to reduce both, vulnerability of bank depositors and 
links between banks and their sovereign, the European Deposit Insurance Scheme is needed. 
Moreover, the European Commission highlighted that since the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive and the Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation have already provided 
for the possible use of Deposit Guarantee schemes, the establishment of a common system is 
the “logical next step” to complete the Banking Union. In a communication relative to its 
proposal, the Commission also specifies that through the amendments of the Regulation (EU) 
806/2014 it will be constituted a European Deposit Insurance Fund that will be maintained 
separate from the Single Resolution Fund and that will be composed of banks’ contributions. 
Moreover, amendments will provide that a strong independent authority at banking-union 
level would administer the European Deposit Insurance Schemes. The European Commission 
proposed the Single Resolution Board to play this role, after having adopted some changes in 
its governance structure to avoid potential conflict of interest between the resolution and the 
deposit guarantee functions.  
In this way, the Commission intended to give to European Deposit Insurance Schemes 
the same construction of ESM and ERM: a single rulebook composed of the Deposit 
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Guarantee Directive for all Member States and the EDIS that will be mandatory for all Euro-
Area member states but as well as the other two, open to non-Euro area member states.  
Finally, to underline the link between the three pillars, the Commission envisages that 
non-Euro Member States willing to participate to the Banking Union would be required to 
participate in all the three pillars. 
1.2. IAS/IFRS and banks’ financial statements 
The framework described in the previous paragraph is part of regulators’ attempt to 
harmonize internal market in Europe and its capital markets in particular. Homogeneity in 
regulation and supervision could not be achieved without the provision of a unique set of 
standards governing the production of financial statements.  
To this purpose, yet in 2002, the European Parliament and the Council have adopted the 
Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 on the application of International Accounting Standards. 
These standards have been developed by the International Accounting Standard Committee 
with the aim to provide a single set of accounting standard. The International Accounting 
Standard Board replaced the IASC in 2001 and the new set of standards has been renamed 
International Financial Reporting Standard – IFRS. Nonetheless, the last goal of this 
harmonization process has not been altered: through the adoption of IAS/IFRS could be 
ensured a high degree of transparency as well as the comparability of financial statements. 
These two characteristics increase the investors’ confidence about the functioning of financial 
markets ensuring also the principle of freedom of movement of capital across European 
internal market. Additionally, their introduction is considered crucial for cross-border 
transactions and for listing anywhere in the world23. 
The international accounting standards adoption 24  has changed significantly the 
structure and the composition of banks’ financial statements. The drivers of these changes are 
principles contained in IAS 1 “Presentation of Financial Statements” and IAS 7 “Cash Flow 
Statements” that, among with other adjustments, introduce the Cash Flow Statements and the 
Statements of changes’ in Shareholders’ equity.  
Nonetheless, three standards assume a crucial position: (i) IAS 32, “Financial 
Instrument: Presentation”; (ii) IAS 39, “Financial Instrument: Recognition and 
Measurement”; and (iii) IFRS 7, “Financial Instruments: disclosure”.  Indeed all these regard 
                                                
23 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 
24 Information reported in this paragraph and in all its sub-paragraphs come from: Paolucci, G. and 
Menicucci, E., 2008. 
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banks and financial intermediaries’ operations concerning financial assets and liabilities. 
Their impact is evident in the principles regarding classification and valuation of financial 
instruments. These provisions give greater importance to the Notes of financial statements 
where a lot of qualitative and quantitative information are included in order to: (i) highlight 
the impact of financial management; (ii) forecast the amount, the deadline and the probability 
of cash flows inherent the issue of financial instruments. In this way it is possible to obtain a 
more transparent and qualitative information arising from financial statements.  
1.2.1. Financial Instrument evaluation methods 
The most important change introduced by international accounting standards attains the 
valuation method used to determine the value of financial instruments. It is evident that, since 
the greatest portion of assets (and liabilities) in banks’ financial statements are composed of 
financial instrument, their evaluating process assumes a predominant role.  
Although a lot of European countries used to believe that the “historical cost”25 method 
is the primary criteria through which evaluates financial statement items, with the adoption of 
these standards this method has been substituted by the “fair value” one, that becomes the 
benchmark method. IAS 32 defines the fair value as: 
“The amount for which an asset could be exchanged or a liability settled between 
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm’s length transaction” IAS 32, par. 11 
As it has been explained by Paolucci and Menicucci (2008) these two methods arise 
from different prerequisites: the first one is based on results of an effective, real transaction 
while the latter refers to a potential exchange, requiring to calculate the theoretical value of an 
hypothetical transaction. Authors explain that the transition from the first to the second is a 
signal of the willingness to go beyond the concept of  “effective” transaction in favor of the 
“potential” one. This also means that, through this method, costs and revenues are accounted 
even in absence of a specific and effective transaction. Although this could be seen as a 
loosening of the prudence principle, actually IAS/IFRS provide for the imputation of positive 
variation in the value of assets in a specific reserve until they are effectively realized. 
Nonetheless, IAS 39 establishes that if those expected profits are high probably and reliably 
determinable, they can be accounted directly through profit and loss statement. On the 
contrary, valuing an item with the fair value method also implies that whenever the actual 
                                                
25 Through this method, assets are accounted in balance sheet considering their nominal or original 
cost when acquired by the company.  
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value of an asset (liability) is lower (higher) than the accounted one, losses are recorded 
immediately26. 
Although the use of financials constantly revised allows highlighting resources 
employed for the business activity and future cash flows that can be produced, this also 
implies a higher variability of profits/losses. This is source of particular concerns especially in 
the banking sector since that more updated financial information are also more uncertain and 
variable: indeed, they come from economic elements that do not arise from exchanges but are 
consequences of theoretical valuations expressed by the market or by indirect estimation 
methods. Paolucci and Menicucci (2008) point out the presence of information that are 
relevant but for which reliability could be questionable. For this reason, IAS/IFRS sketch the 
presence of a trade-off between more value relevant information and the safeguards of a 
greater level of reliability.  
It should also be considered that the coincidence between market prices and fair values 
is verified only when an active market exists for the financial instrument. In that case, quoted 
prices that are readily and regularly available from an exchange, dealer, broker, industry 
group, pricing service or regulatory agency constitute the fair value for the instruments, since 
it reflects the price at which the exchange would be concluded at market condition between 
willing parties. Effective market quotes represents the “first level” of fair value.   
In the case in which these effective market quotes are not available or the market is not 
functioning regularly, IAS 39 impose a hierarchy of the methods to be used in order to 
determine the fair value of financial instruments using valuation techniques. 
The second level of fair value, the comparable approach, is based on market-observable 
parameters: it provides for the identification of elements inside the market that could be useful 
to evaluate the financial instrument. The calculation methodology is based on the 
reproduction of prices of financial instruments quoted on active markets. Moreover, this 
approach uses an appropriate credit spread test, estimated from financial instruments with 
similar characteristics. Sources for the evaluation of financial instrument through this method 
are: (i) quoted and liquid securities of same issuer or of an issuer with same rating and 
belonging to the same sector; (ii) Credit Default Swap on the same reference entity. 
The third level of fair value is the Market-to-model: it is based on non-observable and 
more discretional inputs. Fair value is estimated by way of assumptions made by the valuator 
                                                
26 On the contrary through the historical cost method it is necessary to ascertain that those are 
durable losses. These losses are accounted through a depreciation that is an index of the irrevocable 
loss in value.  
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when no comparable financial instruments are available and on the definition of some kind of 
parameters to use. The calculation methodology is based on: (i) development of future cash 
flows; and the (ii) level of specific input parameters not quoted on active markets. 
From the definition of the three levels of fair value, it is clear that fair value could be 
usefully determined only for financial instruments whose valuation is verifiable, that is, when 
a regulated active market exists or when it is possible to determine fair value through 
valuation techniques. In all other cases it is necessary to use the historical cost method. This 
means that IAS 39 identifies fair value as the benchmark method for the evaluation of 
financial instruments27. Considering that these instruments are particularly relevant for banks, 
since that they constitute the largest part of assets and liabilities, the main observation 
concerning fair value are the ones linked to the impacts of this method on recognition, 
valuation and information concerning financial instruments.  
Financial instruments 
Two principles assume great importance for the study of the impact of fair value on 
financial instruments: IAS 32 and IAS 39.  The first describes rules inherent the presentation 
of financial instruments as well as their definitions, while the second establishes how they are 
initially measured, evaluated and derecognized. It also provide rules concerning how assets 
(liabilities) are classified, respecting the principle of substance over form28, in four (two) 
categories depending on objective and subjective elements. Objective elements attain some 
technical characteristics of financial instruments while subjective elements are linked with 
management motivation to detain such instruments.   
The assets categories set out by IAS 39 are: (i) Financial assets at fair value through 
profit or loss; (ii) Held to Maturity; (iii) Loans and Receivables; and (iv) Available for sale. 
While the liabilities categories are: (i) Financial Liabilities at fair value through profit or loss; 
and (ii) Other liabilities. 
Initial measurement. Financial assets and liabilities are initially measured at their fair 
value (that is the payment due for financial asset or received after the issue of a liability). 
Normally it comprises also transaction costs directly imputable to the transaction anyway, the 
initial measurement value of financial assets/liabilities at fair value through profit or loss 
                                                
27 IAS 32, “Financial instrument: presentation”, defines a financial instrument as a contract that gives 
rise to a financial asset of one entity and a financial liability or equity instrument of another entity. 
28 The substance over form principle is an accounting concept which means that the economic 
substance of transactions and events must be recorded in the financial statements rather than just 
their legal form in order to present a true and fair view of the affairs of the entity.  
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does not include these costs since that in this case they have to be considered in the statement 
of profit or loss. For which regards the date of the initial measurement, IAS 39 specifies that 
the recognition of a financial asset or a financial liability must be done only when the entity 
becomes a party to the contractual provisions of the instrument that is in the trade date29.  
Derecognition. Financial assets are derecognized if: (i) their sale leads to the substantial 
transfer of all the risk and rewards connected; (ii) the asset is sold and the entity retains the 
contractual rights to receive cash flows but signs a simultaneous obligation to pay such cash 
flows to third parties; or (iii) if it is no possible to ascertain the transfer but no control over the 
asset is maintained. On the contrary, in the case that: (i) a significant part of the risk and 
rewards is maintained, the financial assets sold continue to be recorded in assets; or (ii) 
control is maintained even partially, the assets continue to be recognized for the entity's 
continuing involvement, measured by the bank’s exposure to changes in value of assets sold 
and to variations in relevant cash flows.  
The principle disciplines how financial assets and liabilities can be classified in each 
category, specifying for each one subsequent measurement methods and how to account fair 
value changes. 
Financial assets at fair value through profit or loss. It should be noted that IAS 39 
provide for both assets and liabilities at fair value through profit or loss to be furthermore 
decomposed in: (a) Held for Trading; and (b) financial assets (liabilities) designated at fair 
value through profit or loss.   
In the first subcategory are included financial instruments that the management intends 
to sell in the short run, so as to profit from the spread between the price at which they have 
been bought and the one at which they could be sold. The subjective characteristic of assets in 
this category attains the fact that management considers these activities as short-term/current 
investments so as to maintain a reserve of financial resources that are promptly realizable. 
With regards to the objective characteristic, this category includes the instruments that 
generally compose the bank’s trading book: debt securities and equities; positive value of 
derivative contracts30 but excluding those designated at hedging purposes. 
                                                
29 It should be considered that in the case of loans the trade date and the disbursement date could 
coincide. Paolucci and Menicucci (2008, p.128). 
30Including also those embedded in combined financial instruments subject to separate accounting 
when: (i) characteristics and risk are not closely related; (ii) embedded instrument fully meets the 
definition of derivatives; (iii) combined instruments are not measured at fair value with changes 
recognised in profit and loss. 
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The latter sub-category represents a sub-portfolio whose ratio is the “fair value option” 
for which any financial asset that is designated on initial recognition as one to be measured at 
fair value with fair value changes in profit or loss. The possibility arises from specific 
circumstances indicated in the principle or in order to give more relevant information by the 
use of fair value.  
Assets included in both these sub-categories are measured at fair value through Profit 
and Loss31. If they are quoted on active market the fair value is constituted by market 
quotations; otherwise standard practices estimation methods and valuation techniques are 
used. For which regards equity, quota of CIU and derivative instruments which have equity as 
underlying assets that are not quoted on an active market and for which is not possible to 
determine a fair value, IAS 39 provides that they are maintained at cost.  
Held to Maturity instruments. Contrary to Held for Trading financial instruments, the 
ones that turn up in this category are non-derivative financial assets with fixed or 
determinable payments that an entity intends and is able to hold to maturity and that do not 
meet the definition of loans and receivables and are not designated on initial recognition as 
assets at fair value through profit or loss or as available for sale. This definition sets out the 
two subjective prerequisite: first, the management’s intent to detain instruments until the date 
of maturity; second the economics and financial ability to detain them. To this purpose it 
should be considered that the designation of a financial instrument into “held to maturity” 
category is not free from criticism. Particularly the bank should consider that this choice 
could impede to undertake other more profitable opportunities and subject the bank to rate 
changes and other risks linked with variable market conditions.  
Financial assets held to maturities are valued at amortized cost using effective interest 
method32. When these assets are derecognized or impaired: profit or losses are recorded in the 
Income statements. Through the amortization process their book value is compared with their 
present value reimbursable at maturity. IAS 39 provides that these assets are assessed to 
identify if they show objective evidence of impairment losses. If evidence exists the loss is 
equal to the differences between their carrying value and the present value of estimated future 
                                                
31 The fact that fair value differences are accounted through the Income statements means that any 
positive or negative changes in value of financial assets contribute in determining Net Profit (Loss) of 
the year. 
32 The effective interest rate is defined as the rate that exactly discounts estimated future cash 
payments or receipts through the expected life of the financial instrument to the net carrying amount 
of the financial asset or liability. 
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cash flows discounted at the original effective interest rate. The loss is recorded in the Income 
Statements. If the reasons cease to exist: recoveries are recorded in Income Statements and 
must not lead the carrying amount to exceed the amortized costs, had no impairment losses 
been recognized in previous periods.  
Available for Sale instruments are any non-derivative financial assets designated on 
initial recognition as available for sale or any other instruments that are not classified as (a) 
loans and receivables, (b) held-to-maturity investments or (c) financial assets at fair value 
through profit or loss. These assets represent a temporary investment but they are not intended 
to be sold in the short term nor to be maintained until maturity: they constitute a momentary 
investment and the category is a residual group where are included all financial assets that do 
not meet criteria of other categories. They are measured at Fair Value and gains and losses 
deriving from changes in fair value are recorded in a specific reserve of shareholders' equity33. 
Equity, quota of CIU and derivative instruments, which have equity as underlying assets 
and are not quoted on an active market and for which is not possible to determine a fair value 
are maintained at cost. 
As held to maturity instruments, even these ones are assessed to identify if they show 
objective evidence of an impairment loss. If such evidence exists the loss is equal to the 
carrying value of asset minus its fair value. If the reason cease to exists the value of the asset 
must be recovered through the Income Statements for loans and debt securities and the 
shareholders' equity for equity. Size of the recovery must not lead the carrying amount to 
exceed the amortized costs. The loss must be identified in a reliable way and must be incurred 
and not merely expected.  
Loans and Receivables are non-derivative financial assets with fixed or determinable 
payments that are not quoted in an active market, other than held for trading or designated on 
initial recognition as assets at fair value through profit or loss or as available-for-sale. Loans 
and receivables, for which the holder may not recover substantially all of its initial 
investment, other than because of credit deterioration, should be classified as available-for-
sale. Subsequent measurements are made at amortized cost34 defined as their initial value, 
                                                
33 Through the use of this shareholder’s equity reserve it is possible to highlight the presence of 
changes in value of financial instruments without impacting the Income statements with profits or 
losses not yet realized. On the contrary, they will impact Income statements only in the moment of the 
sale or of derecognition of the financial instrument. 
34 The amortized cost method can be used only for short-term loans, not for: (i) loans whose short 
maturity implies the application of discounting approach that leads to immaterial effects; (ii) loans 
with unspecified maturity; (iii) loans with notice period. All these loans are recorded at historic cost. 
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plus/minus principal repayments (calculated using effective interest method) plus/minus 
adjustments/recoveries, minus amortization.  
Together with Held to Maturity and Available for Sale financial instruments, loans are 
assessed to identify if they show objective evidence of impairments.  IAS 39 establishes that, 
every credit should be valued individually if it is significant35 while it should be valued 
individually or collectively if the single credit is not considered significant. Through this first 
evaluation it is assessed if the credit constitutes a performing or a non-performing loan. The 
latter are credits for which exist objective evidences of losses; they represent risky credits that 
can be bring back to the concept of default36. 
Performing loans are subject to collective measurement with homogeneous categories in 
terms of credit risk and the percentage of loss is estimated considering past time series and 
other observable elements to determine the latent loss for each category.  
In the second case, Non Performing Loans are subject to individual measurement and 
determination of credit adjustment. Particularly, NPL are subject to individual measurement 
process or, for small position, the calculation of the expected loss for homogeneous categories 
and the consequent allocation to each position the amount of the adjustment of each loan. This 
adjustment is equal to the carrying value at time of measurement (amortized cost) minus the 
                                                
35 In order to define a credit as “significant” some qualitative and quantitative parameters have to be 
considered: amount of the credit with reference to some banks’ aggregates (resources, 
capitalization…); other positions of the single borrower, credits belonging to some categories, credits 
that are relevant for the banks for its strategic plans. 
36 Particularly: Doubtful loans, where the borrower is judged as “insolvent” by a bank or a court; 
Substandard loans where financial difficulties are believed that can be removed in a short period; 
Restructured loans and Past-due loans that already reached the maturity but have not been paid. 
These categories of credits meet the list of events set out by IAS 39 (59) that defines situations in 
which there is objective evidence of value reduction: “significant financial difficulty of the issuer or 
obligor; a breach of contract, such as a default or delinquency in interest or principal payments; the 
lender, for economic or legal reasons relating to the borrower’s financial difficulty, granting to the 
borrower a concession that the lender would not otherwise consider; it becoming probable that the 
borrower will enter bankruptcy or other financial reorganization; the disappearance of an active 
market for that financial asset because of financial difficulties; or observable data indicating that 
there is a measurable decrease in the estimated future cash flows from a group of financial assets 
since the initial recognition of those assets, although the decrease cannot yet be identified with the 
individual financial assets in the group […]”.  
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present value of expected future cash flows discounted at the original effective interest rate 
(which is unchanged over time). 
 Both these individual and collective adjustments are recorded in Income Statements. If 
the reasons which lead to the impairment cease to exist the original value of the loan must be 
reinstated in subsequent periods, provided that it happened due to an event subsequent to the 
impairment. The recovery is recorded in the IS and includes the time value effects. 
Considering the two categories of liabilities, the first, financial liabilities at fair value 
through profit or loss, follows the same decomposition and the same rules described for 
financial assets at fair value through profit or loss. The second one, other liabilities, includes 
liabilities arising from the business activity and contracted loans. 
Finally, IAS 39 imposes strict regulations for which regards reclassifications, especially 
with reference to Held to Maturity instruments. The ratio of these regulations is to limit 
discretional and opportunistic changes aimed to obtain more favorable valuation methods that 
leads to the cover up of capital losses and/or to defer capital revenues. As an example, the 
principle establishes that financial instruments in the category “at fair value through profit or 
loss” cannot be reclassified in any other category as well as financial instruments in any other 
category cannot be reclassified in that specific one that provides for a fair value evaluation 
with direct allocation in profit and loss statement. 
In the light of what have been presented, advantages and disadvantages of the use of 
fair value appear clearly: the evaluation of a financial instrument through fair value implies 
that volatility of such estimate will rise sharply; on the contrary, information arising from 
such estimation techniques are projected toward the extern of the firm, with the aim of 
highlighting the business situation to investors so that the financial statement becomes the 
link between the company and the market.  
Nonetheless International Accounting Standards impact not only accounting methods 
through which develop financial statements but also banks’ organization and management. 
Financial statements drawn up and the recognition and measurement of financial instrument 
postulate a financial accounting approach that has to consider the interaction of different 
organizational functions and the conciliation of accounting and financial competences. Indeed 
IAS 39 provides for the use of analytic and financial valuation techniques that are generally 
adopted only for management purposes. 
In order to follows dispositions set out by IAS 39, banks have to develop innovated 
processes concerning risks measurement, management and control that are all prerequisites 
for the evaluation of financial instruments. As an example, the method of discounted cash 
flow is associated with high degree of subjectivity in both, the estimation of cash flows and 
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the choice of the discounting rate, which should reflect the degree of risk. Difficulties linked 
with the adoption of such method for the estimation of reliable fair value cannot be 
overlooked, as well as the fact that this method requires that accountant utilize values arising 
from algorithms and techniques developed in Risk management and Finance areas. It is for 
this reason that IAS 39 does not impact only accounting procedures; its effects are relevant 
for the whole organization with a particular focus on the cooperation among different 
business areas (Risk Management, Treasury, Finance, Administration)37.  
Risk Management assumes a predominant role also for the evaluation of banks’ 
receivables, as the amortized cost method cannot exclude considerations regarding the 
riskiness of each position as well as the procedures for their segmentation. Moreover, 
evaluation techniques developed by IAS 39 have also consequences on banks’ commercial 
strategies that have to consider the assessment of the impairment. These consequences 
includes also new types of customers clustering through strategic positioning actions and the 
redefinition of pricing strategies capable to consider the degree of risk assumed by the bank38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
37 Paolucci and Menicucci, 2008, p. 111. 
38 Paolucci and Menicucci, 2008, p. 147. 
  
 
 
 
 
  39 
 
Chapter II  
Value Relevance Literature 
 
 
The last goal of this study is to assess whether banks’ market-to-book ratios and stocks 
returns follow the trend of some Financial Statements information. The argument is largely 
discussed in the academic literature where an accounting measure that has a significant 
relation with share price is defined as value relevant.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: the first paragraph focuses on authors that clarify, 
criticize and discuss about the “relevance” of value relevance literature. The second paragraph 
is the review of studies that concentrate on the banking sector. The peculiarity of these 
researches is that they focus on one single issue over time, trying to provide evidence of the 
value relevance of: fair value estimate, capital structure, diversification, rating changes and 
IFRS adoption. On the contrary, the last paragraph contains articles in which banks’ Market-
to-Book ratio and banks’ stocks returns are regressed with different financial statement items.  
2.1. Relevance of Value Relevance studies 
Even before the adoption of the terms “value relevance” many studies, in finance, try to 
understand the impact of some financial statements information on firms’ market value. The 
literature is so wide that some authors39 extend it until Modigliani and Miller researches. In 
this paragraph there is a review of the studies that present, define and criticize the concept of 
value relevance. 
Francis and Shipper (1999) try to answer the question whether financial statements are 
loosing their value relevance, taking into account the period 1952-94. Decrease in financial 
statements value relevance should infer that balance sheets information are not able to explain 
equity market values anymore. They find that while returns of trading strategies based on the 
trend of earnings decreased over time, this is not the case for trading strategies based on book 
values of assets and liabilities.  
                                                
39 See page 41 about Barth, Beaver and Lendsman (2001) study. 
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The issue has been brought to light also by the works of other authors mentioned by 
Francis and Shipper (1999)40: In 1996, Amir and Lev in their article about the value-relevance 
of nonfinancial information in the wireless communications industry, suggested that, to 
improve balance sheet informative content, the disclosure of some value relevant variables 
should be reported and that there should be a change in the income measurement and in the 
asset valuation. In 1997 Collins, Maydew and Weiss achieved similar findings of Francis and 
Shipper (1999) concluding that are due to the increased importance of unreported intangible 
assets and reported losses. In 1999, Lev and Zarowin highlighted the needs for financial 
statements to reflect the change in business environment.  
In their work, Francis and Shipper (1999) give four interpretation of value relevance: (i) 
The first considers that financial statements information capture the intrinsic share values, that 
is the value where stock prices tend to converge. In this context, value relevance attains the 
profits coming from “accounting-based” trading. (ii) In the second interpretation, all the 
financial information that are used in valuation models are defined “value relevant”. (iii) In 
the third, the attribution of value relevance is subject to the presence of a statistical 
association between balance sheet information and prices/returns taking into account whether 
the information is used by investors or not. Value relevance attains “the ability of the financial 
information of changing the total mix of information in the market place” (Francis and 
Shipper, 1999, p. 325). In the last interpretation, (iv) the statistical association refers to the 
correlation between accounting information and information used by investors. A value 
relevant information is the one that is capable to concentrate information that affects market 
values.  
One of the criticisms that have been addressed to value relevance studies is the one of 
Holthausen and Watts (2001). The authors argue that value relevance studies have restricted 
influence for standard settings and, in absence of a specific theory that describes the empirical 
associations, these kinds of researches cannot be useful and remain only mere associations. 
The object of the analysis of Holthausen and Watts is then to critically evaluate the standard-
setting inferences that various authors have intended to provide. An interesting point of the 
paper is the classification of the value relevance studies in three different categories: (i) 
“Relative association studies”, in which the market value is associated with alternative 
bottom-lines accounting measures. In these studies, the variable of the regression with the 
greatest R2 is described as the more value relevant. (ii) “Incremental association studies” test 
                                                
40 For further information about Amir and Lev (1996); Collins, Maydew and Wess (1997) and Lev and 
Zarowin (1999) see Francis and Shipper 1999, p. 323. 
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if additional accounting variables could be value relevant in explaining market value. (iii) 
“Marginal information content studies” analyse the supplementary information provided to 
investors by the use of an accounting measure. Holthausen and Watts (2001) consider fifty-
four studies in which authors explicitly indicate that results have implications for standard 
settings. The majority of these studies are relative or incremental association (the 94 percent 
of the sample; against the 11 percent of  “information content studies”).  
The accounting theories used in value-relevance studies have been connected to “direct 
valuation” theory and “inputs-to-equity valuation” theory (Holthausen and Watts 2001, 
p.11). The first consider earnings or book values of equity as measures associated with equity 
market values. The latter is aimed to provide information on plausible inputs of a valuation 
models. Authors define three different valuation models: (i) balance sheet model, in which 
market value of equity equals market value of assets less market value of liabilities; (iii) 
earnings model, that link earnings to future cash flows; (iii) Olshon model, developed by 
Olshon (1995), that defines the market value as a linear function of the book value of equity 
and the current value of any extra-profit, “abnormal earning”.  
 Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue that the impediment in these theories is their lack to 
explain accounting and standard setting. The authors show how neither the direct valuation of 
equity nor the inputs to equity valuation are really able to provide such explanation, 
concluding that valuation literature cannot be used to derive standard setting implications. 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) reply to Holthausen and Watts showing the 
pertinence of the value relevance studies for accounting standard setting. In their reply, also 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman define the value relevance as an association – correlation – 
between accounting measures and market value. The writers specify that even Modigliani and 
Miller in 1961 have conducted this kind of analysis even without an explicit reference to the 
two terms.41   
The fact that value-relevance attains the ability of an accounting amount to reflect 
relevant information for investors, does not mean that it will be also decision relevant: In 
order to be decision relevant, a value relevant amount must be the last available information. 
If a more timely one replaces it, then the accounting information could be considered as value 
relevant but not as decision relevant (Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001). The question has 
been already discussed by Francis and Shipper (1999, p.324): 
 “Other concerns expressed about, and recommendations for changing, financial reporting seem 
to address the issue of when information is reported, specifically the timeliness of financial 
                                                
41 For further information about Modigliani and Miller see Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001, p.79. 
  42 
reporting and the extent to which competing information pre-empts financial statement 
information.” 
Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) suggest that this point can be solved: (i) by 
changing what is reported without variation in the frequency of reports; (ii) by increasing the 
frequency of reporting; (iii) by requiring restated financial statement or forecasted financial 
statements in order to maintain unchanged the frequency and the object of what is reported. 
Another interesting aspect point out is a specific distinction of the two approaches 
through which studies proceed. Researches can be developed in terms of level of firm value or 
in terms of changes in share prices (returns).  The first, that are also the most used, explains 
cross-sectional variations in share prices. Miller and Modigliani, 1966 and Ohlson, 199542 are 
some of the authors that have been mentioned by Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) and 
that develop this kind of analysis. The two valuation models approach different but related 
questions: the first intend to determine what is reflected in the share price while the latter 
what is reflected in stock returns over a specific period of times. Different inferences and 
conclusions arise from the two approaches and it is therefore crucial to promptly recognize 
which question the author intends to answer in order to avoid incorrect inferences.  
Among other conclusions of their work, Barth, Beaver and Landsman explain that 
contrary to Holthausen and Watts (2001)’s declarations, value relevance studies are designed 
to explain stock market value rather than firms’ value. They end the work arguing that, given 
the complexity of financial markets, that increase over time, “it is a challenge for accounting 
research to make a substantive contribution in addressing questions relevant to standard 
setting” (Barth, Beaver and Landsman 2001, p.99).  
Globalization of financial markets and the increase in international investments are the 
two drivers described also by Anandarajan et al. (2011) to explain the expansion of value-
relevance literature. Studies examine the association between market value (or returns) and 
income, firm assets and liabilities. Conclusions of these studies arise from: explanatory power 
of the models; significance of the regression coefficients; test of market adjusted stock 
returns. Authors observe that one of the restrictions of these studies comes from their samples 
that, often, gather entities of different industries, which have different characteristics. Given 
these dissimilarities, in their point of view, it is difficult to provide correct results and 
inferences on value relevance studies. For the same reason, in the proceeds of their work, they 
concentrate on one single industry: banking. 
                                                
42 For further information, see Barth, Beaver and Landsman, 2001, p. 95.  
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2.2. Value Relevance in Banking 
Banks prominent role on international economics development and the increasing 
consolidation of the sector make banking value relevance studies particularly interesting. 
Nevertheless, banks financial statements are less transparent than those of industrial firms and 
international regulations as Basle Accords, harmonize them only partially: Cross-country 
differences in the definition of some financial statement elements still remain and, for this 
reason, studies on banking sector are mainly domestic ones43. Most of the studies, if not 
differently specified, refer to United States banking system. Nevertheless, for the international 
context, Anadarajan et al. (2011) provide evidence of the effect on value relevance of some 
measures that account for: mandatory disclosure; corporate, legal, economic and financial 
environment; differences in accounting measurement practice; bank regulatory environment; 
Banks’ size; relative risk, non traditional activity and multinational status. A first step of the 
analysis is constituted by the regressions of book value, earnings and the combination of both 
on market value. Then, authors use the coefficients obtained in the first step as proxy 
variables for value relevance in the regression investigating the importance of the over 
mentioned country-level and bank-level measures. As results, they obtain evidence of the 
explanatory power of earnings in market-based economies with a common low background 
and in British/American clusters; the contrary holds for book value. Anandarajan et al (2001) 
also find that value relevance is affected by transparency coming form disclosure 
requirements: the higher they are, the more significant is value relevance. Private sector 
oriented environment and a shareholders friendly legal environment also increase value 
relevance and, for all these reasons, authors conclude that British American banks are more 
value relevant. 
The rest of the paragraph is composed of four sections through which studies are 
classified: First, an overview of the value-relevance of fair value estimate. Second section 
concern studies about the role of the banks’ capital structure. Third section attains literature 
regarding banks’ business model and product diversification. Lastly, there are the studies on 
the effects of rating changes and IFRS adoption. 
2.2.1. Value-Relevance of Fair Value 
Banks’ financial statements differ from industrial firms’ ones because they are mostly 
composed of financial instruments such as loans, securities and OTC derivatives. This 
peculiarity force banks to continuously recognize and measure risks associated whit those 
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exposures. Moreover, International accounting standards44 provide for the adoption of fair 
value method, rather than the historical cost. The easiest way to obtain the fair market value 
of a financial instrument is to observe the price with which it could be exchanged in a 
secondary market. Anyway, if such markets are not available for financial instruments, the 
estimation of their fair value can rely only on internal “asset-pricing model” (Resti and Sironi, 
2007, p.278).  
Financial instrument’s fair value literature investigates the value relevance of such 
estimations.  
Investments Securities 
Barth (1994) studies the correlation between fair values of banks’ investment securities 
and fair value of securities gains and losses with share prices. In particular, the author 
compares these results with the results of the correlation that considers historical costs rather 
than market fair values. The analysis intend to provide an alternative view to the critics for 
which investment decisions should not be taken considering fair value estimations given the 
low reliability of this method. For what regard investment securities, results confirm the thesis 
and fair value estimates have more explanatory power than historical costs. This is not true for 
securities gains and losses and their fair value cannot be considered value relevant because of 
two reasons: (i) estimating errors are too large for gains and losses; (ii) The problem of 
correlated omitted variables (such as unrecognized gain and losses of other assets and 
liabilities). The latter problem is the same faced by Nelson (1996) in the relevance analysis of 
fair value estimates of financial instruments in the valuation of the market value of banks’ 
common equity. The model, which refers to 1992 and 1993 US banks’ data, differs form other 
studies because the author considers the changes in the differences between fair value (market 
value) and book value. However, results do not confirm the value relevance of fair value 
estimate. In the conclusions, Nelson explains that the value relevance of investment securities 
proved in other prior studies (Barth, 1994; Petroni and Wahlen, 199545) comes from the 
omission of proxies that control for future profitability.  
Contrary to Nelson (1996), results of the work of Eccher, Rames and Thiagarajan 
(1996) are consistent with Barth (1994). Considering fair value disclosures of investment 
securities for the same time period, they find that the regressions of market-to-book ratios on 
the differences between fair value and book values are value-relevant. They also test the 
incremental value-relevance by comparing historical cost variables and fair value ones with a 
                                                
44 Chapter 1, paragraph 1.2.1, page 28.  
45 For further information, see Nelson (1996). 
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benchmark model; results suggest that historical cost variables provide more value-relevant 
information. 
Off balance-sheet items – Derivative Instruments 
Negative results of value relevance test for securities gain and losses in Barth (1994) 
have been justified by the possibility that other correlated and omitted variables could offset 
them. Barth states that among these omitted variables there could be off-balance sheet items. 
Different researches try to solve this problem by controlling explicitly for the effect of these 
items. Nelson (1996) includes in the empirical model that study the relation between market 
value and book value of banks’ common equity with fair value estimate of financial 
instrument, also a variable that account for the net fair value of off-balance sheet items. A first 
concern comes from the definition of the sample and the analysis of available data. As author 
explains, the poor quality of disclosures of such instruments forces her to assume the most 
likely interpretation of data but, in this way, measurement errors cannot be excluded46. 
Moreover, results show that off-balance sheet items fair value estimates are not value 
relevant. This finding is partially in line with the one of Eccher et al. (1996). They distinguish 
two different kind of off-balance sheet instrument: (i) credit-related instrument and (ii) market 
related instrument. If the first ones have the same measurement and disclosure problems 
reported by Nelson (1996), the latters are considered by the authors “free from ambiguities” 
and are for this reason included in their empirical model. Results suggest that off-balance 
sheet fair values are value relevant only in limited settings.  
Negative results relative to fair value estimate of off-balance sheet items have been 
founded also by Barth, Beaver and Landsman (1996). Fair value estimates appear to have 
opposite signs on firm values rather than the predicted ones. Moreover they appear to be 
statistically insignificant. Differently to all these studies that do not find value relevance of 
off-balance sheet derivatives, Venkatachalam (1996), after the adoption of the Statements of 
Financial Accounting Standards No 119  “Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments 
and Fair Value of Derivative Instruments”, studies the effect of the new regulation on the 
value relevance of Derivative Instruments in equity valuation. Accordingly to other authors 
(Nelson, 1996 and Eccher et al., 1996), Venkatachalam blames the ambiguity of the fair value 
disclosures under SFAS 107 on the insignificance of the results obtained in previous works. 
He argues that the SFAS 119 aims to improve transparency by imposing banks: (i) to identify 
the purpose for which derivative instruments are used (trading, hedging, others); (ii) to 
                                                
46 In order to preserve the reliability of the work, Nelson re-estimates all the regressions excluding off-
balance sheet variable. For further info, see Nelson, 1996, p.167. 
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indicate whether the derivatives represent a net asset or a net liability position; (iii) to provide 
disaggregated information for fair value and contractual amounts of derivatives. The author 
explains that these additional requirements should allow researcher to study more accurately 
the value-relevance of fair value of derivatives instruments in equity valuation so, in order to 
test this hypothesis, he performs a cross-sectional analysis. Positive regression coefficients, in 
contrast with prior studies, provide evidence of the usefulness of derivatives fair value for 
valuation purposes.  
A possible restriction to the work of Venkatachalam is highlighted by Ahmed, Kilic, 
and Lobo (2006), whom argue that the author, by aggregating disclosed and recognized 
derivative financial instrument, imposed also to their coefficients to be the same, limiting in 
this way the reliability of the model. Using a cross-sectional valuation model, they provide 
evidence of the value-relevance differences of disclosed and recognized derivative 
instruments, suggesting authors to consider also the problem of possible different pricing 
implications for disclosed and recognized derivative instrument. 
Loans 
Lending is one of the inherent activities of a commercial bank and, for this reason, loans 
portfolios constitute their largest portion of investments. Loans are recognized at the 
disbursement date at their Fair Value while they are measured at the amortized cost (in the 
case of long terms loans)47. In particular, loans are assessed to identify if there is evidence of 
possible impairments. As a rule, every credit is valued in order to assess if it constitutes a 
“Performing” or a “Non Performing” loan. In order to estimate the percentage of loss, the first 
are subject to collective credit risk measurement while the latter are individually measured to 
determine the credit adjustment. These adjustments – both individual and collective – are 
recorded in the Income Statements as allowances and contribute to form a loan loss reserve in 
the bank’s balance sheet.  
Lancaster, Hatfield and Anderson (1993) study the market reactions after the 
announcement of an increase in loan loss reserves. Through the analysis of 18 U.S. banks 
between 1980 and 1986, the authors find that investors negatively assimilate the news of such 
increase and stock prices tend to decrease. Furthermore, the positive effect of an increase in 
cash flows due to tax saving seems not enough to counterbalance the negative one. This 
finding is recognized by Lancaster, Hatfield and Anderson (1993) as a proof that investors 
interpret higher loan loss reserves as a “managerial signal” of: an increase in banks’ loans 
                                                
47 The focus is on long-term loans that are measured at amortized cost. Other kinds of loans are 
measured at historical cost. For more information see Chapter 1, par. 1.2.1, p. 28. 
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portfolio riskiness; or a change in supervisory policy. In contrast with this research, Whalen 
(1994) tests the information provided to investors by changes in Non Performing Loans, Loan 
loss provision and loans charge-off. The first and the latter give information about future 
loans losses and are for this reason negatively related with future cash flow, stock returns and 
earnings. On the other hand, authors find that, after having considered Non Performing Loans 
and Loans charge-off changes, an increase in loan loss provision is considered as “good 
news” rather than negative ones. Whalen (1994) describes this result as in line with prior 
studies on signalling literature (Akerlof, 1970; Spence, 1973; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 
1981)48. Finally, the author suggests that his study contributes to the value-relevance debate, 
having provided evidence of the informational content of balance sheet and footnote 
disclosures. 
Nelson (1996) and Eccher et al. (1996), in their studies about fair value relevance of 
financial instruments, also consider fair value of loans. As previously discussed for other 
instruments, Nelson (1996) finds that loans fair value estimates are not incrementally value 
relevant while even if Eccher et al. (1996) find that net loans fair value estimate are value 
relevant both in their full-sample and in some sub-sample regressions, they also find that 
historical cost variables provide a more value relevant information. Conversely, results of 
Barth et al. (1996) attribute value relevance to the fair value disclosure of loans in particular 
when are included information about: (i) interest sensitivity of loans and (ii) bank’s financial 
health. Khurana and Kim (2003) argue that, in the case of loans, historical costs are more 
informative than fair value estimates because, since loans are not actively traded, their fair 
value comes from subjective assumptions and valuations method. For this purpose, Nissim 
(2003) studies the reliability of loan fair values, testing for the existence of some factors that 
could induce management to overstate them in order to positively affect market value. These 
factors are recognized by the author as: (i) small loan portfolio; (ii) low regulatory capital, 
asset growth and liquidity; and (iii) deterioration in the credit quality (Nissim, 2003, p.374). 
Accordingly, Huizinga and Laeven (2012) find that distressed banks take advantage of 
managerial discretion over loan loss provisioning in the attempt to increase their book value, 
which enable them to meet regulatory capital requirements.  
Differently from all other mentioned studies, Drago, Mazzucca and Trinca Colonel 
(2013) consider European banks in the analysis of the value relevance of loans fair values. 
The authors adopt a “price-levels” regression to study the relation between stock price and 
different accounting variables. In particular, one of these accounting variables checks the 
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difference between book value of loans and their fair value. Results show the incremental 
explanatory power of fair value estimates in relation to loan book values and are a proof of 
the value relevance of such estimations. As a consequence, Drago, Mazzucca and Trinca 
Colonel argue that findings of their study have important implications for banks, regulators 
and standard setters. First of all because bank managers should consider that investors react to 
fair value estimate of loans even if they are illiquid assets. Historical cost method does not 
seem the better alternative to evaluate loans and, for this reason, authors suggest to regulators 
and standard setters to look for different evaluation criteria. 
2.2.2. Banks’ capital structure 
Banks are exacerbated by different kind of risks: in addition to credit risk, bankers have 
to cope liquidity, market and operational risks and, therefore, their management is one of the 
fundamental activities of a bank. If it is true that the more risks banks assume the higher will 
be risk-premiums and so profits, it is also true that this peculiarity could lead to various 
adverse selection problems that, at last, could drive the bank to liquidity and solvency crisis. 
As a matter of facts, this is what happened in the recent banking crisis: the biggest U.S. banks, 
conscious to be “too big to fail”, continue to increase their leverage for years, until the end 
with its consequences49. Aside from moral hazard, it is capital the primary safeguard for a 
bank: it allows bankers to run their business with an adequate level of autonomy and, most 
importantly, without compromising bank’s stability. Given this predominant role, both 
regulators and researcher have always paid attention on bank’s capital: The first establishing 
stricter and stricter international capital requirements50; the second studying the impact of 
such requirement on banks’ stocks market price, banks’ value, profitability. 
Cantor and Johnson (1993) analyse market reactions to capital ratio improvement for 
U.S. banking holding companies between 1990 and 1992. The capital ratio considered is 
made of the total capital (tier 1 and tier 2 capital) over the risk weighted assets. As authors 
underline, the improvement in capital ratio are associated with an improvement in the 
leverage ratio that diminish as soon as capital increase. These changes have a positive impact 
on stock market value that is greater, the lower the initial capitalization. In detail, while well-
                                                
49 For which regard the largest financial firms: Bear Stearns was bought by JP Morgan with U.S. 
government assistance; Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac were put into conservatorship; Lehman Brothers 
failed; Merill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley lost market confidence. (U.S. Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Commission, 2011, p.23.) 
50See Chapter I, paragraph 1.1.2, page 20. 
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capitalized institutions’ prices react more to increase in capital rather than to assets reduction, 
this difference is not accounted for less capitalized institutions.  
The question of how capital affects bank’s value has been developed only during ‘90s 
and has been reviewed by Mehran and Thakor (2011) that, in their study, select two 
diametrically opposite theories51: The first has been proposed by Miller (1995) and considers 
capital structure as value irrelevant while the second is the one of Diamond and Rajan (2001) 
that suggest that capital negatively affect banks value. Between these two points, Mehran and 
Thakor (2011) try to answer the question in an acquisition context. They develop a model to 
understand how bank capital and value are related in a cross-section analysis. According to 
the authors, capital has both costs and benefits. The first are related to adverse selection and 
agency problems while benefits are due to: (i) high probability of survival for the bank that 
invests more time in monitoring loans (direct benefit) and (ii) enhanced value of the loan 
portfolio, due to the increased monitoring (indirect benefit). Given these effects, banks 
optimally choose their level of capital. Banks’ acquisitions data give empirical support to the 
model that predicts a positive relation between capital and banks’ value.  
Altunbas, Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez (2012) in their study related to the role of 
bank’s business model during Great Recession, assess the presence of a negative relation 
between bank capital and risk of distress during financial crisis: “high level of Tier 1 capital 
ex-ante the crisis generally decreases the likelihood of bank distress during crisis” (Altunbas, 
Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez 2012, p. 30).  
The positive relation between capital and probability of survival is the core of the 
analysis of Berger and Bouwman (2013). In their paper they examine how capital affects 
bank’s performance that are accounted in terms of probability of survival and market share 
(bank’s share of aggregate total assets52). The analysis is conducted on U.S. banks’ data from 
1984 to 2010 considering: (i) different types of financial crisis (individually and has a whole) 
and (ii) normal times. Moreover, given bank’s dimension, authors divide them in three 
different clusters: small, medium and large banks. Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that: 
first, small banks with high pre-crisis capital have more probability of survival to any 
financial crisis and in normal times as well. Differently for medium and large banks, having a 
high pre-crisis capital helps to increase probability of survival only in case of banking crisis. 
Second, pre-crisis capital also influences banks’ exit:  high capitalized banks are improbable 
                                                
51 For further information about Miller (1995) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), see Mehran and 
Thakor, 2011, p. 1021. 
52 Berger and Bouwman, 2013, p. 148 
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to exit with a government-assisted M&A. Lastly, higher pre-crisis capital increases bank’s 
market share: in any financial crisis and in normal times for small banks; in case of banking 
crisis for medium and large banks.  
The latest banking and financial crisis, with the failure of high leveraged banks, and the 
Basel III accord, that requires banks to detain capital of higher quality, reopen the question of 
the impact of capital structure on banks’ profitability: critics argue that by imposing banks to 
detain high level of capital, regulators could undermine banks’ profits. De Bandt et al. (2014) 
address the question looking for a significant relation between capitalization and ROE.  The 
authors study 17 of the largest French banks over the period 1993-2012 and find that the two 
measures are positively correlated: an increase in capital lead to an increase in ROE. 
Moreover, de Bandt et al. (2014) explain that the effect on ROE is independent from the level 
of capital requirement constraints and from the method through which banks increase 
capitalization.  
2.2.3. Diversification  
In banking, as well as in any other industry, customers’ preferences change over time, 
following the continuous development of new technologies and IT systems. Bank’s customers 
ask more and more online services that allow them to send and receive payments, trade on 
capital markets and so on. As Hefferman (2005, p.99) declares, in order to survive, banks 
have to consider these changes as opportunities rather than threats, evolving themselves, 
together with customers preferences and new technologies and maintaining, in this way, their 
competitive advantage. As a matter of fact, even if some small banks still remain focused on 
their core traditional business, the most of banks offer a wide range of services from the 
traditional ones (lending and deposits) to the more diversified non-bank financial services 
(unit trusts/mutual funds, stockbroking, insurance, pension fund or asset management, and 
real estate services). Not only, a lot of banks offer also off-balance sheet services (such as 
credit cards, letters of credit, the issue of securities, fund management, advise activity on 
derivatives and securitization) which generate profits, in the form of fees, without appearing 
in banks’ balance sheets.53  
Given the magnitude of these changes, with the increased diversification of products 
offered, researchers start to investigate their impact on bank’s value and risks. Among others, 
Stiroh (2006) conducts a portfolio analysis to evaluate how non-interest income affects equity 
market measures of risk (in terms of volatility and bank’s market beta) and returns. The 
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author collects and empirically studies United States banks’ data from 1997 to 2004 finding 
that volatility of returns and bank’s market beta have a significant and positive relation with 
non-interest income while, at the same time, this positive and statistically significant relation 
is absent for average returns. Stiroh (2006, p.1359) suggests that this combination is the result 
of internal agency problems or managerial incentives to expand newly business line that 
overexposed banks to activities that generate non-interest income.  
Similar conclusions are the ones of Laeven and Lavin (2007) that conduct a study to 
assess whether a bank’s range of activities has an impact on its market value. As authors 
explain, prior literature identified costs and benefits linked to diversification: if it could allow 
a bank to achieve economies of scope; diversification could also amplify agency problems. 
Depending on which of the two alternatives will prevail, there could be an increase or a 
discount in bank’s market valuation. To test this issue, Laeven and Lavin (2007) collect data 
of 43 countries between 1998 and 2002 finding that market values are lower for banks that 
have high diversification in their activities identifying a diversification discount in their 
valuation. Although authors cannot infer a causality link between agency problems and 
diversification discount, they conclude that economies of scope are not sufficiently large to 
counterbalance costs of diversification.  
Contrary to Stiroh (2006) and Laeven and Lavin (2007)’s inferences, Baele, de Jonghe 
and Vander Vennet (2007), in the attempt to assess the presence of a comparative advantage 
for diversified banks, find a positive relation between the degree of diversification and stock 
market value. They compute a panel study of listed European banks during the period 1989-
2004, obtaining evidence that the market seems to anticipate future bank profits arising from 
diversification. In their opinion, on average, benefits coming from diversification should be 
higher than agency costs and, as authors argue, this is in contrast with previous finding.  
Others lines of studies try to attempt the degree of risk generated by diversification. 
Lepetit et al. (2008) concentrate on European banking system between 1996 and 2002 to 
check whether there is a relation between bank risk and product diversification. Activities are 
divided in traditional and non-traditional based on the fact that they generate interest or non-
interest income. Results point out that higher lever of risk are linked with banks that have 
more non-interest income activities in their balance sheet and this is true, above all, for small 
banks. A further analysis is conducted by dividing non-interest income into: fee and 
commission and trading income. While for the first it is confirmed the positive correlation 
with risk, it is not the case of the latter: trading activities seem to decrease risk for smaller 
banks. 
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Altunbas, Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez (2012) analyse the role of business model on 
bank’s risk, taking as natural experiment the financial crisis. Results explain that, especially 
for riskier banks, customer deposits reduce bank distress during financial crisis while, on the 
contrary, market funding increases the likelihood of distress. Authors also show that some 
banks achieved large market-to-book prior to the crisis because of systematic risk rather than 
for managerial ability. In their work, Altunbas, Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez (2012) 
highlight that bank’s business model described in terms of bank size, undercapitalization, 
degree of credit expansion and bank funding structure have implemented the financial crisis 
and that this supports prudential regulatory initiatives of Basel III.  
Finally, also Bonaccorsi di Patti, Felici and Signoretti (2016), in an empirical analysis 
of Euro Area Significant banks, find that bank’s main business influences their profitability. 
The Single Supervisory Mechanism Framework designates the European Central Bank54 to 
supervise directly 123 banks which are defined as “Significant” on the base of: their bank 
size, their importance for a specific country or for the EU as a whole; their cross-border 
activities. In their work authors provide a simple approach to classify these banks into eight 
clusters on the base of their business model. The first two subsets of banks are Network banks 
and Public Development Banks then banks are classified on a combination of their core 
business (lending rather than diversified banks) together with banks’ size and degree of 
internationalization. Among others findings55 they evidence that, before the financial crisis, 
lending banks have higher profits than high-diversified institutions. Moreover, although 
authors specify that this result requires further investigations, analysing the evolution of 
profits through years, they highlight the presence of an high sensitivity to macroeconomic 
condition (i.e. GDP growth), that is higher for lending banks rather then for diversified ones.  
2.2.4. Other issues  
Two different lines of studies refer to the development and transmission of information. 
The first, attain the role of Rating assigned to banks by Credit Rating Agencies. Although 
these agencies are often criticized for scarce transparency, their opinions still have a 
prominent role in financial markets. The second line analyses the value relevance of the IFRS 
adoption that particularly influences banks’ financial statements.  
                                                
54 Before the introduction of the SSM, National Competent Authorities were charged of the bank’s 
supervision. After the introduction in November 2014, while the “significant banks” are directly 
supervised by the ECB, the others still remain under the supervision of the NCAs in cooperation with 
the ECB (Bonaccorsi di Patti, Felici and Signoretti, 2016). 
55 For further information, see Bonaccorsi di Patti, Felici and Signoretti, 2016. 
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Credit Ratings changes 
As explained by Schweitzer et al (1992), regulators carefully monitor and supervise 
banks in order to promptly recognize distressed institutions and avoid banks failure. Given the 
rigid regulatory requirement, also in terms of information supply, to which banks are subject, 
one can argue that changes in credit rating does not provide additional information to the ones 
already integrated in share prices. Schweitzer et al. (1992) study this hypothesis comparing it 
with the alternative that regulators have some information about distressed banks that do not 
disclose to the public in order to preserve a liquid market for their financial instruments. 
Empirical evidence from United States’ banking holding companies, produced by the authors, 
confirms this latter case: In particular, bond downgrades seems to provide market with 
valuable information that were not included in market prices yet. 
European banks are examined by Gropp and Richards (2001), which analyse abnormal 
return for market prices of both, stocks and bonds, controlling for the impact of expected and 
unexpected ratings changes. In detail, the research is on 32 European banks between 1989 and 
2000 considering also the reasons of ratings changes and whether the major agencies  
(Moody’s, Standard&Poor’s and Fitch/IBCA) agree on such decisions. Strong effects of 
rating changes are found for equity prices and more importantly, reasons of the changes seem 
to be relevant: if the downgrade is due to an increase in risk rather than to a deterioration of 
earnings, there will be an increase in returns. Ultimately authors confirm Schweitzer et al. 
(1992) findings: even in this analysis, rating agencies provide useful information that, 
otherwise, remains non-public. 
On the contrary, Bongini et al (2002) argue that credit rating agencies’ have “the lowest 
discriminatory power between sound and insolvent banks” in the empirical analysis of 
financial institutions of East Asian Countries considering the period 1996-1998. 
An analysis similar to Gropp and Richards (2001) is the one of Linciano (2004) that 
focus con the Italian banking system. He considers 299 ratings changes made by Moody’s, 
Standard&Poor’s and Fitch/IBCA during the period 1991-2003. Results show that when the 
reasons behind the rating changes are provided, the impact on share prices is stronger. The 
author does not deny the value of the information provided by rating changes but suggests 
that, in order to use the rating as informative instrument, rating agencies should be subject to 
stricter regulations. 
Value relevance of IFRS for banks  
In the attempt to harmonize different accounting processes, IFRSs affect different area 
of reporting: introducing extensive disclosure requirements, changing financial statements 
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presentation and how items are recognized and measured56. All these changes should increase 
transparency and accounting quality with the effect of a greater comparability of financial 
statements that, in turn, should allow the realization of a wider access to investment capital in 
the European Union. Value relevance studies analyse the correlation between financial 
information and market values therefore they are described by Agostino et al. (2011) as a 
good proxy for accounting quality. In their study, the authors test the value relevance of IFRS 
accounting measure to the market value, considering 221 European listed banks from 2000 to 
2006. In order to control for individual and country characteristics (legal and financial 
systems, tax and financial reporting alignment), they conduct a panel data regression clustered 
by countries. Results confirm that value relevance of earnings increased for the entire sample 
with the largest effects in Germany and Italy. Agostino et al. (2001) comment that it is 
consistent with the additional disclosures required by IFRS. On the contrary, authors do not 
find a significant influence of book value on stock price. Moreover, results differ between 
small and large banks and between rated and non-rated banks suggesting that there could be a 
problem of opaqueness that explains the low relevance of book value. Analysing also the 
legal form, Agostino et al. (2001) conclude that the introduction of IFRS improves the value 
relevance of earnings and book values for more transparent intermediaries (large, rated and 
public limited banks). 
2.3. Banks’ market values analyses 
Studies presented so far evidence the impact on bank’s measures of value of different 
bank’s characteristics focusing on one single issue per time. Another kind of studies aims to 
point out what is reflected on either changes in share prices or market-to-book ratios, trying to 
understand why they are so different across banks. Particularly, studies included in this 
paragraph consider different banks’ characteristics without single out one peculiar aspect.  
A first empirical study refers to the relation between bank’s stocks returns and some 
financial statements information that may affect bank risk. The study is conducted by Cooper, 
Jackson III and Patterson (2003) considering a sample of 213 US publicly traded banks 
holding companies in the period between June 1986 and December 1999. The authors regress 
quarterly banks’ stock returns with quarterly changes of financial statements variables. Some 
of these variables, namely earnings, noninterest income, loan loss reserve, leverage and 
standby letters of credit are correlated with future bank stock returns and provide useful 
indication on their forecast. On the contrary, book-to-market and bank size appear not 
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significant in forecasting the cross-section of bank stock returns. Finally, authors test whether 
the cross-sectional predictability is due to investors’ under/over reaction to changes in banks’ 
fundamental variables or to increase in bank’s risk. They conclude that in the case analysed 
investors under reactions prevail. 
Another research, developed in terms of level of firm value rather than in terms of share 
returns, is the one of Ming-Li and Liang (2005) that try to understand which are the drivers of 
value and the reasons of the differences between Book and Market values. In particular, 
authors intend to provide evidence to the work of Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000)57 for 
which non-financial indicators have an incremental explanatory power on the market-to-book 
ratio. Authors analyse 32 listed commercial banks in Taiwan collecting data from the first 
quarter of 1996 to the last quarter of 2002. Following the work of Trueman, Wong and Zhang 
(2000), they regress the Market-to-Book ratio to some income components: Gross Profits, 
Operating Expenditure (administrative & sales expenses) and Other operating Expenditure 
(depreciation, amortization and merger-related costs). Given that they intend to verify the 
incremental explanatory power of nonfinancial indicator, authors include, step-by-step, other 
three variables that account for bank’s bad debts, Non Performing Loans Ratio and an 
Efficiency score. As expected, coefficients of bad Debts and NPL Ratios are both statistically 
significant and negative, anyway, authors state that from the comparison of the model that add 
only the NPL Ratios and the one that include only the Bad debts, the explanatory power of the 
first is greater than the second. More over, the incremental information that both variables 
provide is less than expected, in the full sample. A further analysis is conducted dividing the 
sample in three segments: old public banks, old private banks58 and new private banks. 
Results suggest that Bad debts and NPL Ratios give more information about old private banks 
rather than public ones since that, for the first, estimated coefficients are more significant. 
Finally, the explanatory power of NPL Ratios is higher for new private banks rather than for 
other banks, and authors suggest that it could be due to investors’ concerns about the 
reliability of new private banks’ NPL ratios. 
                                                
57 Trueman, Wong and Zhang (2000) analyze the Internet stock market. They start from the Ohlson 
(1995) postulate that relates the Market value to Book value and residual Earnings and decompose 
the last in the difference between Gross Profits, Operating Expenses and Non Operating Expenses. 
Furthermore, authors assume Non Operating Expense equal to zero and include in the regression a 
variable that account for other financial and non financial information. For further information, see 
Ming-Li and Liang, 2005, p.90. 
58 A bank is classified as “old” if it has been created before 1992. Ming-li and Liang, 2005, p. 98. 
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 Following the work of Cooper, Jackson III and Patterson (2003), also Romagnoli 
(2007) regresses bank’s monthly stock returns with changes in financial ratios. The analysis 
contributes to the existing literature by analysing Italian listed banks from January 1997 to 
June 2007. Financial ratios, considered as annual percentage changes, describe five areas of 
the banking business: capitalization (Solvency ratio), business activity (Net Loans to Total 
Assets and Net Loans to Funding), credit quality (Loan Loss Reserve over Gross loans and 
NPL Allowances to Intermediation Margin), profitability (ROE, Recurring Earning Power, 
Dividends to Net Income, Net Interest Income over Earnings Assets and Cost to Income ratio) 
and liquidity (interbank assets to interbank liabilities). In order to derive conclusions, 
Romagnoli (2007) conducts three kind of analysis: first she confronts the average quintile 
returns, then there are univariate and multivariate regressions and, finally, the author adjusts 
the regressions of the previous step controlling for risk59. Overall results confirm that 
financial ratios impact on shares’ returns. In detail, the author finds that capitalization ratios 
are the only ones that do not seem to be correlated with shares’ returns. In accordance with 
authors that recognize the presence of a diversification discount60, Romagnoli (2007) also 
finds that an increase in traditional activity leads to greater stock returns and vice versa. 
Moreover, strong changes in NPL allowances have a negative impact, given the fact that 
investors interpret them as a signal of deterioration in loans portfolio. Higher profitability 
ratios are associated with higher stock returns except for the case of Net Interest Income to 
Earnings Assets and dividends policies. Finally higher returns seem also to follow an increase 
in liquidity ratio. In order to further corroborate her results, the author makes the same 
analysis considering two smaller time frames: from 1997 to 1999 and from 2000 to 2003. 
Findings do not differ from the previous ones; moreover Romagnoli (2007) argues that the 
effects are stronger in the latest period. To conclude her analysis, the author confronts Italian 
results with Cooper, Jackson III and Patterson (2003)’s US results. As she highlights, the 
main difference attains capitalizations ratio that in US have a strong, positive and statistically 
significant impact on market returns.  
Following the banking crisis started in 2007, the US Congress passed the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the attempt to restore confidence on the US banking system 
by increasing bank’s capital base. Jordan et al (2011) utilize a market-to-book value analysis 
to investigate results of the introduction of TARP program. Authors collect a total sample of 
                                                
59 For the purpose of risk controlling, the author uses the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Fama 
and French three factors model. Further info in Romagnoli 2007, p. 10.  
60 Supra, paragraph 2.2.3, page 50. 
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6604 quarterly observations of US banks (bank holding companies and savings banks). The 
sample contains TARP recipients banks (576) and non-TARP recipients banks (6028). In the 
analysis, authors regress the market to book value ratio as a function of interest income 
coming from Earing Assets; non-earning assets; additional non-interest income; Tier1 capital 
and a Cost X-Efficiency ratio. Moreover, they include some dummy variables to control for 
exogenous influences. These dummies are constructed to consider: whether a bank is part of a 
banking holding company; if it is a savings banks; whether it is located in metropolitan area; 
bank’s assets size; and, the quarterly periods considered61. Authors conduct two analyses, the 
first using a Fixed Effects Model and the second using a random-effects GLS panel regression 
in order to test for autocorrelation in the temporal effects. Results of these two analyses 
corroborate each other. Regarding the main purpose of the research, the effect of TARP funds 
on investors’ expectation of future profits, they find that TARP recipients banks shown a 
decrease in share prices as long as they maintain TARP funds. Similarly for banks that detain 
a lot of non-accrual assets. On the other hand, accordingly with previous studies, low relative 
costs and high interest income on earning assets, Tier 1 ratio and Non-interest income are 
correlated with high market-to-book value.  
The last study of this review tries to understand financial reasons behind the differences 
of market-to-book ratios in the Turkish banking sector. Macit and Topaloglu (2012) conduct 
this analysis, with data from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2014. The 
sample is composed of 16 publicly traded banks, the majority of which are commercial banks, 
followed by participation and investment banks. As other authors did, Macit and Topaloglu 
(2012) regress market-to-book ratio with: net loans to total assets, non performing loans ratio, 
equity to total assets, return on assets, non-interest income to interest income, assets size and 
loans to total deposits. The authors also include dummies that control for each bank 
characteristics such as whether it is a commercial, participation or an investment bank and 
whether it is public, private or foreign bank. Again, results confirm initial hypothesis and the 
work of previous researchers. The market rewards commercial banks that are public and 
foreign. The strongest positive impact follows an increase in return on assets. Capital 
adequacy is also perceived as a positive indicator. A negative influence is given by bank size 
and non-performing loans ratio. Finally, accordingly with the findings of Jordan et al. (2011), 
they confirm that the higher is non-interest income the higher will be market-to-book value.  
                                                
61 Jordan et al. 2011, p. 2051. 
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Chapter III  
Banks’ Market-to-Book Value: Analysis for the Euro Area 
 
 
Academic literature proposed in the previous chapter provides evidence of the relevance 
of some financial statements measures on investors’ decisions. Although the argument is not 
free from criticisms, many authors describe the impact that certain financial amounts have on 
market value. Most of all, the latest studies focus on the banking sector for two main reasons: 
first, considering its prominent role on international economics development and the 
increasing consolidation of the sector; second, because the greatest portion of assets in banks’ 
balance sheet are valued at market value. The latter, in particular, is the driver of studies on 
the value relevance of fair value estimates. Other studies reported focus on banks’ capital 
structure and diversification as well as on the impact of rating changes and IFRS adoption.  
The work presented in this chapter is an attempt to enhance the existing literature 
especially for which regards studies that aim to assess the presence of a correlation between 
banks’ Market-to-Book ratio and different financial and accounting ratios (Ming-Li and 
Liang, 2005; Jordan et al., 2011; Macit and Topaloglu, 2012)62. This empirical research 
focuses on the Euro Area banking system, considering the period between 2006 and 2014. It 
should be particularly interesting to verify if and in which measure the value of a bank, 
measured by the Market-to-Book ratio, follows the trend of some bank’s characteristics, such 
as profitability, efficiency, riskiness, business activity and capital adequacy. 
The first paragraph describes the procedures followed in building up the sample and its 
peculiarities; financial ratios included in the model and the econometric methods used to 
develop the analysis. The second paragraph focuses first of all on Fixed Effects regression 
findings and it concludes with some heteroskedasticity controls. 
3.1. Data and methods 
The analysis considers commercial and cooperatives banks63 registered in the Euro Area 
and for which financial data are available for the period between 2006 and 2014. 
                                                
62 See Chapter 2, paragraph 2.3, page 54. 
63 Data have been exported also for “savings” banks however they have been excluded from the 
sample because of financial information shortage. 
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3.1.1. A well-balanced sample 
Financial Statements data have been exported from Bureau Van Dijk - Bankscope, a 
database that gives access to detailed financials in universal format so as to compare banks 
globally. The database contains not only banks’ financial statements but also a wide range of 
other information including ratings, bank structures, news, M&A details, country risk etc. It 
has information on over 32 thousands public and private banks from all over the world with 
financial statements available for up to 16 years.  
The first, rough, selection has been made through the search format, imposing the 
database to consider only banks that are (i) Registered in the Euro Area; (ii) Active; (iii) 
Commercial, Cooperative or Savings; and (iv) Listed. The result is a list of about ninety-one 
banks; for each of these the database creates, and allows users to export, a report containing 
all the available information. Moreover, the final user can personalize these reports selecting 
all the information that will be displayed. To the purpose of this work, the report of each bank 
is composed of: bank’s overview, financial information (detailed balance sheet and income 
statements, financial ratios) and market information. Although the pattern of the report is the 
same for every bank in the list, differences still remain with regard to the time-horizon. 
Specifically, there could be one bank with ten years of financial info and others with only five 
years and this is the most important issue to address in order to obtain a balanced sample.  
Another complexity regards market information. Even if these data have been included 
in Bankscope’s reports, they are fragmentary for almost all the banks. For this reason, 
numbers of shares and year-end market prices have been exported from Thomson Reuters - 
DataStream. This database is specialized on data of equities, stock market indices, currencies, 
company fundamentals and economic indicators for 175 countries. Equities data are available 
in DataStream from the Initial Public Offering date and are updated every day. This means 
that, again, the time horizon is different for every bank, considering that every one: (i) has a 
different IPO date; (ii) could be delisted/suspended from transaction. 
The nine years composing the time frame come from the comparison of: 
i. The first year for which Financial and Market information are available for the 
majority of banks: 2006; 
ii. The last year of Financial data availability: 2014. 
After having determined the time-horizon of the analysis, other three controls have been 
adopted. The first check regards the presence of all the necessary variables. As a matter of 
fact, even if banks' Financial Statements are provided from 2006 to 2014, this does not mean 
that all the required variables are available for the entire period.  
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The second attains the presence of negative values in: (i) banks’ equity book value; and 
in (ii) banks’ net income. These two issues reflect the peculiarity of the years considered: the 
banking crisis started in the United States in 2007 reached also the Euro Area banking 
systems, additionally, it was exacerbated by the Eurozone Sovereign Debt crisis, with high 
concern especially for Greece insolvency status that threatened the stability of the entire Euro 
Area economy. The sharpening of the crisis and the increase of banks’ regulation decreased 
both banks’ equity and profits. 
Two different approaches have been implemented to solve these issues. First, banks 
with negative book value have been excluded from the sample. They are four banks64 for 
which it seems more appropriate a different analysis on a gone concern basis. Differently, 
banks with negative profits are maintained considering that: (i) it is a common element that 
affects approximately half of the sample; (ii) it occurs mainly during financial crisis years. In 
order to exclude biases in the results of the analysis, negative profits are considered equal to 
zero. This could be considered a strong simplifying hypothesis; in fact, a bank with huge 
losses could not be considered equal to a bank with zero profits; anyway, although this 
constitutes a limit of the work, it could be reasonably accepted, as the aim is to study the 
correlation between positive profits and banks’ market-to-book ratios. Hence, in order to infer 
the nexus between these two variables, excluding at the same time the presence of biases, it 
could be admissible to adjust negative values differentiating only among profitable banks and 
unprofitable banks. 
A further sample-selection criterion regards banks’ main business. Although in the 
search form there have been selected only Commercial, Cooperative and Saving banks, some 
of the exported ones are specialized in leasing and investment activities. These banks have 
been excluded from the sample in order to obtain a homogeneous final sample. 
After all these checks, the dimension of the sample decreased from ninety-one to fifty-
two banks65; particularly, we excluded all Saving banks. Table 1 shows banks distribution 
across Euro Area countries, distinguishing between Commercial and Cooperative ones. 
France and Italy contribute the most to the sample composition, followed by Austria, Spain, 
Germany and Slovakia. French banks are mostly Cooperative Banks and they represent more 
than half of cooperative banks, the others are Italian and Austrian.  
                                                
64 Namely: Bnp Paribas, negative book value in 2006; National Bank of Greece and Piraeus Bank 
negative in 2011 and 2012; Eurobank Ergasias negative in 2012. 
65 See annex for the list of all banks in the sample. 
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Table 1: Banks distribution by country and business activity. 
Banks AT CY DE ES FR GR IE IT LT MT PT SK Total 
Commercial 4 1 3 5 2 2 1 7 1 1 1 4 32 
Cooperative 2    12   6     20 
Total 6 1 3 5 14 2 1 13 1 1 1 4 52 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
Nonetheless the adjustments described, the sample seems to be affected by high 
variability of its elements. Although the fifty-two banks considered are principally involved in 
commercial activities, they still differ in term of size. This difference could lead to a 
difference also in their assets compositions: the larger is a bank, the higher is the likelihood to 
be a more diversified bank. Chart 1 shows the evolution of banks’ average assets in the time 
frame of the analysis: the variability of assets is L-shaped, meaning that it is concentrated 
approximately around the first ten banks. These set of banks include the largest ones, with 
average assets from 1.800 billion of euro (Deutsche bank) to 555 billion of euro (Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria). Following banks appear to be more concentrated, with average 
assets value between 238 billion of euro (Deutsche Postbank) and 106 billion of euro 
(Raiffeisen Bank International). The last group of banks shows the lowest variability with 
average assets from 89 billion of euro (Banco Comercial Português) to 0,86 billion of euro 
(Siauliu bank). 
 
Chart 1: Banks’ Average Assets between 2006 and 2014 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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3.1.2. Financial Ratios analysed 
In order to obtain evidence of the impact of different bank managements’ decisions, a 
financial statements analysis of the banks have been conducted taking into account different 
areas: profitability, efficiency, riskiness, business activity and capital adequacy.   
Ratios are similar to those used in selected studies66. The main difference across these 
studies attains the approaches through which they proceed. Some authors (Ming-Li and Liang, 
2005; Jordan et al., 2011; Macit and Topaloglu, 2012) develop the research in terms of firm 
value, explaining cross-sectional differences in share prices with the final aim of determining 
what is reflected in those values. Others consider changes in share prices with the purpose to 
provide evidence of what is reflected in stock returns over a specific period of time (Cooper, 
Jackson III and Patterson, 2003 and Romagnoli, 2007).  
The present analysis could be included in the first group as it aims to verify: (i) if 
financial ratios have an impact over a value measure such as the Market-to-Book ratio; (ii) if 
that impact is positive.  
The next sections describe all ratios used in the analysis. 
Market-to-Book ratio 
Since the majority of banks’ assets and liabilities are apprised at market value, market-
to-book ratio is particularly used in banks’ valuation67. Banks with high market-to-book ratio 
are expected to continue in creating value for shareholders despite of companies whose ratio 
is low, that can be considered either mispriced in the market or expecting not to create value. 
For this reason, this metric constitutes the dependent variable of this analysis with the aim to 
establish if market valuation could be correlated to banks’ financials. Market data exported 
from DataStream have been particularly useful; indeed, share prices at the year-end constitute 
the market values while the equity values arising from banks’ financial statements divided by 
banks’ number of shares at the year-end represent the book values. Chart 2 shows the 
evolution of Banks’ average market-to-book ratio between 2006 and 2014. It should be noted 
the strong reduction in the ratio between 2007 and 2008, when the financial crisis began. As a 
matter of fact, considering that this measure is computed through market values, it must be 
bear in mind that it might be influenced by external, systemic factors. To this purpose, the 
                                                
66 Chapter II, paragraph 2.3, page 54. 
67 The “Market-to-book ratio” is a financial ratio used to evaluate a company by comparing its 
shares’ price, which constitute the market value, with the company’s book value of equity arising from 
the difference between company assets and liabilities.  
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analysis will be integrated by a “control variable” that accounts for market trends in the 
period of analysis. 
 
Chart 2: Banks’ average Market-to-Book ratio between 2006 and 2014 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Profitability 
This first category of ratios concerns the ability to generate earnings. Ratios in this 
category are expected to positively affect the value of a bank: the more the bank is able to 
generate profits, the more the market should value it. For this reason, banks that have an 
higher profitability but a lower market-to-book value ratio are potentially undervalued, while 
banks having an higher market-to-book ratio but a lower profitability are potentially 
overvalued. Previous studies confirm this expectation with profitability ratios that have a 
positive impact in both value measure and returns. 
The present analysis considers two different profitability ratios, Return on Equity 
(ROE) but also the ratio between the Interest Income and the Earning Assets (herein after Net 
Interest Margin – NIM).  
With regard to the first, as previously clarified, the aim of this work is only to obtain 
evidence of the impact of positive profits, as it regards the valuation of banks on a going 
concern basis. Unfortunately, approximately half of the banks in the sample obtain negative 
profits during financial crisis year and this could induce some biases in the analysis outcomes. 
Although economically it is not admissible to match banks with negative and zero profits, 
considering the final aim of this analysis and in order to preserve statistical significance of the 
model, negative profits have been adjusted to zero, differentiating only among profitable 
banks and unprofitable banks. Chart 3 evidences the decrease in ROE during 2006-2014. 
Particularly through this graph it is possible to observe two negative trends that drive ROE 
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drops: the first in 2007-2008, when the real estate bubble blew up leading to the US and world 
banking crisis. The second during 2011 with the lowest peak reached in 2012 and linked to 
the worsening of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis. 
 
Chart 3: Group-mean ROE between 2006 and 2014 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Given the peculiarity of the data set used in this analysis, the graph loses a lot of 
information that make it impossible to infer anything about the evolution of ROE among each 
bank. Despite this constraint, it helps to understand when ROE reached the lowest value, 
showing that ROE falls could be linked to the recent financial crisis. 
Table 2 offers some summary statistics of ROE and NIM. Both variables have a 
minimum value around zero. It should be noted that NIM values about Mean, Median and 
Maximum are all lower than ROE ones. It is normal considering that Net Interest Margin, the 
first source of profits for banks, considers neither Fees & Commission nor Trading Income. 
On the contrary, both this non-operating profits are part of the Net Income, which is in turn 
reflected into ROE ratio. As the sample contains information about each of the banks in every 
year, the degree of dispersion around mean is computed in three version: (i) an “overall” 
Standard Deviation, that considers all the 468 observation; (ii) a “between” S. D. calculated 
after having computed each bank’s temporal mean; (iii) a “within” S.D. calculated after 
having computed cross-sectional means for every year of the time frame. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics, using the observations 1:1 - 52:9 for the variables ROE and NIM 
 ROE NIM 
Mean 0,0686 0,0200 
Median 0,0602 0,0188 
Minimum 0,0000 0,0000 
Maximum 0,3492 0,0430 
Standard Deviation 0,0574 0,0073 
S. D. Within  0,0507 0,0033 
S. D. Between  0,0321 0,0066 
5% percentile 0,0000 0,0091 
95% percentile 0,1845 0,0336 
Missing Observation 0 0 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Efficiency 
The economic crisis, the decline in the real estate market and the introduction of the 
new technologies, with customers that are more and more comfortable using on-line services, 
considerably decreased banks’ profits. This reduction forced banks to be involved in a 
continuing attempt to reduce operating costs in order to maintain efficiency.  
Cost to Income ratio has been introduced to check the impact of efficiency 
(inefficiency) on banks value. To obtain the ratio, operating expenses are divided by operating 
income (Intermediation Margin), so, an increase in this ratio could be due to expenditures 
increase and/or to a decrease in income; in other words, to a worsening of bank efficiency. 
Vice versa, a decrease in Cost-Income ratio is due to bank’s efficiency increases. There could 
be also the case in which operating costs decreased (ex. due to employment contraction) 
without affecting efficiency. In this situation, if the Cost-Income ratio did not decline, or if it 
reduced very slowly, there could mean that there is also a reduction in operating income. The 
figure drawn is a very distressed bank and, high Market to book ratio should only mean 
overvaluation. In theory, the more a bank is profitable, even maintaining efficiency, the 
higher should be the Market to Book ratio. 
A first analysis could be conducted through the summary statistics in Table 3. It is 
important to note that the mean is lower than one, suggesting that, on average, for the banks 
of the sample operating costs are lower than operating income. The Minimum value is 
reached by Raiffeisen Bank International AG in 2013, while the Maximum by Allied Irish 
Banks in 2012.  Table 3 shows also information about Deviation from mean value, for the 
overall sample, between each of the banks and within them. 
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Table 3: Cost-to-Income summary statistics, using the observations 1:1 - 52:9. 
 CIR 
Mean 0,8505 
Median 0,7418 
Minimum 0,2783 
Maximum 7.0113 
Standard Deviation 0,5147 
S. D. Within  0,4326 
S. D. Between  0,3161 
5% percentile 0,5351 
95% percentile 1,4726 
Missing Observation 0 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Although the summary statistics provided by Gretl software give also details about 
Median value and percentiles, they do not infer a lot about the evolution of the Cost-to-
Income ratio in the period considered. To this purpose, the Compound Annual Growth Rate 
(herein after CAGR) has been calculated for the Cost-to-Income ratio of every bank in the 
sample, from 2006 to 2014. As it is possible to appreciate from the Chart 4, even if the Cost-
to-Income is on average lower than one, it has generally observed an increase in the period 
2006-2014. The highest boost is the one of the Italian “Monte dei Paschi di Siena”, with a 
CAGR near 16%. It is followed by the Greek “Alpha Bank” and the two Italians “Banca 
Carige” and “Banco Popolare” that have all experimented a decline in their efficiency. On the 
other side, nine banks of the sample have reached negative values of CAGR even though this 
falls have percentage lower than the previous mentioned. The best result is accounted by the 
“Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel de l'Ille-et-Vilaine” a French cooperative bank 
with a CAGR of -1,26%. A rise in efficiency has been scored also by the Austrian 
“Oberbank” and “BKS bank” and by other French cooperatives. 
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Chart 4: Cost-to-Income CAGR between 2006 and 2014. 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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The largest portion of banking risk is represented by credit risk. This kind of risk is 
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banks of an adequate level of capital in order to cope all their risks and, credit risk in 
particular68. 
The degree of riskiness of a bank comes from the quality of its investments but also 
from the coverage policy adopted. Given the fact that loans portfolio constitute their largest 
portion of investments, banks are continually involved in the assessment of expected and 
unexpected losses that could arise from that portfolio. As a rule, every credit is valued in 
order to assess if it constitutes a “Performing” or a “Non Performing” loan. In order to 
estimate the percentage of loss, the first are subject to collective credit risk measurement 
while the latter are individually measured to determine the credit adjustment. These 
adjustments – both individual and collective – are recorded in the Income Statements as 
allowances and contribute to form a loan loss reserve in the bank’s balance sheet. 
Previous studies, reviewed in the literature chapter, about loans fair value estimate and 
about the market impact of an increase in loan loss reserve highlighted that the effect of 
changes in credit adjustments and in loan loss reserve are not obvious. A high coverage from 
Non-performing Loans could be desirable because it could be an index of increase in 
prudence; on the other side, it could also mean that there could be a worsening in the quality 
of the loans portfolio. Moreover, allowances increase has a negative impact on banks’ 
profitability.  
Given the scarce availability of data about Non Performing Loans, the NPL Ratio could 
not be included in the analysis, where the stock index Loan loss Reserve to Gross Loans 
(LLRGL) has been considered as a measure for the quality of investments. Table 4 provide 
some descriptive statistics of this ratio. 
Business Activity 
The fact that commercial banks - on which this study focus – are mostly involved in 
lending activities with the over mentioned consequences that their loans portfolio constitute 
their largest portion of investments, it does not mean that banks do not differ substantially 
from each other. On the contrary, their mix of investments could be highly diversified. 
Although some small banks still remain focused on traditional activities, the majority of 
banks are getting closer to an universal bank model offering, together with traditional 
products also a wide range of non bank financial services and off-balance sheet services. Prior 
literature obtains controversial evidence of the impact of non-traditional activities over bank 
risks, profits and, finally, market reactions69. Although some authors find that there is a 
                                                
68 Chapter I, paragraph 1.1.2, page 20. 
69 Chapter II, par 2.2.3, page 54. 
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positive relation between non-interest income and market value, other authors identify a 
market discount for banks that are more diversified. Debate is still open so, in order to control 
for the impact of diversification, the ratio Net Loans to Total Assets (NLTA) is included in 
the analysis. Table 4 also shows summary statistics of this ratio. 
 
Table 4: Summary statistics, using the observations 1:1 - 52:9 for the variables LLRGL and NLTA 
 LLRGL NLTA 
Mean 0,0400 0,6575 
Median 0,0294 0,6837 
Minimum 0,0021 0,1033 
Maximum 0,2841 2,1934 
Standard Deviation 0,0348 0,1691 
S. D. Within  0,0271 0,0919 
S. D. Between  0,0238 0,1464 
5% percentile 0,0129 0,3093 
95% percentile 0,1034 0,8313 
Missing Observation 0 0 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Capital adequacy 
As discussed in previous chapters, capital represents the primary safeguard against risk 
exposures and for this reason regulators impose stricter and stricter requirements in terms of 
capital of best quality. Although part of the researches reviewed in the second chapter argues 
that capital is value “irrelevant” or that it negatively affects banks profitability, other studies 
confirm the positive impact of capital on banks value. Moreover, some studies provide 
evidence that banks with higher capitalization are more likely to survive to financial crises. 
Tier1 Ratio should take into account the impact of higher degree of capitalization. 
Particularly, high Tier1 Ratios are expected to positively affect the Banks’ Value.  
Unfortunately, information shortages about the Tier 1 ratio cause the sample to decrease 
to thirty-seven banks; Tier 1 impacts has been studied in a second model which considers the 
restricted sample. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the thirty-seven banks composing 
this sub-sample with data collected from 2006 to 2014. 
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Table 5: Summary statistics, using the observations 1:1 - 37:9 for the variable T1R. 
 T1R 
Mean 9,5463 
Median 9,3600 
Minimum 2,1000 
Maximum 19,9300 
Standard Deviation 2,6964 
S. D. Within  2,3720 
S. D. Between  1,5198 
5% percentile 5,7000 
95% percentile 14,3000 
Missing Observation 0 
 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
3.1.3. Econometric model and methods 
The sample described is a statistical structure where time series and cross sectional units 
are combined together in a dataset known as panel of data or longitudinal data. In this analysis 
the fifty-two banks are the individuals that compose the panel and for which the same 
quantities (financial ratios, market to book ratio) are measured over a specific period of time, 
from 2006 to 2014. Since that a panel data contains both information it allows to extend the 
analysis and solve some multicollinearity problems. Moreover, depending on the econometric 
techniques used, panel data help to remove some omitted variables problems that could bias 
regression results (Brooks, 2008). The first representation of this dataset is the equation: 
 𝑀𝑉𝐵𝑉 !" = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝑣!" ( 1 )  
Where !"!!!" is the Market-to-book ratio that constitutes the dependent variable of the 
regression, calculated for every bank i and at any time t; α is the intercept term; β is a k × 1 
vector of parameters on the explanatory variables R that is in turn a vector 1 × k of Financial 
Ratios calculated for every bank i and at any time t. Finally 𝑣!" is the error term. Moreover, in 
order to exclude external influences, the model includes another controlling variable  
“ESTOXXB” which accounts for the trend of the “Euro STOXX banks” index from 
31/12/2006 to 31/12/2014. Data, provided by the European index specialist STOXX Ltd, 
should account for market trends in the period of the analysis. Especially, this index considers 
the Euro Area banking sector. In order to account for other issues that could have an external 
influence over the Market to Book ratio, also the variable “Euribor” could be included in the 
analysis controlling for the trend in the official rate from 31/12/2006 to 31/12/2014. Anyway, 
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this last two variables appear to be highly correlated, with 𝜌!" = 0,80 and, for this reason, 
only the first has been implemented in the next two equations. 
The previous equation can be rewritten in an extended version so as to obtain the 
regression equation (2). 
   𝑀𝑉𝐵𝑉 !" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐼𝑀!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼𝑅!"+ 𝛽!𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑋𝑋𝐵!" + 𝑣!" 
 
( 2 ) 
With 𝑖 = 1… 52 and 𝑡 = 1… 9. The model considers all the banks for the nine years of 
the time horizon but without accounting for the impact of Tier 1 Ratio. 
Given the fact that banks considerably differ also in terms of size, results will be shown 
for the whole sample and for two sub-samples composed of about twenty banks. These sub-
samples have been obtained considering the median of the Average of Total Assets. The first, 
includes banks whose Average of Total Assets is contained in the range 0,86 billion – 27,88 
billion. The second sub-sample is composed of banks with an Average of Total Assets from 
27,88 billion to 1891 billions. 
As previously specified, the introduction of Tier 1 ratio caused the sample to decrease 
from fifty-two banks to thirty-seven. To preserve the information provided by the banks for 
which Tier 1 data are not available, this last variable has been considered only in a second, 
restricted model, that aim to study the impact of capital on market-to-book. This model can be 
described by the regression function (3): 
  𝑀𝑉𝐵𝑉 !" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐼𝑀!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼𝑅!! + 𝛽!𝑇1𝑅!"+ 𝛽!𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑋𝑋𝐵!" + 𝑣!" 
 
( 3 ) 
With 𝑖 = 1… 37  and 𝑡 = 1… 9 . The whole sample has been split in two halves 
considering the Average of Total Assets. The median distinguishes between the first 
subsample, which includes banks with Average Total Assets up to 63,35 billion and the 
second where the banks’ Average Total Assets ranges from 63,35 billion to 1891 billion. 
Econometric Methods 
Once specified the sample characteristics and the econometric model to be estimated, 
the last choice attains the statistical estimation techniques to be applied. This choice depends 
first of all from the structure of the sample. It is possible to estimate a panel of data by using 
separate cross sectional regression or separate time series regressions but this are only 
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suboptimal solutions since they loose information about: (i) time series changes in the first 
case; and (ii) cross sectional variation in the second one. Another way to estimate coefficients 
of the explanatory variables considers the use of a pooled OLS regression but even this 
simplification implies the loss of all the additional information that panel structure furnishes: 
data must be stacked together so that observation on cross sectional units and on time series 
would not be distinguished anymore (Brooks, 2008). As explained by Wooldridge (2014) 
problems in exploiting this method are linked to some heterogeneity bias. Considering the 
composite error term: 𝑣!" = 𝑎! + 𝑢!"                𝑖 = 1…𝑁;             𝑡 = 1…𝑇 
Where 𝑢!" is the idiosyncratic error, representing unobserved factors that change over 
time and affects the dependent variable, while 𝑎!  represents the unobserved effects and 
capture all the unobserved time constant factors that affect the dependent variable 𝑦!". The 
limits of the pooled OLS estimations are linked to this term. One of the fundamental 
conditions to use the OLS estimators is that the error term is uncorrelated with the 
independent variables. Although it could be assumed that the idiosyncratic error 𝑢!"  is 
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable, pooled OLS are still biased if the unobserved 
effects 𝑎! are correlated with the explanatory variables.  
Among other solutions to solve this heterogeneity problem, there are First 
Differentiation and Fixed Effect model (FE). Both use a transformation to delete the 
unobserved effect, 𝑎! , from the regression. Moreover, along with 𝑎! , any time-constant 
variables are removed from the regressions. Using First Differentiation, the unobserved effect 
is eliminated by differencing adjacent periods. Following, time series will be composed of 𝑇 − 1 periods and the regression will describe the relation between Δ𝑦!", the one-year change 
in the dependent variable, and Δ𝑥!", the one-year change in every one of the explanatory 
variables. 
The Fixed Effect model considers, for each unit i – i.e. for each bank – the average 
across time of each variable in the regression equation (dependent variable, explanatory 
variables and error terms) and then differentiate each variable with its within mean. For this 
reason the Fixed Effect model is also known as “within transformation”. The important thing 
to consider is that the unobserved effects, which change only across each cross-sectional 
units, disappear after differentiation because the difference between each 𝑎! and their within 
means – still 𝑎! – are zero. Of course this is true for every time constant variable. 
Another way to estimate a Fixed Effects model is through the Dummies Variable 
regression. Here the unobserved effects 𝑎! are considered as parameters to be estimated for 
each of the cross-sectional units. With this interpretation, in order to estimate every intercept, 
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the regression equation must include along with the explanatory variables also a set of dummy 
variables that accounts for each cross-sectional unit. Regardless of the practical limit linked to 
panel data with a lot of cross-sectional units, for which the Dummy Variable Regression 
appears to be composed of too many explanatory variables, this method provides the same 
estimate of the “within transformation” method previously described (Wooldridge, 2014). 
Differently from the two previous statistical methods, if the unobserved effect are 
considered uncorrelated with each of the independent variables, which is if: 
  𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝑥!"# ,𝑎! =   0      ∀  𝑖 = 1…𝑁;         ∀  𝑡 = 1…𝑇        ∀  𝑗 = 1… 𝑘   
then, the Random Effect Model could be considered. Wooldridge (2014) specifies that, if the 
model contains a set of controls that accounts for special characteristics of the cross-sectional 
units, it could be plausible that any unobserved effect does not cause correlation between the 
composite error term and the explanatory variables. This model does not completely delete 
the unobserved effects, but only a fraction of them which depends on the variances of 𝑎! ,𝑢!"  and on the number of years T. To proof, consider the composite errors 𝑣!", which are 
serially correlated across time due to the presence of the term 𝑎!: 𝐶𝑜𝑣   𝑣!" , 𝑣!" =    !!!!!!!!!!    , 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠. 
OLS standard errors ignore this serial correlation so, in order to deal with it, the 
Random Effect model uses a GLS transformation based on the variable 𝜆 in order to delete 
the serial correlation: 𝜆 =   1−    !!!!!!!!!!!    , 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 . 
So, while the fixed effect model subtracts the time averages from each variable, the 
Random Effects model considers only a fraction 𝜆 of those time averages. The error becomes: 𝑣!" − 𝜆𝑣!" = 1− 𝜆 𝑎! +   𝑢!" − 𝜆𝑢!", and the correlations between the explanatory variables 
and 𝑎! are contained by the presence of the parameter 𝜆. Particularly, as 𝜆 gets close to one, 
the unobserved effects go to zero and the Random Effects estimators tend to the Fixed Effects 
estimator. The contrary if 𝜆 tends to zero (Wooldridge, 2014). The Random Effects model 
supposes that cross-sectional units are a random sample of a large population (Marcellino, 
2013) anyway it is not always possible to threat the sample of the analysis as a random one. 
Wooldridge (2014) suggests that in those situations it is better to consider each 𝑎! as a 
separate intercept to be estimated for each cross-sectional unit, using the Fixed Effects model. 
On the contrary, using the Random Effects model means to consider the intercepts of each 
cross sectional units composed of a common intercept 𝛼 plus a random variable 𝑎! that is 
time-invariant and “measure the random deviation of each entity’s intercept term from the 
global intercept term 𝛼” (Brooks, 2008). 
  75 
Although the sample of banks previously described is part of a larger population, it 
appears to be too rush to recognize it as a random one. Moreover, it seems more conservative 
to consider plausible the correlation between the explanatory variables and unobserved effects 𝑎!. For both reasons, this analysis adopts a Fixed Effects Model for the estimation of beta 
coefficients. This choice has been confirmed by the implementation of the Hausman (1978)’s 
test, which is an econometric test for the null hypothesis: “Random Effects model is 
consistent”. This hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative Fixed Effects model.   
Lastly, after having controlled for serial correlation, some other controls have to be 
taken in order to account for potential heteroskedasticity in errors70. Particularly, Arellano’s 
robust standard errors for within-groups estimators have been considered as they have been 
demonstrated to efficiently deal with both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Arellano, 
1987). The last section of this chapter expressly deals with heteroskedasticity problems. 
3.2. Regressions findings 
The two models described in the previous paragraph by equations (2) and (3) have been 
processed using Gretl, a free open-source statistical package for econometric analysis.  
Regressions results provided by this software using a panel Fixed Effects method, 
contains, along with beta coefficients, standard errors, t-statistics, p-value and many other 
statistics, two different measures for the goodness of fit. Indeed, based on how the Fixed 
Effects methods have been computed, the model provides a LSDV R-squared and a Within R-
squared. The first attains the Dummy Variable Regression method while the second considers 
time-demeaned data of the Within Transformation. As Wooldridge (2014) specifies, since that 
the dummy variables included in the first method explain much of the variability of data, the 
LSDV R-square is typically high.   
Some preliminary clarifications must be done: first of all, due to the high variability of 
the banks in the sample, both models have three different specifications, for the overall 
samples and for their two halves, considering as discriminating factor banks’ averages of total 
                                                
70  Heteroskedasticity means the absence of homoskedasticity for which the variance of the 
unobservable error term u, conditional to the explanatory variable, is constant. It is one of the 
fundamental assumption for which the OLS Estimators are B.L.U.E (Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimators). Although heteroskedasticity does not cause the OLS estimators to be biased or 
inconsistent, the contrary holds for their variances and, since the OLS standard errors are based on 
these variances, they are no longer valid to justify t-test statistics, F-tests statistics and confidence 
intervals of linear regressions (Wooldridge, 2014). 
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assets in the time horizon of the analysis. Secondly both models have been implemented by 
adding one variable at time in order to test their significance. This test considers p-value for 
the significance of the estimates and changes in the R-squared. Moreover, by adding one 
variable at time it is possible to control the effect that each variable has on others already 
implemented71.  
First results to be presented attain the equation (2), which does not consider the effect of 
Tier 1 Ratio in order to preserve the information provided by the banks for which these data 
are not available. Table 6 reports beta-coefficients estimated for the entire sample of 52 banks 
in the nine years of analysis. Columns from “A” to “E” describe results of the models that, 
step by step, add explanatory variables. It must be point out that the Within R-squared of 
these models are very low stating for the scarce ability of the models to explain Market-to-
Book value changes. The measure slightly increases only in the column “E” that includes the 
controlling variable EuroStoxxBanks. Accordingly, the first four models of the table, does not 
have any significant predictor. P-values are all high meaning that the null hypothesis: “the 
real beta is equal to zero” cannot be rejected. P-value of the estimated beta coefficient of 
EuroStoxxBanks is statistically significant at 5% level. 
Another problem regards the ability of the model to predict signs of beta coefficients. 
Column “A” includes as explanatory variables only ROE and Net Interest Margin, which are 
expected to positively affect the Market-to-book Ratio. Although this is verified for ROE, the 
estimated beta coefficient of Net Interest Margin has a negative sign, meaning that an average 
increase in the Net Interest Margin is correlated with a decrease in the Market-to-Book ratio. 
This negative relationship is maintained also in the following columns where Net Loans to 
Total Assets, Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans and the Cost-to-Income ratio are added one 
at time. Only in the column “E” with the inclusion of the controlling variable 
EuroStoxxBanks, the beta coefficient of Net Interest Margin becomes positive. Net Loans to 
Total Assets has always a negative sign meaning that the market should value more banks that 
are more diversified. Others concerns come from the signs of Cost-to-income beta 
coefficients, that are always positive. Considering that an increase in this ratio is due to a 
decrease in efficiency (due to either an increase in operating costs or a decrease in operating 
income), the fact that the beta coefficients appear with a positive sign could mean that 
inefficiency could be associated with higher market-to-book ratio, which is of course a 
misrepresentation. Finally, beta coefficients of Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans are always 
                                                
71 It must be also considered that the aim of this analysis is to provide evidence of the correlation 
between financial ratios and market-to-book ratio without giving any inference about causality. 
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negative, even if this relation appears to be statistically insignificant. The negative effect 
might means that the market negatively reacts to increases in Loans loss reserve, attributing 
them to a worsening in the quality of loans portfolio rather than to an increase in bank’s 
prudence. In any case, due to the insignificance of the estimate, it is not easy to infer 
something on the reasons behind this relation. 
All the problems described could be associated to either: high variability in data or 
heteroskedasticity problems that remain even using robust standard errors.  
 
Table 6: Fixed effects model using robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Full Sample, excluding T1R. Dependent variable: MTB 
  A B C D E 
Constant -0,099 1,268 1,389 1,080 0,612 
 
(1,189) (1,552) (1,346) (1,299) (1,364) 
ROE 32,873 32,671 32,475 33,030 30,392 
 
(22,952) (22,745) (22,935) (23,732) (25,135) 
NIM -13,263 -6,455 -7,924 -2,182 -3,067 
 
(67,0418) (64,144) (59,212) (54,181) (54,112) 
NLTA 
 
-2,265 -2,315 -2,325 -2,042 
  
(2,709) (2,683) (2,699) (2,745) 
LLRGL 
  
-1,116 -2,212 -1,649 
   
(7,841) (6,601) (6,443) 
CIR 
   
0,242 0,245 
    
(0,459) (0,449) 
ESTOXXB 
    
0,005 
     
(0,004) 
      LSDV R-squared 0,619 0,619 0,619 0,619 0,619 
Within R-squared 0,099 0,101 0,101 0,101 0,102 
N. of observation: 468 with 52 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 7,63. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
In order to decrease the variability of the banks in the sample, the next two tables 
present Fixed-Effects regressions results considering the two halves of the entire sample. 
Table 7 considers the smallest banks in the sample with Average of Total Assets contained in 
the range 0,86 billion – 27,88 billion.   
A positive signal comes from the Within R-squared that increases from the 9-10% 
registered in Table 6 to 20-22%. Anyway, despite of this positive signal, no one of the 
estimated beta coefficient appears to be significant, neither the one of EuroStoxxBanks 
variable. Opposite to expectations, NIM appears to have a strong, negative effect on Market-
to-Book ratio. Despite of results obtained in the previous table, Net Loans to Total Assets 
ratio has a positive relation with Market to Book ratio: considering the smallest banks of this 
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analysis, the ones that maintain a more traditional business activity reaches higher level of 
market valuation. The same is valid for Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans. The sign of Cost-
to-income ratio beta coefficients follow expectations only in column “C”, before the 
introduction of EuroStoxxBanks. 
 
Table 7: Fixed effects model using robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Small banks of full sample, excluding T1R. Dependent variable: MTB 
  A B C D E 
Constant 1,129 0,311 -0,144 -0,041 0,180 
 
(3,473) (4,408) (4,78148) (5,678) (5,396) 
ROE 83,134 83,674 84,916 84,725 85,822 
 
(63,674) (63,429) (66,4619) (68,628) (69,809) 
NIM -218,990 -220,741 -224,682 -225,728 -224,334 
 
(189,996) (186,667) (198,424) (191,432) (190,628) 
NLTA 
 
1,143 1,445 1,446 1,289 
  
(2,456) (2,680) (2,67569) (2,575) 
LLRGL 
  
5,964 6,067 5,915 
   
(16,200) (15,0925) (14,873) 
CIR 
   
-0,094 -0,108 
    
(1,661) (1,657) 
ESTOXXB 
    
-0,002 
     
(0,004) 
      LSDV R-squared 0,653 0,653 0,653 0,653 0,652 
Within R-squared 0,203 0,204 0,204 0,204 0,204 
N. of observation: 234 with 26 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 10,29. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Table 8 considers the second sub-sample composed of banks with an Average of Total 
Assets that goes from 27,88 billion to 1891 billions. This table is particularly different from 
the previous ones. The Within R-squared increases from 14% to 23% after the introduction of 
EuroSTOXXBanks variable; then, ROE has on average a positive and statistically significant 
effect on Market-to-Book Value. Its p-value is statistically significant at 1% level in all the 
models that do not include the controlling variable EuroSTOXXbanks. Unfortunately, after its 
introduction the estimated beta-coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. On the 
contrary, EuroSTOXXbanks coefficient is statistically significant at 1% level with a weak but 
positive impact on Market-to-book ratio. The change could be due to some moderate form of 
correlation between ROE and EuroSTOXXbank (𝜌!" = 0,63).  
Finally, also the signs of other variables appear to be compliant with our expectations. 
Particularly, Net Interest Margin has a strong and positive (even if not significant) relation 
with the Market-to-book ratio, and the Cost-to-Income ratio enters in the regression with a 
  79 
negative coefficient meaning that inefficiency has a negative impact on banks Market-to-
Book ratio. Both Net Loans to Total Assets and Loans Loss Reserve to Gross Loans reverse 
their signs after the introduction of the controlling variable.  
Despite the fact that a lot of variables do not appear to be statistically significant, 
variances in the banks of this sub-sample seems to be lower than those of previous one.  
 
Table 8: Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Big banks of full sample, excluding T1R. Dependent variable: MTB  
  A B C D E 
Constant -0,271 -0,029 0,100 0,163 -1,548 
 
(1,302) (1,168) (1,242) (1,343) (1,601) 
ROE 10,825 10,865 10,676 10,551 1,626 
 
(2,750)*** (3,777)*** (2,829)*** (2,955)*** (2,071) 
NIM 72,511 74,712 71,439 70,034 78,510 
 
(64,2433) (66,146) (53,984) (53,453) (54,237) 
NLTA 
 
-0,046 -0,496 -0,484 0,306 
  
(0,863) (1,053) (1,046) (0,934) 
LLRGL 
  
-1,125 -0,688 2,703 
   
(12,874) (11,971) (11,803) 
CIR 
   
-0,057 -0,061 
    
(0,168) (0,139) 
ESTOXXB 
    
0,018 
     
(0,005)*** 
      LSDV R-squared 0,743 0,743 0,743 0,743 0,770 
Within R-squared 0,144 0,145 0,145 0,145 0,226 
N. of observation: 234 with 26 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 3,28. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Next tables include as explanatory variable the Tier 1 Ratio (introduced in column “E”) 
in order to test its effect on the Market to Book Ratio.  
Table 9 considers all the thirty-seven banks for which Tier 1 data were available in the 
years of the analysis. First of all, the Within R-squared, even if low, slightly increases slightly 
with the introduction of the explanatory variables. Unfortunately, even in these models no one 
of the explanatory variable seems to be statistically significant.  
Regarding the signs of beta coefficients, Net Interest Margin appears with a negative 
sign only in column “A”, in the model that includes as explanatory variables only profitability 
ratios. Adding the Net Loans to Total Assets variable, adjusts the coefficients of NIM that 
remain positive thereafter. Net Loans to Total Assets ratio appears always to decrease the 
Market-to-Book ratio, suggesting that the market rewards a more diversified bank. As in the 
previous sample, Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans coefficients has a negative sign meaning 
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that an increase in these reserves is interpreted as a decrease in the quality of loans portfolio. 
Conversely, Cost-to-income ratio coefficients appear with a positive sign, that is weird 
considering that it means that less efficiency has a positive impact on bank’s market-to-book 
value. In accordance with expectations, Tier one ratio has a positive impact on Market-to-
book value; this is true even in the last column “F” that considers also the controlling variable 
EuroSTOXXBanks. 
 
Table 9: Fixed Effects model using robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Narrow sample, including T1R. Dependent variable: MTB 
  A B C D E F 
Constant 0,462 7,398 9,157 8,713 7,516 6,137 
 
(1,345) (6,485) (7,631) (7,143) (6,222) (7,283) 
ROE 35,950 35,322 33,712 34,580 36,900 33,507 
 
(25,493) (24,853) (23,615) (24,699) (26,666) (29,638) 
NIM -19,159 21,190 12,719 23,632 13,161 10,212 
 
(76,776) (12,4149 (61,692) (59,2059) (60,094) (57,072) 
NLTA 
 
-12,500 -14,241 -14,391 -15,093 -13,880 
  
(12,414) (13,852) (14,057) (14,490) (15,400) 
LLRGL 
  
-9,245 -11,360 -17,517 -17,156 
   
(11,302) (12,165) (16,677) (16,895) 
CIR 
   
0,384 0,448 0,461 
    
(0,55259) (0,585) (0,569) 
T1R 
    
0,198 0,223 
     
(0,194) (0,172) 
ESTOXXB 
     
0,007 
      
(0,008) 
       LSDV R-squared 0,615 0,619 0,620 0,620 0,622 0,623 
Within R-squared 0,107 0,117 0,118 0,119 0,123 0,124 
N. of observation: 333 with 37 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 8,97. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
As in the previous analyses, the insignificance of the estimated coefficients could be 
associated to either: high variability in data or heteroskedasticity problems that remain even 
using robust standard errors.  To decrease the variability of data, the restricted sample has 
been split in two different halves considering the average of bank’s total assets in the nine 
years of analysis. Results are displayed in tables 10 and 11. 
Table 10 shows results obtained for the sub-sample that considers banks with average 
total assets between 0,63 and 63,35 billion of euro. Even with this sample breakdown the 
significance of the model does not improve. Within R-squared reaches only the 16% in the 
last column of the table, that includes all the explanatory variables. Estimated beta 
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coefficients are not statistically significant except for the model in column C that introduces 
the variable Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans, which enters the regression with an estimated 
beta coefficients negative and statically significant at 10% level. However, this significance is 
not maintained after the introduction of other variables such as: Cost-to-Income ratio, Tier 1 
ratio and EuroStoxxBanks. With reference to the signs of beta coefficients, Net Interest 
Margin has a negative estimate. It seems to has a very strong and negative impact on market 
to book value that is a misrepresentation of real data. On the contrary, even if statistically 
insignificance, ROE has a strong and positive effect on Market to Book ratio. Moreover, 
accordingly with previous findings, Net Loans to Total Assets has a negative sign, as well as 
Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans. The same problem of Net Interest Margin is accounted for 
Cost-to-Income ratio sign. A decrease in efficiency seems to positively affects Market-to-
Book. Finally the sign of Tier 1 Ratio has a positive – even if weak – relation with the value 
measure. 
 
Table 10 Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Small banks of narrow sample, including T1R. Dependent variable: MTB 
  A B C D E F 
Constant 1,669 6,214 9,290 9,113 8,188 6,134 
 
(2,264) (7,211) (9,013) (7,729) (7,749) (7,783) 
ROE 62,384 60,446 58,037 58,327 59,554 56,352 
 
(53,334) (51,510) (49,585) (51,092) (52,885) (52,714) 
NIM -119,840 -109,464 -115,298 -112,000 -111,728 -124,899 
 
(176,373) (176,988) (157,446) (155,991) (160,857) (152,025) 
NLTA 
 
-6,862 -9,819 -9,862 -10,470 -8,596 
  
(11,035) (13,431) (13,821) (13,991) (16,241) 
LLRGL 
  
-16,382 -16,892 -20,026 -19,405 
   
(9,374)* (13,870) (16,875) (16,241) 
CIR 
   
0,158 0,431 0,604 
    
(1,565) (1,685) (1,750) 
T1R 
    
0,120 0,147 
     
(0,218) (0,205) 
ESTOXXB 
     
0,009 
      
(0,011) 
       LSDV R-squared 0,631 0,632 0,634 0,633 0,634 0,635 
Within R-squared 0,152 0,154 0,158 0,158 0,159 0,159 
N. of observation: 171 with 19 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 12,14. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.   
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
Banks with average total assets between 63,35 billion and 1845 billion compose the 
subsample which regressions results are presented in Table 11. First of all, Within R-squared 
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increases from 17% to 30% in the last model that includes EuroStoxxBanks variable. 
Moreover, ROE estimated beta coefficients appear to have a moderate positive effect on 
Market-to-book value with a statistical significance at 1% level in all models that exclude the 
controlling variable. Tier one ratio appears to have a positive, significant effect on Market to 
Book ratio even if it has only a weak correlation with the measure; nevertheless it is 
significant at 5% level. Additionally, also EurostoxxBanks has a positive effect and although 
it is only a weak relation, it is statistically significant at 1% level. Net Interest Margin 
estimated beta coefficient, even if not statistically significant, has a positive effect on Market 
to book value, even after the introduction of the controlling variable. Net loans to total assets 
and Loan Loss reserve have both negative beta-coefficients while Cost-to-income ratio 
reflects expectations only in the last model.  
 
Table 11: Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Big banks of narrow sample, including T1R. Dependent variable: MTB 
  A B C D E F 
Constant 0,361 2,938 3,157 3,142 2,912 -1,088 
 
(1,519) (2,749) (5,061) (5,030) (4,579) (3,806) 
ROE 13,934 14,889 14,619 14,694 15,571 3,097 
 
(5,093)*** (5,812)** (4,094)*** (4,334)*** (4,457)*** (2,336) 
NIM 27,033 62,281 59,743 61,010 54,474 69,318 
 
(73,2713) (109,567) (79,575) (83,581) (75,886) (79,857) 
NLTA 
 
-5,888 -6,077 -6,134 -6,631 -3,701 
  
(8,009) (10,037) (10,168) (10,634) (9,667) 
LLRGL 
  
-1,301 -1,646 -5,588 -7,912 
   
(23,584) (23,796) (27,734) (27,796) 
CIR 
   
0,035 0,055 0,055 
    
(0,146) (0,163) (0,1511) 
T1R 
    
0,074 0,181 
     
(0,112) (0,122) 
ESTOXXB 
     
0,023 
      
(0,006)*** 
       LSDV R-squared 0,657 0,662 0,662 0,662 0,664 0,696 
Within R-squared 0,170 0,182 0,183 0,183 0,186 0,264 
N. of observations: 162 with 18 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 3,01. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
3.2.1. Heteroskedasticity controls 
Heteroskedasticity problems have been taken into account in the previous Fixed Effects 
regressions by the use of Arellano (1978) robust standard errors. Unfortunately, these robust 
errors correct only partially the absence of homoscedasticity assumption.  
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Results reported in the previous tables – with only few exceptions – do not appear to be 
statistically significant. This might be due to: (i) an excess of data variability; (ii) the sample 
size that in the best scenario is composed of only 52 banks; (iii) some heteroskedasticity 
problems that still remain even with the use of robust standard errors.  
If the first two hypotheses could not be treated because they are intrinsic characteristics 
of the sample, regarding the last option some corrections can be adopted.  
First of all, in order to verify that heteroskedasticity affects the model, it has been 
performed the White’s test for the null hypothesis that the errors are homoscedastic. Through 
this test all the forms of heteroskestasticity that invalidate OLS standard errors and test 
statistics are considered that is, the likelihoods of correlations between the squared errors and: 
(i) the independent variables; (ii) the squared independent variables; (iii) all the cross product 
of the independent variables (Wooldridge, 2014). This test is only one of the alternatives 
through which it is possible to verify the presence of homoscedasticity. Obtaining a low p-
value means that the null hypothesis is rejected, in favour of the alternative for which the 
model is affected by heteroskedasticity. This is the case of all model described in the previous 
sections. 
Before the introduction of robust standard errors, heteroskedasticity problems were 
treated using Weighted Least Squares (Wooldridge, 2014). As Wooldridge (2014) explains, 
the aim of this method is to estimate a function of the explanatory variables ℎ(𝒙)! that 
determines heteroskedasticity, i.e. 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑢 𝒙 =   𝜎!ℎ(𝒙)!. Moreover, since variance must be 
positive, the function ℎ(𝒙)! > 0. Once having determined this function, it could be used to 
transform the regression function with heteroskedastic errors in one with homoscedastic ones. 
The logic is that in order to obtain 𝑉𝑎𝑟 𝑢 𝒙 =   𝜎! it is sufficient to divide the regression 
equation by ℎ. In this way, as clarified by the author, 𝑉𝑎𝑟 !! 𝒙 =   𝜎! with a zero mean. 
The beta coefficients obtained are the generalized least squares estimators and, due to the fact 
that they correct heteroskedasticity problems, they are also called weighted least squares 
estimator. Indeed, they minimize the weighted sum of squared residuals using as weight the 
function !! giving less weight to observations with higher error variance. Moreover, even if 
WLS estimates and standard errors are different from OLS ones, their interpretations remain 
the same (Wooldridge, 2014). 
When the exact function ℎ(𝒙)!, that determines the heteroskedastic errors, is unknown, 
author suggests to model a function ℎ! that is an estimate of the unknown one and that is 
called Feasible GLS estimator.  
  84 
Gretl software allows performing both a manual WLS regression and an automatic 
WLS regression. In the first it requires to define which variable will be used as weight, while, 
in the second Gretl itself estimates weights based on per units error variances. The latter 
method is used in the regressions whose results are shown in the next tables. Results suggest 
an overall improvement reached trough the use of Weighted Least Squares. As it has been 
done in the previous Fixed-Effects models, independent variables are added in succession so 
as to verify how much they are able to explain variation in the dependent variable.  
Table 12 shows results of the regressions performed using the Full sample of banks that 
do not consider Tier 1 ratio variable. Adjusted R-squared (computed on average data) goes 
from 0,134, in the model that considers only profitability ratios, to 0,214 in the last column 
where all the variables are considered. Particularly, it must be considered that the measure has 
reached its maximum in column D, before the introduction of EuroStoxxBanks variable, 
which contrary to the Fixed-Effect model findings seems to deteriorate the ability of the 
model to describe variations in the dependent variable.  
Profitability ratios appear to have positive relations with Market-to-Book ratio, that are 
statistically significant at 1% level for ROE and at 5% level for NIM. This last increases its 
significance after the introduction of Net Loans to Total Assets in column B, which leads also 
to an increase in the Adjusted R-squared that reaches 0,264. Net Loans to Total Assets 
strengthen the relation between Market-to-Book ratio and Net Interest Margin and enters the 
regression with a negative estimated beta-coefficient that is statistically significant at 1% 
level. Although an increase in the percentage of Net Loans in respect to bank’s total assets 
produces an increase in interest margin that is highly positively correlated with the value 
measure, it induces also a slightly decrease in the market-to-book ratio due to the fact that a 
more diversified bank is valued more by the market. Moreover, this relation is maintained in 
all the other columns.  
Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans enters the model with a positive, not very strong, 
relation with the dependent variable. Moreover, despite the fact that this relation is 
statistically significant at 5% level, it partially deteriorates the ability of the model to explain 
Market-to-book ratio with the adjusted R-Squared that goes back to 0,224. Regarding the 
relation between this variable and the dependent one, it should be noted that even if the 
market rewards banks with high Net Interest Margin and a business activity that is well 
diversified among traditional and non traditional services, it also seems that an increase in 
Loan Loss Reserve is interpreted as an index of greater management’s prudence rather than as 
a deterioration in Loans portfolio. 
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The introduction of Cost-to-Income ratio leads to two consequences: (i) it increases the 
Adjusted R-squared, which reaches its maximum level; and (ii) it causes the Loan Loss 
Reserve to Gross Loans to become statistically insignificant. Moreover, this variable registers 
a weak negative relation with the Market-to-Book ratio, statistically significant at 1% level. 
One can probably assert that the positive relation considers changes in Cost-to-income ratio 
that are in any case very contained around the mean.  
EuroStoxxBank is included in the last column. Although it appears to be statistically 
significant at 5% level, its coefficient is almost zero and causes the fall of Adjusted R-
squared, which goes back to 0,214. Moreover, after this inclusion Net Interest Margin 
estimated beta coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. 
 
Table 12: Weighted Least Squares. Full Sample, excluding T1R.  
Dependent variable: MTB, weights based on per-unit error variances 
  A B C D E 
Constant 0,154 1,651 0,960 0,270 0,081 
 
(0,103) (0,210)*** (0,228)*** -0,273 -0,311 
ROE 6,031 4,447 6,701 7,953 7,912 
 
(0,722)*** (0,775)*** (0,948)*** (0,948)*** (1,147)*** 
NIM 12,060 31,634 15,141 13,642 12,021 
 
(5,714)** (7,097)*** (6,983)** (6,707)** (8,111) 
NLTA 
 
-2,801 -2,087 -1,716 -1,554 
  
(0,250)*** (0,251)*** (0,257)*** (0,303)*** 
LLRGL 
  
6,002 2,981 6,022 
   
(2,423)** (2,509) (2,846)** 
CIR 
   
0,685 0,561 
    
(0,150)*** (0,164)*** 
ESTOXXB 
    
0,002 
     
(0,001)** 
Statistics based on weighted data: 
   R-squared 0,138 0,269 0,230 0,270 0,225 
Adjusted R-squared 0,134 0,264 0,224 0,260 0,214 
N. of observations: 468 with 52 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. Standard Errors in parenthesis; 
*, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Table 13 considers the subsample composed of the smallest banks, whose averages of 
total assets reach 27,88 billion of euro. Particularly, it should be considered that for the banks 
in this subsample, the model that better approximates Market-to-Book ratio is the first one, in 
column A. Its Adjusted R-squared is 0,176 and it decreases significantly just after the 
introduction of Net Loans to Total Asset variable. Profitability ratios have both positive and 
statistically significant estimated beta coefficients: ROE at 5% level and Net Interest Margin 
at 1% level. This last contributes the most to increase Market-to-Book ratio and contrary to 
  86 
what happens for ROE it remains significant even in column B that includes Net Loans to 
Total Assets. The latter enters the analysis with a negative estimated beta coefficient, which is 
also statistically significant at 1% level. The negative relation seems to infer that the smallest 
banks of the analysis are valued more by the market if their business activities are more 
oriented to diversification. The model is further deteriorated by the inclusion of Loan Loss 
Reserve to Gross Loan that appears to be statistically insignificant72. In any case, following its 
inclusion, ROE becomes statistically significant at 1% level, maintaining this level in all other 
columns. Adjusted R-squared starts to rise again in column D, where Cost-to-Income ratio is 
added. As in the previous table, it enters the analysis with a positive, weak relation with 
Market to Book ratio and it is always statistically significant at 10% level. It also causes Net 
Loans to Total Asset ratio to become significant at 5% level rather than 1%. This ratio 
decreases furthermore its significance after the inclusion of EuroStoxxBank that, although, it 
appears to be statistically insignificant, helps the restoration of Adjusted R-squared. 
  
Table 13: Weighted Least Squares. Small banks of full sample, excluding T1R.  
Dependent variable: MTB, weights based on per-unit error variances 
  A B C D E 
Constant -0,716 1,083 0,876 0,161 -0,315 
 
(0,124)*** (0,432)** (0,491)* (0,593) (0,657) 
ROE 2,498 0,808 4,500 6,046 7,678 
 
(1,140)** (1,048) (1,575)*** (1,832)*** (2,065)*** 
NIM 44,771 22,727 2,175 5,548 4,007 
 
(6,886)*** (7,255)*** (7,451) (8,249) (8,590) 
NLTA 
 
-1,785 -1,613 -1,340 -1,086 
  
(0,504)*** (0,512)*** (0,544)** (0,576)* 
LLRGL 
  
5,728 3,063 2,906 
   
(3,525) (3,754) (3,829) 
CIR 
   
0,649 0,880 
    
(0,362)* (0,393)** 
ESTOXXB 
    
0,002 
     
(0,001) 
Statistics based on weighted data: 
    R-squared 0,183 0,111 0,091 0,100 0,110 
Adjusted R-squared 0,176 0,099 0,075 0,080 0,083 
N. of observations: 234 with 26 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. Standard Errors in parenthesis; 
*, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
                                                
72 Nonetheless, the variable has been maintained in the model because its presence contributes to the 
increase in Adjusted R-squared in the following columns. The model that includes all the variables 
except of LLRGL obtain an adjusted R-squared near 0,07.  
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Differently from the results obtained in the previous subsample, Table 14 shows that, 
considering the biggest of the fifty-two banks, the model that includes all the explanatory 
variables, is also the one with the highest Adjusted-R squared, which is equal to 0,28.  
Particularly, it should be noted that Net Interest Margin is never statistically significant 
and that ROE is statistically significant at 1% level in all cases except when EuroStoxxBank 
is added to the other explanatory variables. Indeed, in column E, ROE is statistically 
insignificant and its estimated beta coefficient becomes negative. Of course the fact that it is 
not significant means that it cannot be rejected the hypothesis for which the true coefficient is 
zero.  
Accordingly, also Net Loans to Total Assets is never significant while Loan Loss 
Reserve to Gross Loans enters the regression with a 5% level of significance. Its coefficient 
implies that an increase in Loan Loss Reserves to gross loans for the biggest banks is 
interpreted as an index of greater prudence against Loans losses. The inclusion of Cost-to-
Income ratio, whose beta estimate is positive and statistically significant at 5% level, cause 
the estimated beta coefficient of LLRGL to become statistically insignificant. Nonetheless, it 
becomes again significant, at 1% level, after the introduction of EuroStoxxBank that is the 
only other variable statistically significant.  
 
Table 14: Weighted Least Squares. Big banks of full sample, excluding T1R.  
Dependent variable: MTB, weights based on per-unit error variances 
  A B C D E 
Const 0,525 0,657 0,652 0,333 -0,576 
 
(0,141)*** (0,186)*** (0,178)*** (0,219) (0,268)** 
ROE 4,492 4,355 5,187 5,682 -1,300 
 
(0,897)*** (0,924)*** (0,867)*** (0,914)*** (1,259) 
NIM 5,416 7,462 1,477 7,169 14,545 
 
(7,867) (9,392) (9,731) (9,634) (9,028) 
NLTA 
 
-0,277 -0,316 -0,333 0,123 
  
(0,307) (0,294) (0,284) (0,350) 
LLRGL 
  
5,131 1,743 9,258 
   
(2,256)** (2,553) (2,93)*** 
CIR 
  
 0,298 0,006 
   
 (0,131)** (0,13) 
ESTOXXB 
    
0,011 
     
(0,002)*** 
Statistics based on weighted data: 
    R-squared 0,101 0,092 0,142 0,150 0,300 
Adjusted R-squared 0,093 0,079 0,126 0,132 0,280 
N. of observations: 234 with 26 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. Standard Errors in parenthesis; 
*, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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The next three tables present results of regressions, which include among explanatory 
variables also the Tier 1 ratio. As it has been argued in previous pages, by considering this 
variable, the sample decrease from fifty-two banks to thirty-seven as this data are not 
available for fifteen banks.  
Table 15 considers all these thirty-seven banks. It should be noted that the model does 
not present a high ability to explain Market-to-book ratios as it could be observed by the 
Adjusted r-squared that is maximum in Column F. Although even in this model independent 
variables have been added subsequently, in order to improve the measure of fit some of them 
have also been excluded.  
Considering the first column, we can see that the two profitability ratios enter the 
regression with positive estimated beta coefficients that are also statistically significant at 1% 
level. Unfortunately, Net Interest Margin, that has the greater effect on Market to Book ratio, 
becomes statistically insignificant73 in the column B, where it is included Net Loans to Total 
Assets. This last enter the analysis with a negative coefficient, which denotes a negative 
relation with Market-to-Book ratio that is statistically significant at 5% level. It confirms that 
a more diversified banking business is well rewarded by the market. Column D has two 
changes with respect to the previous one: (i) Net Interest Margin ratio has been excluded from 
the analysis; and (ii) Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans has been included. In spite of the 
statistically insignificance of the estimate of this variable, with these changes it has been 
possible to increase the Adjusted r-squared from 0,065 to 0,089. It remains almost the same in 
column D where it is added also the Cost-to-Income ratio, while, the inclusion of Tier 1 Ratio 
decreased the ability of the model to explain the dependent variable. Nevertheless, Tier 1 
Ratio enters the regression with an estimated beta coefficient that is near zero, but still 
negative, meaning that an increase in capital requirements produce a slightly decrease in 
Market-to-book ratio. The relation is statistically significant at 1% level. Moreover, this 
inclusion increases the statistically significance of Net Loans to total Assets and Loan Loss 
Reserve to Gross loans. It does not have any effect on the significance of Cost-to-income ratio 
that is therefore excluded in the last column where it is also included EuroStoxxBank 
variable, in order to consider the possible effects linked to the market. By including this last 
variable, there are some changes in the significance of the estimated beta coefficients: (i) 
ROE becomes statistically insignificant, (ii) Loan Loss reserve to gross Loans decreases its 
significance to 10% level; and (iii) Tier 1 Ratio reduces its one to 5%. Never the less, the 
                                                
73 After some tests, the variable NIM has then been excluded starting from the model in column D. 
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market variable has a positive and statistically significant beta coefficient at 1% level, and it 
increases the explanatory power of the entire model to 0,141. 
 
Table 15: Weighted Least Squares. Narrow sample, including T1R.  
Dependent variable: MTB, weights based on per-unit error variances 
  A B C D E F 
Const 0,104 1,221 0,931 0,748 2,516 2,119 
 
(0,139) (0,331)*** (0,372)** (0,425)* (0,601)*** (0,668)*** 
ROE 6,340 4,819 7,161 7,452 5,637 2,382 
 
(0,968)*** (1,113)*** (1,344)*** (1,389)*** (1,481)*** (1,864) 
NIM 31,393 17,268 
    
 
(8,210)*** (12,85) 
NLTA 
 
-1,377 -1,039 -1,068 -2,073 -2,076 
  
(0,579)** (0,504)** (0,508)** (0,581)*** (0,598)*** 
LLRGL 
  
4,325 4,009 7,638 6,444 
   
(3,376) (3,571) (3,848)** (3,781)* 
CIR 
   
0,240 0,121 
 
    
(0,225) (0,225)  
T1R 
    
-0,105 -0,093 
     
(0,031)*** (0,036)** 
ESTOXXB 
     
0,008 
      
(0,002)*** 
Statistics based on weighted data: 
     R-squared 0,143 0,074 0,099 0,099 0,096 0,154 
Adjusted R-squared 0,137 0,065 0,089 0,088 0,079 0,141 
N. of observations: 333 with 37 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. Standard Errors in parenthesis; 
*, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
From the analysis of the next two tables, it is possible to clarify that, the reason of the 
scarce ability of the model to explain Market to Book ratio has to be attributed to an high 
variability in data especially for which regards the smallest banks of the sample, whose 
subsample is considered in the findings shown in table 16.  
Even with all the adjustment considered (i.e. excluding the variables with the highest p-
value) the model is not able to explain data with an Adjusted R-squared that move from 2% to 
6,5%, after the introduction of EuroStoxxBank.  
Except of the intercept, the only variable that seems to be statistically significant is Net 
Loans to Total Assets (in detail, it becomes significant in column C, after the inclusion of 
Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans). This variable confirms the negative relation existing 
between traditional banking activities and the measure of value given by the Market-to-Book 
ratio. All the possible assertion on the other variables appear to be superfluous given the fact 
that their estimate are not significant and that plausibly their true value could be zero (it is not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis). 
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Table 16: Weighted Least Squares. Small banks of narrow sample, including T1R.  
Dependent variable: MTB, weights based on per-unit error variances 
  A B C D E F 
Const 0,130 4,890 3,300 3,723 4,975 6,692 
 
(0,351) (1,594)*** (1,221)*** (1,305)*** (1,660)*** (2,205)*** 
ROE 1,866 -0,365 
    
 
(1,812) (2,820) 
    NIM 25,657 20,859 30,253 27,527 38,067 48,027 
 
(15,941) (25,187) (23,593) (24,722) (27,295) (32,381) 
NLTA 
 
-6,417 -4,820 -5,315 -6,665 -9,173 
  
(2,157) (1,777)*** (1,824)*** (2,001)*** (2,484)*** 
LLRGL 
  
2,963 1,004 1,402 
 
   
(4,712) (5,763) (6,734) 
CIR 
   
0,097 0,154 0,535 
    
(0,619) (0,693) (0,632) 
T1R 
    
-0,063 -0,102 
     
(0,063) (0,073) 
ESTOXXB 
     
0,002 
      
(0,005) 
Statistics based on weighted data: 
     R-squared 0,019 0,053 0,050 0,050 0,067 0,090 
Adj. R-squared 0,007 0,036 0,028 0,028 0,039 0,065 
N. of observations: 171 with 19 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. Standard Errors in parenthesis; 
*, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
The opposite holds for big banks: R-squared and Adjusted R-squared go from 14,6% to 
31,8% and from 13,6% to 30% although they reach their maximum level in Column C, before 
of the introduction of Cost-to-Income ratio, Tier 1 Ratio and EuroStoxxBank. Nonetheless, a 
lot of estimated beta coefficients appear to be statistically significant even in the last three 
columns.  Starting from column A, which considers only profitability ratio, it is possible to 
see that only ROE has a positive, statistically significant relation with Market-to-Book Ratio. 
Although it enters the regression with a positive, and statistically insignificant relation with 
Market-to-Book ratio, beta coefficient of Net Interest Margin becomes negative in the second 
column that considers also the effect of Net Loans to Total Assets. The presence of some 
forms of collinearity between these two variables could be the reason of this change. 
Moreover, these estimated beta coefficients are statistically significant until it has been 
included also the Tier 1 ratio, in column E. Net Loans to Total Assets, differently from 
previous analyses, enters the regression with a positive estimated beta coefficient, which is 
also statistically significant at 1% level: while for small banks diversification has a positive 
effect on market-to-book value, for big banks there is evidence of a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between Market-to-Book and a more traditional business. Even this 
significance remains until Tier 1 ratio is included.  
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Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans introduction increases a lot the ability of the model 
to fit data. The variable has a positive and statistically significant relation with Market-to-
Book ratio and its significance rises from 5% level to 1% level after the inclusion of Tier 1 
ratio. On the contrary, Cost-to-Income ratio does not improve the model and it is statistically 
insignificant with p-value that similarly to the one of Net Interest Margin is around 88% so 
that both variables have then been excluded in column F. Moreover, this column excludes 
also Net Loans to total Assets that becomes statistically insignificant in column E. Here, the 
intercept, ROE, Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans and Tier 1 Ratio are all statistically 
significant at 1% level. Particularly, Tier 1 Ratio appears again with a negative coefficient, 
stating for the impact that an increase in banks capital requirements has on Market-to-Book 
ratio. The last column considers only variables that have appeared to be significant in the 
previous columns, moreover, it adds EuroStoxxbank index to consider any possible effect 
linked to the market. These changes entails the statistically insignificance of ROE and the 
decrease in Tier 1 ratio significance. Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans is still positively 
correlated with Market-to-book value and its beta-coefficient estimate remains statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
 
Table 17: Weighted Least Squares. Big banks of narrow sample.  
Dependent variable: MTB, weights based on per-unit error variances 
  A B C D E F 
Const 0,617 0,108 0,021 -0,079 1,306 0,176 
 
(0,174)*** (0,125) (0,144) (0,175) (0,472)*** (0,463) 
ROE 5,766 5,700 7,494 7,662 4,871 0,158 
 
(1,120)*** (0,866)*** (0,681)*** (0,738)*** (1,297)*** (1,429) 
NIM 4,062 -24,345 -43,820 -40,053 -4,679 
 
 
(10,029) (11,491)** (12,185)*** (13,176)*** (11,466) 
NLTA 
 
1,933 2,326 2,179 0,111 
 
  
(0,396)*** (0,363)*** (0,398)*** (0,540) 
 LLRGL 
  
5,584 5,510 13,208 12,362 
   
(2,423)** (2,577)** (3,745)*** (3,191)*** 
CIR 
   
0,115 0,044 
 
    
(0,118) (0,159) 
 T1R 
    
-0,114 -0,065 
     
(0,033)*** (0,035)* 
ESTOXXB 
     
0,013 
      
(0,002)*** 
Statistics based on weighted data: 
    R-squared 0,146 0,310 0,483 0,467 0,208 0,318 
Adj. R-squared 0,136 0,297 0,469 0,449 0,177 0,300 
N. of observations: 162  with 18 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 9 years. Standard Errors in 
parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Chapter IV  
Banks’ Returns: Analysis for the Euro Area 
 
 
As it has been argued in the second chapter, Market-to-book ratio analysis is only one 
of the possibilities through which it could be assessed the value relevance of banks’ financial 
statements. The other approach, recognized by Barth, Beaver and Landsman in 2001, aims to 
determine what is reflected on changes in share prices over a specific period of time. This 
latter will be analysed in the present chapter, so as to provide a comprehensive disclosure of 
the argument. Cooper, Jackson III and Patterson (2003) and Romagnoli (2007)74 executed this 
kind of analysis, regressing banks’ stock returns with some financial and accounting ratio.  
In line with the work proposed in the third chapter, this empirical research focuses on 
the Euro Area banking system but, contrary to the previous analysis, the period considered 
goes from 2007 to 2014. Financial ratios account again for profitability, efficiency, riskiness, 
business activity and capital adequacy. 
The first paragraph describes the changes adopted in the sample and its new 
peculiarities; how financial ratios have been modified and the econometric methods used to 
develop this last analysis. The second paragraph focuses on Fixed Effects regression findings. 
4.1. Data and methods 
Although even this analysis concentrates on publicly listed commercial and 
cooperatives banks registered in the Euro Area, due to the different approach followed in the 
research, both the sample of banks and the timeframe have registered some small changes.  
4.1.1. Changes in the Sample 
The fifty-two banks that compose the balanced sample described in the previous chapter 
constitute the starting point to develop this additional analysis. That sample was composed of 
commercial and cooperatives banks for which have been exported: (i) financial statements, 
from Bureau-Van Dijk – Bankscope; and (ii) market information (prices and number of 
shares), from Thomson Reuters – Datastream. Through a complex selection process the final 
                                                
74 Chapter II, paragraph 2.3, page 54. 
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sample was composed of all the banks for which financial and market variables were 
available from 2006 to 201475. 
The present work requires the availability, for each bank and for every year, of another 
market variable: annual stock returns. This last has been exported from Thomson Reuters – 
Eikon that is a trading and investing tool elaborated by the same company of Datastream. It 
gives access to both real-time data and historical information, from more than 400 exchanges 
and OTC-traded markets. The first change in the sample arises from the inclusion of this 
variable: Thomson Reuters – Eikon does not give access to annual stock returns of one 
Austrian bank76 that, for this reason, has been excluded from the sample. 
Even the timeframe is subject to some changes: as it will be clarified in the next 
subparagraph, due to the fact that the dependent variable is an “annual change”, also the 
explanatory variables must be considered as annual changes. This means that, in order to be 
part of the sample, each bank must have data available from one year before the first 
considered in the time horizon. As it has been largely discussed in the previous chapter, 2006 
was the first year for which all data were available for the fifty-two banks so, this new 
analysis will cover the period between 2007 and 2014.  
4.1.2. Changes in Financial Ratios 
The financial statements analysis conducted in the previous chapter has been repeated in 
order to understand whether bank’s characteristics have some kind of impact on the change in 
shares prices. If the first analysis could be connected with the ones developed by Ming-Li and 
Liang (2005), Jordan et al. (2011) and Macit and Topaloglu (2012) that study the relation 
between a bank’s market value measures and financial ratios; this last could be linked to the 
researches of Cooper, Jackson III and Patterson (2003) and Romagnoli (2007) that aim to 
explain the correlation existing between bank’s stock returns and financial ratios.   
Due to the fact that this research does not concern anymore the correlation between a 
measure of value such as the Market-to-Book ratio and financial and accounting information, 
this last have been adjusted in order to be comparable with the new dependent variable. 
Particularly, financial ratios concerning banks’ profitability, efficiency, riskiness, business 
activity and capital adequacy will be expressed in terms of annual percentage changes.  
                                                
75 Chapter III, paragraph 3.1.1, page 60. 
76 The excluded bank is Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberösterreich AG. Although Datastream provided 
share prices until 2014 (the company has then been delisted) Eikon does not provide its stock returns. 
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Considering a financial ratio R, the annual percentage changes are calculated by 
dividing the value of the ratio at time t with the value of the ratio one period before, minus 
one (equation (4)): 
Δ𝑅! = 𝑅!𝑅!!! − 1   ( 4 ) 
This equation shows why the time horizon has been reduced: the first year of analysis 
cannot be 2006 due to the fact that in 2005 financial information are not available for some of 
the banks included in the original sample. In order to maintain them, the analysis will start 
considering the changes in financial ratios registered in 2007.  
The main difference between this analysis and the Market-to-Book one is constituted by 
the substitution of the dependent variable, which will be described in the next section. 
Stock returns 
Stock returns constitute one of the crucial arguments in financial markets researches. 
Starting with Markowitz’s portfolio selection theorem elaborated during ‘50s, many other 
authors develop theories, known as “asset pricing models” in which expected returns of a 
portfolio have been related with some measures of risks which consider a systemic 
component due to the market risk and an idiosyncratic component, specific of the single 
asset/firm. Anyway, the present analysis does not intend to expand existing literature: the aim 
of this work is not to develop models through which estimate stock returns for investing 
purposes but rather to understand whether the variations in banks’ stock returns are linked, in 
some ways, with variations in their financials ratios.  
Stock returns can arise from two sources: profit of trading and dividends given by the 
company. This last comes from management’s decisions 77  to distribute a portion of 
company’s profits to its shareholders. Both these components are included in the definition of 
stock return index developed by Thomson Reuters – Eikon and that it is therefore used in this 
analysis. As it is possible to see from the equation (5), the Return Index is influenced by  
return of the previous period; stock prices and dividends. 
𝑅𝐼! = 𝑅𝐼!!!×𝑃! + 𝐷!𝑃!!!  ( 5 ) 
                                                
77 Although dividend distribution can be seen as a positive signal linked to the high profitability of the 
company, managers are always very careful with changes in dividend policies: for example, an 
increase in dividend yield could be also interpreted as a signal of scarce growth opportunities to 
exploit.  
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Particularly, the return index at time t, 𝑅𝐼!, is calculated by multiplying its value at time 
t–1, 𝑅𝐼!!!, with the ratio of: (i) the stock price at time t, 𝑃!, plus the dividend at time t, 𝐷!; 
and (ii) the stock price at time t–1, 𝑃!!!.  
Table 18 shows some summary statistics relative to Stock Return Index. The mean 
value is negative, as a lot of banks registered a negative return index during the period 
considered with their prices that had a negative trend. As it has been previously discussed, 
this finding cannot be considered an unexpected outcome since that between 2007 and 2014, 
the banking system has been overturned by the burst of the financial crisis with its negative 
effects also in banks’ stock prices. 
 
Table 18: Stock Return summary statistics, using the observations 1:1 - 51:8 
 RI 
Mean -0,4748 
Median -0,5138 
Minimum -0,9977 
Maximum 0,4542 
Standard Deviation 0,3292 
S. D. Within  0,2342 
S. D. Between  0,2477 
5% percentile -0,9401 
95% percentile 0,1348 
Missing Observation 0 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
4.1.3. Changes in the econometric model 
The few changes in the sample that have been described does not alter its structure, 
which continues to be a panel of data with the same characteristics and advantages of the one 
used in the previous chapter. Particularly, the dataset is now composed of fifty-one 
individuals (banks) whose financial ratios are measured for the eight years between 2007 and 
2014. Similarly to equation (1), the dataset could be described by: 𝑅𝐼!" = 𝛼 + 𝜷𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝑣!" ( 6 ) 
Where, 𝑅𝐼!, is the Return Index calculated by the use of equation (5) that constitutes the 
dependent variable of the regression and that is calculated for every bank i, and for every year 
t; 𝛼 is the intercept term; β is a k × 1 vector of parameters on the explanatory variables R that 
is in turn a vector 1 × k of percentage changes in Financial Ratios calculated again for every 
bank i and at any time t. Finally 𝑣!" is the error term. 
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Contrary to the previous analysis, the variable ESTOXXB, that was included in order to 
accounts for external influences linked to the market, has not been considered78. Indeed, one 
important adjustment to the models analysed in chapter three and described by equations (2) 
and (3), is the introduction of   𝑇 − 1 time dummies79, which are equal to 1 for a specific year 
and 0 for the others. That is, considering the last year of analysis, 2014, which is controlled by 
the dummy variable dt_8: observations that refer to that specific year will have a 1 in dt_8 
while, observations that refer to other years will report a 0. By using these time dummies, we 
allow the intercept to vary across years so as to take into account time-specific fixed effects 
(i.e. the exacerbating of the financial crisis)80.  
In accordance with the reasoning and the methodologies adopted in the third chapter, 
also this analysis will be developed in two steps.  
First, all the fifty-one banks are considered in a model that, similar to the one expressed 
by equation (2) does not study the effect of changes in Tier 1 ratio. The new model is defined 
by the equation (7): 
                                                
78Due to the fact that, this analysis will include a set of time dummies in order to control for any kind 
of trend, it does not make sense to include either a time trend variable or a variable that does not 
change across every individual (as EuroStoXXBanks). Indeed time dummies and both these two kind 
of variable are perfectly collinear (Wooldridge, 2014) 
79 The first time dummy has been removed in order to escape the “dummy variable trap”: an event 
where independent variables are highly correlated so that one variable can be predicted from the 
others. Considering the situation in which one wants to control for two specific factors, let’s say A and 
B. It is sufficient to include a dummy that equals 1 if the factor is A and 0 otherwise. If the model 
includes another dummy that equals 1 when the factor is B and 0 otherwise, the two dummies will be 
perfectly correlated. The same is valid when the events to control are N: it will be sufficient to insert 𝑁 − 1 dummies. 
80In order to test the utility of these variables, regressions have been performed, first of all, for the 
models that do not include them. Results confirm that the inclusion of time dummies increases the 
ability of the model to explain the variability of the dependent variable. Moreover, as it will be 
clarified in the next page, by using these dummies, it is possible to correct some forms of 
heteroskedasticity that remain even considering robust standard errors. To this purpose, the 
introduction of time dummies was considered also in the analysis in the third chapter. However, in 
that case, the variables did not appear to be statistically significant and their inclusion did not correct 
for the absence of homoscedasticity. These are the reasons why the analysis in the previous chapter 
does not consider time dummies, preferring a macro variable, which accounts for trend in the market 
during years. 
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 𝑅𝐼!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐼𝑀!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼𝑅!" + 𝜆!𝑑!!!!! + 𝑣!" ( 7 ) 
With 𝑖 = 1… 51 and 𝑡 = 1… 8.  
Second, as it has been explained in the third chapter, a narrow sample is considered, 
including only banks for which information about Tier 1 ratio are available. The regression 
function (8) describes the changes that have been made in equation (3): 
 𝑅𝐼!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐼𝑀!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝐿𝑇𝐴!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐿!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐼𝑅!"+ 𝛽!𝑇1𝑅!" + 𝜆!𝑑!!!!! + 𝑣!" 
 
( 8 ) 
With 𝑖 = 1… 36 and 𝑡 = 1… 8.  
In both cases, results are shown for the whole samples and for their halves so as to 
consider the differences in bank’s size that have been explained in the third chapter. 
A Fixed Effects model is developed to perform the analysis81 and, even in this case, the 
Hausman’s test supports the choice rejecting the null hypothesis for which the Random Effect 
model is consistent.  
Heteroskedasticity is taken into account by ordering the statistic package Gretl to 
consider Arellano’s robust standard errors. Contrary to the previous analysis, the White’s test 
ascertains that Arellano’s robust standard errors combined with time dummies are able to 
correct heteroskedasticity82.  
4.2. Regression findings 
Before showing results obtained from the regressions of equations (7) and (8), it must 
be clarified that, as in the previous analysis, both models have been implemented by adding 
one variable at time (except for the seven dummies that are always considered). This choice 
allows to test the significance of variables by studying their p-value and the enhancement that 
their inclusion provides to the explanatory power of the model, measured by the within R-
squared83. 
                                                
81 Chapter III, subparagraph 3.1.3, page 71. 
82 Particularly, the White’s test has been performed before and after the introduction of the time 
dummies: When, in the first case, robust standard errors are not able to control for heteroskedasticity 
the introduction of those variables resolves the problem. 
83 Chapter III, paragraph 3.2, page 75. 
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Results of equation (8), which does not consider the effects of Tier 1 Ratio changes, are 
presented in table 19. The first assertion that it could be made attains the predictive power of 
the model. The within R-squared, that is the one which considers time-demeaned data, is 
around the 59% in almost all models described from column A to column D. Particularly, the 
inclusion of explanatory variables increase, even if very slowly, the measure of fit stating for 
the improvement that those inclusions cause to the model.  
Considering the significance of beta-estimates, the first positive conclusion could be 
made for the two profitability ratios. Both, changes in ROE and changes in Net interest 
margin are linked with increases in the variation of stock returns signaling the positive effect 
that the perception of a profitable bank has on investors’ decisions. Although the two beta-
coefficients are very low (i.e. a change in ROE or NIM of 20% is correlated with an increase 
of 0,02% in Stock Returns), both relations are statistically significant at 1% level and 
maintain this significance also after the inclusion of other explanatory variables. Particularly, 
changes in Net Interest Margin remain always significant at 1% while changes in ROE 
decrease their significance after the introduction of Cost-to-Income changes. One possible 
explanation could be that both operating costs (negatively) and operating incomes (positively) 
have an influence on Net Profits, so that an increase in Cost-to-Income ratio could be linked 
with a decrease in ROE. Although the correlation between these two variables shows a very 
weak, negative relation (𝜌!" = −0,20), it could be the reason why after introducing Cost-to-
Income variable the significance of ROE decreases from 1% to 5% level.  
For the full sample, Net Loan to Total Assets changes are positively linked with 
changes in stock returns meaning that a more traditional banking structure, on average, is 
valued more by the market. Anyway, this positive relation appears to be statistically 
insignificant. Even Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans and Cost-to-Income ratio do not appear 
to be statistically significant. Anyway, positive changes in the first variable are associated, on 
average, with positive changes in stock returns, as the market will consider an increase in 
reserves as a signal of increase in management prudence. On the contrary, and in accordance 
with expectations, positive variations in Cost-to-Income are associated with negative changes 
in stock return: an inefficient bank is valued less by the market.  
Finally, time dummies account for any kind of external issue linked to a specific year 
that can be correlated with stock returns. All estimated beta coefficients of these dummies are 
statistically significant at 1% level, and all register negative relations with stock returns. One 
of the possible reasons could be the peculiarity of the years considered: the first time dummy, 
dt_2, considers the second year of analysis for which changes in financial ratios and stock 
returns are available for the period between 2007 and 2008 that is exactly when the U.S. 
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banking crisis started to spread itself all over the world. Dt_5 and dt_6 are inherent the years 
2011 and 2012 respectively, so that changes in explanatory variables are calculated 
considering the periods: 2010-2011 and 2011-2012. Negative peaks registered by these two 
dummies, perhaps, could be correlated with the exacerbating of the euro-area sovereign debt 
crisis with all its negative consequences84. 
 
Table 19: Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Full sample, excluding T1R. Dependent variable: RI 
  A B C D 
Constant -0,0542 -0,056 -0,058 -0,058 
 
(0,028)* (0,028)** (0,027)** (0,027)** 
ROE 0,001 0,001 0,002 0,001 
 
(0,001)*** (0,001)*** (0,001)*** (0,001)** 
NIM 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
 
(0,0002)*** (0,0002)*** (0,0002)*** (0,0002)*** 
NLTA 
 
0,057 0,063 0,066 
  
(0,040) (0,039) (0,040) 
LLRGL 
  
0,017 0,023 
   
(0,017) (0,019) 
CIR 
   
-0,039 
    
(0,024) 
dt_2 -0,468 -0,469 -0,471 -0,465 
 
(0,030)*** (0,030)*** (0,030)*** (0,029)*** 
dt_3 -0,386 -0,385 -0,389 -0,387 
 
(0,028)*** (0,027)*** (0,027)*** (0,026)*** 
dt_4 -0,466 -0,464 -0,465 -0,466 
 
(0,033)*** (0,033)*** (0,032)*** (0,033)*** 
dt_5 -0,545 -0,542 -0,542 -0,538 
 
(0,036)*** (0,036)*** (0,035)*** (0,033)*** 
dt_6 -0,5632 -0,559 -0,563 -0,562 
 
(0,034)*** (0,034)*** (0,034)*** (0,034)*** 
dt_7 -0,48 -0,478 -0,478 -0,48 
 
(0,043)*** (0,044)*** (0,043)*** (0,043)*** 
dt_8 -0,445 -0,441 -0,44 -0,438 
 
(0,048)*** (0,047)*** (0,047)*** (0,046)*** 
     LSDV R-squared 0,817 0,818 0,819 0,820 
Within R-squared 0,589 0,590 0,592 0,594 
N. of observations: 408 with 51 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 8 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 0,329. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
  
                                                
84 Chapter I, subparagraph 1.1.1, page 10 and subparagraph 1.1.2, page 17. 
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Table 20 offers results for the first decomposition of the full sample, which considers 
the smallest banks with averages of total assets up to euro 27,88 billion. This first subsample, 
is characterized of high variability in data and the within R-squared moves from 0,43 to 0,45 
among the four columns where explanatory variables are added, one at time.  
It appears clearly that no one of the estimated beta coefficients is able to correctly 
predict the true values of beta since that no one appears to be statistically significant.  
Return on Equity estimated beta coefficient is so small that variations on the 
profitability ratio are almost not linked with variations of returns index. Only in column D, 
which attains the model where all the explanatory variables are implemented, ROE beta 
coefficients equalize the one obtained for the full sample, even remaining statistically 
insignificant. Considering Net Interest Margin, things are even more complicated: A positive 
variation of this financial ratio is associated, on average, with a considerable negative 
variation in stock returns. However, it must be considered that the statistically insignificance 
of beta estimate implies that the null hypothesis for which the true beta is equal to zero cannot 
be rejected.  
Although also the estimated beta coefficients of Net Loans to Total Assets, Loan Loss 
Reserves to Gross Loans and Cost-to-Income ratio are all statistically insignificant, their signs 
are consistent with the expected ones: the first enters regression results with a positive signs, 
that confirms the previous finding for which a more traditional business activity is valued 
more by the market; the second suggests a positive impact of more prudent management 
decisions; the third highlights the importance for a bank to maintain costs without imposing 
prejudices to its profitability.  
Contrary to what happens with estimated coefficients of explanatory variables, all the 
time-dummies appear to be statistically significant at 1% level: they allow the model to 
account for time specific fixed effects that modify the intercept of regression by considering 
specific events that could be correlated with changes in the dependent variable. 
According with results obtained in table 19 for the full sample, external factors appear 
to have strong negative effects. In detail, it is confirmed that the greatest impacts are 
registered in the dummy variables that control for the years when the U.S banking crisis and 
the euro-area sovereign debt crisis revealed their seriousness.  
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Table 20: Fixed Effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Small banks of full sample, excluding T1R. Dependent variable: RI 
  A B C D 
Constant 0,011 0,005 0,000 -0,003 
 
(0,045) (0,04) (0,043) (0,040) 
ROE 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,001 
 
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) 
NIM -0,144 -0,144 -0,126 -0,140 
 
(0,097) (0,098) (0,096) (0,094) 
NLTA 
 
0,112 0,118 0,119 
  
(0,096) (0,096) (0,098) 
LLRGL 
  
0,029 0,038 
   
(0,019) (0,025) 
CIR 
   
-0,073 
    
(0,070) 
dt_2 -0,428 -0,43 -0,43 -0,417 
 
(0,052)*** (0,052)*** (0,051)*** (0,052)*** 
dt_3 -0,346 0,348 -0,35 -0,343 
 
(0,046)*** (0,047)*** (0,044)*** (0,041)*** 
dt_4 -0,389 -0,383 -0,380 -0,380 
 
(0,054)*** (0,055)*** (0,052)*** (0,051)*** 
dt_5 -0,449 -0,443 -0,44 -0,434 
 
(0,055)*** (0,055)*** (0,053)*** (0,050)*** 
dt_6 -0,500 -0,492 -0,497 -0,492 
 
(0,058)*** (0,058)*** (0,056)*** (0,055)*** 
dt_7 -0,401 -0,395 -0,392 -0,391 
 
(0,069)*** (0,070)*** (0,068)*** (0,065)*** 
dt_8 -0,321 -0,313 -0,31 -0,305 
 
(0,073)*** (0,073)*** (0,072)*** (0,068)*** 
     LSDV R-squared 0,758 0,759 0,764 0,766 
Within R-squared 0,435 0,439 0,449 0,454 
N. of observations: 208 with 26 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 8 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 0,336. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration. 
 
The biggest ones of the fifty-one banks included in the full sample are considered in the 
regressions whose results are shown in table 21. Contrary to what happened with the previous 
subsample, this models are characterized by high ability to explain changes in the dependent 
variable. Even in the first column of the table, which includes only profitability ratios (along 
with the intercept and the time dummies), the within R-squared is 0,805. The inclusions of the 
other independent variables are not able to materially increase it, which stops in the last 
column at 0,809. As a matter of fact, except of the intercept and the dummies, profitability 
ratios are the most statistically significant ones with estimated beta coefficients equal to the 
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ones accounted for the full sample (table 19). Net Loans to Total Assets estimates do not 
appear to be significant at all, as well as Cost-to-income ones. Nonetheless, the signs of their 
estimates are conform to the ones of the full sample: positive for the first and negative for the 
second. Differently, Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans enters the regression with a negative 
sign and a statistically significant relation at 5% level. The negative relation is maintained 
even in the column D where Cost-to-Income ratio is included, however, in this last case it 
decreases significance at 10% level. 
 
Table 21: Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Big banks of full sample, excluding T1R. Dependent variable: RI 
  A B C D 
Constant -0,123 -0,124 -0,126 -0,126 
 
(0,025)*** (0,024)*** (0,024)*** (0,024)*** 
ROE 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
 
(0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)** 
NIM 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
 
(0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** 
NLTA 
 
0,035 0,011 0,012 
  
(0,034) (0,037) (0,036) 
LLRGL 
  
-0,042 -0,038 
   
(0,016)** (0,019)* 
CIR 
   
-0,014 
    
(0,018) 
dt_2 -0,511 -0,511 -0,499 -0,497 
 
(0,027)*** (0,027)*** (0,026)*** (0,025)*** 
dt_3 -0,429 -0,428 -0,413 -0,414 
 
(0,029)*** (0,028)*** (0,028)*** (0,025)*** 
dt_4 -0,541 -0,542 -0,534 -0,535 
 
(0,028)*** (0,027)*** (0,026)*** (0,026)*** 
dt_5 -0,635 -0,632 -0,624 -0,623 
 
(0,027)*** (0,026)*** (0,026)*** (0,026)*** 
dt_6 -0,637 -0,634 -0,617 -0,618 
 
(0,033)*** (0,031)*** (0,030)*** (0,031)*** 
dt_7 -0,554 -0,553 -0,546 -0,549 
 
(0,043)*** (0,042)*** (0,042)*** (0,042)*** 
dt_8 -0,561 -0,559 -0,555 -0,555 
 
(0,048)*** (0,047)*** (0,046)*** (0,046)*** 
 
    
LSDV R-squared 0,861 0,862 0,864 0,865 
Within R-squared 0,805 0,806 0,808 0,809 
N. of observations: 200 with 25 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 8 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 0,259. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Due to the fact that positive changes of Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans ratio could 
be attributed either to an increase in bank prudence or to a decrease in loans portfolio quality, 
the negative sign of the coefficient could be linked to some form of investors’ aversion that 
interpret the positive changes in the ratio as signals of decrease in loans quality.  
Again, time dummies are all statistically significant at 1% with negative signs that state 
for external influences linked with the period considered in the analysis.  
The next three tables present results obtained for the narrow sample that considers only 
banks for which Tier 1 ratio data are available.  
First of all, Table 22 shows results for the whole sample composed of thirty-six banks. 
The model shows, yet in the first column, a good ability to explain Return index variations 
with an R-squared of 0,71 that increases with the inclusion of explanatory variables until it 
reaches the maximum of 0,733 in column E. This result is confirmed by the statistic 
significance of estimated beta coefficients. Starting with ROE and Net Interest Margin, which 
are the only variables considered in the first column (except for the intercept and the time 
dummies), both have a positive – although weak – relation with return index, and both are 
statistically significant at 1% level. Particularly, for Net Interest Margin significance is never 
altered by the inclusion of the other variables while, the significance of ROE decreases at 5% 
level after the inclusion of Cost-to-Income ratio (perhaps for the same reasons argued in 
explaining table 19).  
Differently from all the previous cases, considering this restricted sample, Net Loans to 
Total Assets enter the regression with an estimated beta coefficient that is positive and 
statistically significant at 5% level. Moreover, the coefficient reveals a moderate relation with 
return index so that a positive variation in the ratio, linked with a more traditional business 
model is correlated with a positive variation in stock return. Also the variation in Cost-to-
income ratio enters the analysis with an estimate that is statistically significant at 1% level 
and with a sign that is in accordance with the expected one. Indeed, an increase in inefficiency 
is correlated with a decrease in market valuation, measured by the change in return index. The 
same decrease follows positive variations in Tier 1 ratios that enter the analysis in the last 
column with an estimated beta coefficient that is negative and statistically significant at 10% 
level. A possible explanation of this relation could be that investors negatively react to 
increases in capital requirements. Loan loss reserve to gross loans is the only explanatory 
variable that appears to be statistically insignificant with estimated beta coefficient that shows 
also a weak relation with the dependent variable. 
For which regard the seven dummy variables, previous results are confirmed even in 
this analysis: the presence of a negative trend due to some time fixed effects is verified by the 
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statistically significant beta coefficients of these variables. Moreover, it is also confirmed that 
the estimated beta coefficient could be linked with the getting worse of the financial crises. 
 
Table 22: Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Narrow sample, including T1R. Dependent variable: RI 
  A B C D E 
Constant -0,057 -0,071 -0,071 -0,072 -0,072 
 
(0,034)* (0,035)** (0,034)** (0,033)** (0,033)** 
ROE 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
 
(0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)** (0,000)** 
NIM 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
 
(0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** 
NLTA 
 
0,317 0,319 0,318 0,305 
  
(0,158)** (0,153)** (0,162)* (0,161)* 
LLRGL 
  
0,002 0,016 0,019 
   
(0,031) (0,030) (0,030) 
CIR 
   
-0,064 -0,068 
    
(0,024)*** (0,025)*** 
T1R 
    
-0,031 
     
(0,016)* 
dt_2 -0,457 -0,458 -0,458 -0,445 -0,44 
 
(0,037)*** (0,037)*** (0,037)*** (0,036)*** (0,036)*** 
dt_3 -0,415 -0,404 -0,405 -0,402 -0,396 
 
(0,034)*** (0,034)*** (0,036)*** (0,034)*** (0,034)*** 
dt_4 -0,501 -0,491 -0,491 -0,491 -0,491 
 
(0,039)*** (0,038)*** (0,039)*** (0,038)*** (0,038)*** 
dt_5 -0,589 -0,577 -0,577 -0,565 -0,561 
 
(0,045)*** (0,046)*** (0,046)*** (0,042)*** (0,042)*** 
dt_6 -0,611 -0,585 -0,586 -0,585 -0,581 
 
(0,042)*** (0,044)*** (0,045)*** (0,043)*** (0,043)*** 
dt_7 -0,557 -0,545 -0,545 -0,55 -0,547 
 
(0,046)*** (0,046)*** (0,046)*** (0,045)*** (0,044)*** 
dt_8 -0,549 -0,527 -0,527 -0,524 -0,522 
 
(0,051)*** (0,052)*** (0,052)*** (0,051)*** (0,051)*** 
      LSDV R-squared 0,887 0,89 0,89 0,893 0,894 
Within R-squared 0,717 0,724 0,724 0,731 0,733 
N. of observations: 288 with 36 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 8 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 0,349. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
Partially similar results are obtained considering the first half of banks in the sample, 
the smallest ones (table 23). Although the Within R-squared is lower than the previous case, 
starting from the 0,616 of the model in the first column and reaching 0,669 in the model that 
includes all the explanatory variables, many estimated beta coefficients appear to be 
statistically significant.  
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Table 23: Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Small banks of narrow sample, including T1R. Dependent variable: RI 
  A B C D E 
Constant 0,025	   -­‐0,003	   -­‐0,009	   -­‐0,017	   -­‐0,017	  
 
(0,062)	   (0,062)	   (0,061)	   (0,056)	   (0,056)	  
ROE 0,001	   0,002	   0,002	   0,001	   0,001	  
 
(0,000)**	   (0,001)*	   (0,001)**	   (0,001)	   (0,001)	  
NIM -­‐0,16	   -­‐0,208	   -­‐0,199	   -­‐0,221	   -­‐0,224	  
 
(0,042)***	   (0,042)***	   (0,052)***	   (0,043)***	   (0,041)***	  
NLTA 
	  
0,639	   0,653	   0,704	   0,665	  
 	  
(0,299)**	   (0,284)**	   (0,285)**	   (0,283)**	  
LLRGL 
	   	  
0,016	   0,038	   0,042	  
 	   	  
(0,041)	   (0,036)	   (0,034)	  
CIR 
	   	   	  
-­‐0,127	   -­‐0,149	  
 	   	   	  
(0,050)**	   (0,045)***	  
T1R 
	   	   	   	  
-­‐0,069	  
	   	   	   	   	  
(0,027)**	  
dt_2 -­‐0,398	   -­‐0,403	   -­‐0,399	   -­‐0,372	   -­‐0,371	  
 
(0,064)***	   (0,062)***	   (0,065)***	   (0,064)***	   (0,063)***	  
dt_3 -­‐0,407	   -­‐0,382	   -­‐0,381	   -­‐0,365	   -­‐0,356	  
 
(0,059)***	   (0,057)***	   (0,055)***	   (0,049)***	   (0,048)***	  
dt_4 -­‐0,471	   -­‐0,454	   -­‐0,451	   -­‐0,441	   -­‐0,442	  
 
(0,071)***	   (0,068)***	   (0,067)***	   (0,062)***	   (0,063)***	  
dt_5 -­‐0,524	   -­‐0,498	   -­‐0,494	   -­‐0,459	   -­‐0,457	  
 
(0,084)***	   (0,087)***	   (0,083)***	   (0,072)***	   (0,073)***	  
dt_6 -­‐0,601	   -­‐0,554	   -­‐0,551	   -­‐0,54	   -­‐0,533	  
 
(0,080)***	   (0,080)***	   (0,077)***	   (0,072)***	   (0,072)***	  
dt_7 -­‐0,539	   -­‐0,5	   -­‐0,497	   -­‐0,492	   -­‐0,484	  
 
(0,082)***	   (0,085)***	   (0,081)***	   (0,074)***	   (0,073)***	  
dt_8 -­‐0,504	   -­‐0,443	   -­‐0,439	   -­‐0,433	   -­‐0,43	  
 
(0,088)***	   (0,088)***	   (0,086)***	   (0,083	   (0,084)***	  
 	   	   	   	   	  LSDV R-squared 0,873	   0,878	   0,88	   0,887	   0,89	  
Within R-squared 0,616	   0,637	   0,639	   0,661	   0,669	  
N. of observations: 144 with 18 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 8 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 0,393. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
Source: author’s elaboration 
 
The two main differences attain the profitability ratios. ROE enters the regression with a 
weak, positive relation that is statistically significant at 5% level. Its significance decreases 
after including Net Loans to Total assets and then increase again at 5% level in column C 
where also Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans is considered. Nevertheless, it becomes 
statistically insignificant after the introduction of Cost-to-income ratio.  
Another concerning aspect attains the sign of the relation between Net Interest Margin 
and the return index. It seems that a positive variation in this financial ratio is linked with a 
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negative reaction of the market. Furthermore, this negative, moderate, relation appears to be 
statistically significant at 1% level even introducing all the other variables. Considering that 
similar results have been obtained for the first half of the entire sample (although in that case 
the relation appeared to be statistically insignificant) maybe this finding could be attributed to 
high variability in the data of the smallest banks.  
Accordingly with findings obtained in table 22, Net Loans to Total Assets estimated 
beta coefficient shows a positive strong relation with stock return index that is also 
statistically significant at 5% level. The positive effect of a traditional banking system is 
maintained even in the columns that include other explanatory variables: Loan Loss reserve to 
Gross Loans, Cost-to-Income and Tier 1 ratio. While the estimated beta coefficient of the first 
does not appear to be statistically significant in anyone of the three columns, the other two 
variables enter the analysis with estimated beta coefficients that follow the trend previously 
examined for the whole sample. Particularly, Cost-to-income ratio has a negative, weak, and 
statistically significant relation with stock index return; with the significance that increase 
from 5% level to 1% level in the last column that includes the Tier 1 ratio. Even this last, has 
a negative weak relation with stock returns and it is significant at 1% level.  
As in all the previous cases analysed, time dummies are all statistically significant at 1% 
level and accounts for some time-fixed and negative effects.  
The last results to be presented attain the second subsample composed of the biggest 
banks. Table 24 shows that even in column A – which considers only profitability ratios – the 
model has a within R-squared of 0,857 that further increases with the inclusion of the other 
variables until the maximum of 0,863 reached in column D and maintained in column E, that 
is the column where Tier 1 Ratio effects are studied. 
The first things to be considered are the estimated beta coefficients of profitability ratio, 
that are again statistically significant and that denote the presence of a positive – although 
weak – relation with variations in stock returns.  
As it has been accounted for the biggest bank of the sample composed of fifty-one 
banks, Loan Loss Reserve to Gross loans enter the analysis with a negative, weak beta 
coefficient with a relation that is statistically significant at 5% level only before the 
introduction of Cost-to-Income ratio. This last is significant at 1% level with estimated beta 
coefficient that is always negative and near zero.  
Differently from tables 22 and 23, Net Loans to Total Assets does not appear to be 
statistically significant even if its inclusion increases slightly the within R-squared. Anyway, 
it enters the regression with a positive estimated beta coefficient. The same is valid for Tier 1 
Ratio: positive changes in this ratio are not linked anymore with negative reactions of 
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investors. Plausibly an increase in regulatory capital for the biggest banks, that are also the 
ones most exposed to risk and that are recognized as systematically important even by 
regulators, is not associated with a decrease of market returns even considering that these 
banks should be in any case able to preserve their profitability. Anyway, these assertions are 
not confirmed on a statistic point of view, since that the relation appear to be insignificant. 
Finally, even in this subsample are maintained all the negative, moderate, and 
statistically significant relations between time dummies and stock returns, confirming the 
impact that  the exacerbating of the crisis could have had on banks’ stock returns.  
 
Table 24 Fixed effects model using Robust (HAC) standard errors.  
Big banks of narrow sample, including T1R. Dependent variable: RI 
  A B C D E 
Const -0,134 -0,137 -0,139 -0,137 -0,137 
 
(0,025)*** (0,025)*** (0,025)*** (0,025)*** (0,025)*** 
ROE 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 0,002 
 
(0,001)*** (0,001)** (0,001)** (0,001)** (0,001)** 
NIM 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 
 
(0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** (0,000)*** 
NLTA 
 
0,131 0,131 0,118 0,118 
  
(0,092) (0,090) (0,090) (0,090) 
LLRGL 
  
-0,026 -0,013 -0,013 
   
(0,012)** (0,011) (0,011) 
CIR 
   
-0,032 -0,032 
    
(0,011)*** (0,011)*** 
T1R 
    
0,001 
     
(0,012) 
dt_2 -0,522 -0,522 -0,515 -0,511 -0,511 
 
(0,031)*** (0,032)*** (0,031)*** (0,030)*** (0,030)*** 
dt_3 -0,444 -0,442 -0,432 -0,434 -0,434 
 
(0,034)*** (0,033)*** (0,032)*** (0,032)*** (0,032)*** 
dt_4 -0,551 -0,546 -0,541 -0,545 -0,545 
 
(0,025)*** (0,024)*** (0,024)*** (0,023)*** (0,023)*** 
dt_5 -0,649 -0,645 -0,641 -0,638 -0,639 
 
(0,028)*** (0,028)*** (0,027)*** (0,027)*** (0,027)*** 
dt_6 -0,638 -0,628 -0,616 -0,621 -0,621 
 
(0,032)*** (0,033)*** (0,032)*** (0,032)*** (0,032)*** 
dt_7 -0,58 -0,578 -0,575 -0,581 -0,581 
 
(0,040)*** (0,039)*** (0,038)*** (0,039)*** (0,039)*** 
dt_8 -0,583 -0,576 -0,574 -0,573 -0,573 
 
(0,044)*** (0,044)*** (0,044)*** (0,043)*** (0,043)*** 
      LSDV R-squared 0,898 0,899 0,901 0,902 0,902 
Within R-squared 0,857 0,859 0,861 0,863 0,863 
N. of observations: 144 with 18 cross-sectional units. Time series length: 8 years. S. Deviation of dependent 
variable 0,254. Standard Errors in parenthesis; *, ** and *** denote significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The work presented in this thesis could be included in the set of studies regarding the 
value relevance. These two terms refer to the ability of financial statement information to 
impact firms’ market value.  
The argument is not free from criticisms, Holthausen and Watts (2001) denote the 
restricted influence of such studies for standard setting purposes, arguing that in absence of a 
specific theory that describes the empirical association, those researches cannot be useful and 
remain mere associations. 
Nonetheless, Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001) in their article reply to Holthausen 
and Watts showing the pertinence of these researches for accounting standard stetting, 
particularly, considering the complexity of financial markets, which increase over time. They 
make clear that these studies are aimed to explain stocks market values rather than firms’ 
value distinguishing two approaches through which researches can be developed: (i) in term 
of level of firm value, to determine what is reflected in share price; or (ii) in term of change in 
share price, in order to explain what is reflected in stock return.  
Accordingly with Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001), Anandarajan et al. (2011) 
explain that the expansion of value relevance literature follows the globalization of financial 
markets and the increase in international investments. These authors recognize in the samples 
the main limits of these studies, observing that it is difficult to provide correct results and 
inferences on value relevance studies whose samples gather entities of different industries. 
Moreover, they argue that the banks’ prominent role on international economics development 
and the increasing consolidation of the financial sector make bank’s value relevance analyses 
particularly interesting, although cross country differences in banks’ financial statements 
could constitute one of their limits.  
As a matter of fact, last years have shown the extent of damages that a shock in the 
banking sector could have on the entire economy and how financial instruments can spread 
the crisis from the U.S. to all over the world, reaching public debts, with governments crushed 
by banks’ bailouts, and real economies, blocked-out by credit crunch. These dramatic 
circumstances reopen debates on banks regulation and supervision, challenging EU 
authorities to provide the entire system of a more reliable and harmonized framework through 
which increase transparency, soundness and resilience of the system.  
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In accordance with Anandarajan et al. (2011) a crucial point remains the transparency 
and the harmonization of banks’ financial statements. Even after the introduction of 
IAS/IFRS, they are still characterized by management directionality especially with regards 
the evaluation of financial instruments, that constitute the largest portion of banks’ assets and 
liabilities: Although the international accounting standards provide for the adoption of fair 
value method for their measurement, fair value coincides with market value only when there 
is an active liquid market for the instruments. If it does not exist, the estimation of fair value 
can rely only on internal “asset pricing models”. In this last case, despite the fact that banks 
are obliged to disclose all these information in the notes, financial statements users are not 
able to perfectly reproduce such estimations and have to rely on banks’ proposals.  
The debate is particularly heated so that a lot of studies reported in the literature review 
attain the relevance of fair value estimates, with references to investment securities, off-
balance sheet items and loans.  
Other studies presented in the literature review attain the value relevance of banks’ 
capital structure, diversification and rating changes.  
This work rests on two groups of studies that develop value relevance analyses applying 
the two approaches described by Barth, Beaver and Landsman (2001).  
First of all Market-to-Book ratio analysis has been presented, following the work of 
Ming-Li and Liang (2005), Jordan et al. (2011) and Macit and Topaloglu (2012). Then, with 
references to the works of Cooper, Jackson III and Patterson (2003) and Romagnoli (2007), 
banks’ Market-to-Book ratios have been substituted by bank’s stock returns.  
Both analyses consider Euro-Area commercial and cooperative banks publicly listed 
during the period between 2006 and 2014. This sample is a statistical structure where time 
series and cross sectional units are combined together in a data set known as panel of data. 
With regards to financial ratios, they are similar to those used in the over mentioned studies 
and concern: (i) profitability, measured by ROE and Net Interest Income; (ii) efficiency, 
measured by the Cost-to-Income ratio; (iii) riskiness, with the Loan Loss Reserve to Gross 
Loans ratio;  (iv) business activity, accounted by the Net Loans to Total Assets; and (v) 
capital adequacy, represented by the Tier 1 ratio. This last variable is not available for a lot of 
banks and, for this reason, both analysis are conducted for the whole sample, without 
including capital adequacy and for a restricted sample that considers only the banks for which 
Tier 1 data are available. 
With reference to the first analysis, Market-to-book ratio constitutes the dependent 
variable of a regression whose explanatory variables are the financial ratios plus the variable 
“EuroStoxxBanks”, which take into account the market trend of the banking sector. 
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Considering the structure of the sample, a first kind of analysis has been conducted adopting a 
Fixed Effects model; the choice has been confirmed by the Hausman test. Moreover, in order 
to correct for heteroskedasticity, Arellano’s robust standard errors have been considered. 
Unfortunately, the White test revealed that, even with their adoption, heterosckedasticity 
problems have not been resolved. For this reason, using Gretl software has been performed 
also a Weighted Least Square regression with weights based on per-unit error variances. 
Results confirm expectations for which the market values more banks: (i) whose 
profitability, measured by ROE, is higher; (ii) that are more diversified; and (iii) more prudent 
in evaluating their Loans portfolio. Cost-to-Income ratio and EuroStoxxBanks, although 
significant, do not seem to provide huge variations in market valuation. These results are 
confirmed for the subsample that considers only the smallest banks, even if the Adjusted R-
squared of this model is much lower, probably because of a higher variability in data. Results 
of the model that studies the biggest banks change drastically during the stepwise inclusion of 
explanatory variables. Nonetheless when all variables are considered, the model reaches the 
highest Adjusted R-squared. ROE and Loans Loss Reserve to Gross Loans have a positive 
relation with Market-to-Book ratio before the introduction of the efficiency ratio and of 
EuroStoxxBank. Then, only the latter and the Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans are the 
variables that seem to have a positive and statistically significant relation with Market-to-
Book ratio.  
The narrow sample of banks with available Tier 1 ratio data appears to have high 
variability in data, especially for the subsample of the smallest banks. The capital adequacy 
variable enters all the three regressions (for the whole sample and for the two subsamples) 
with negative, even if very low, estimated beta coefficient that is, almost in all cases, 
statistically significant. This result contrasts with Jordan et Al. (2011) and Macit and 
Topaloglu (2012), which find, respectively for the U.S. and the Turkish banking system, a 
positive correlation between the capital ratio and the Market-to-Book ratio. Profitability ratios 
results are in accordance with those obtained in previous researches. 
In the second analysis, market stock returns substitute the Market-to-book ratios. These 
returns are calculated by Thomson Reuters – Eikon as the product between the Returns of the 
previous period and the changes in share prices, taking into account dividends policies.  
In order to maintain the comparability between the dependent variable and the 
explanatory variables, financial ratios have been considered as annual percentage changes. 
These adjustments imply a reduction in the time period of analysis that is composed of the 
years between 2007 and 2014.  
  112 
Another difference between the two analyses attains the variable EuroStoxxBanks that 
was included in the first model in order to take into account possible external effects linked to 
the market. This last analysis does not consider such variable: the presence of possible time-
specific fixed effects (as the exacerbating of the financial crisis) is accounted by T-1 time 
dummies. Even in this case has been developed a Fixed Effects model to perform the analysis 
and again this choice has been supported by the Hausman’s test. Heteroskedasticity has been 
taken into account by ordering the statistic package Gretl to consider Arellano’s robust 
standard errors and, contrary to the previous analysis, through the White’s test it has been 
ascertained that Arellano’s robust standard errors combined with time dummies are able to 
correct for the absence of homoscedasticity assumption. 
Results of the model that do not consider Tier 1 Ratio show the presence of a positive, 
even if low, relation between changes in returns and profitability ratio that is confirmed also 
considering the sub-sample of the biggest banks. In this analysis, changes in Loans Loss 
Reserve to Gross loans appear to have a negative impact on changes in stock returns.  
The models that include Tier 1 ratio suggest the presence of a positive relation between 
changes in stock return and changes in: profitability and business activity ratios. On the other 
hand changes in Cost-to-Income ratio and Tier 1 ratio are negatively correlated with changes 
in stock return. It should be noted that these results are affected by high variability of data, 
concentrated on the subsample composed of the smallest banks. Here Net Interest Margin 
appears with a negative and statistically significant beta coefficient. This finding is not 
obtained in the regression that consider the biggest bank, where both profitability ratios 
appear again to positively influence changes in stock returns. Cost-to-income ratio has a 
negative influence while Tier 1 ratio does not appear to be significant.  
 The presence of a positive correlation between profitability ratios (except results 
obtained for small banks) and stock returns confirms findings obtained by Cooper, Jackson III 
and Patterson (2003) for the U.S. banking system as well as the ones obtained by Romagnoli 
(2007) in a study about the Italian banking system. Considering this latter study, the presence 
of a diversification discount and the insignificance of capital adequacy ratio are also 
confirmed. It should be noted that for the U.S. banking system Cooper, Jackson III and 
Patterson (2003) found a positive and significant relation between capital ratios and market 
returns. 
One important consideration attains the limits of these analyses. First of all, as it has 
been point out, it should be considered that the sample is characterized by high variability of 
data. This variability is partially explained by considering that the time horizon includes all 
the years of the financial crisis. Another plausible explanation could be that the banks in the 
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sample are very different among each other not only for which regards the amount of their 
total assets but especially for which regards the activities carried out by these banks. As a 
matter of fact, even Authorities have established to distinguish a group of significant banks, 
taking into consideration not only their size but also their importance for the economy of the 
Member State and the significance of their cross-border activities. Results also shows that this 
variability is present, most of all, in the sub sample composed of small banks.  
Following this reasoning, the first adjustments that should be considered for further 
developments could attain the sample: (i) considering different time horizon; (ii) increasing 
the number of banks analysed; (iii) imposing databases further prerequisites to include one 
bank in the analysis. None the less, it should also be considered that a further selection could 
cause the sample to be so small that the reliability of statistical inferences could be in any case 
compromised.  
Both analyses could be improved by considering different explanatory variables: for 
example, instead of the Cost-to-Income ratio, it could be used as measure of efficiency the 
bank’s percentage difference in “Cost X-Efficiency” compared to the best benchmark banks, 
as proposed by Jordan et al. (2011). Moreover, following Romagnoli (2007), the models 
could take into account also bank’s liquidity by adding the ratio between interbank assets and 
liabilities. Finally it could be considered also the inclusion of a variable that accounts for 
banks’ rating changes.  
Regarding Heteroskedasticity problems, Market-to-book ratio analysis have been 
corrected by considering Gretl automatic Weighted Least Squared regression with weights 
based on per-unit error variances. Further econometric researches could be conducted so as to 
define which variable could be used as weight in a manual WLS regression. This attempt 
requires advanced econometric techniques and lies outside the present analysis. 
Last but not least, one should consider that the present study cannot be interpreted as a 
proof of causality between market values and financial information not only for the limits 
previously described or for the possible presence of omitted variables but because of the 
context that we are trying to explain: although the explanatory variables considered in this 
study are not correlated among each other, there are still many connected aspects inherent 
banks management that the statistical models are not able to perfectly synthetize and that 
could drive the inconsistency of some of the results.  
After the financial crisis, in the attempt to provide for a more soundness banking 
system, regulators starts to impose stricter and stricter capital requirements, especially in 
terms of capital of the best quality (Common Equity Tier 1). In order to accomplish with these 
standards banks have to sacrifice resources that could be invested in more profitable financial 
  114 
instruments reducing at the same time their risky exposures. These could lead to a reduction 
in banks’ profitability that, in turn, could deter capital increases since banks’ shares become 
less desirable.  
Furthermore, as it has been previously explained, investors are not really able to 
understand the asset pricing models used by banks in evaluating their financial assets nor they 
are able to evaluate the methods through which banks calculate Non-performing loans 
adjustments. The possibility that banks’ capital do not consider adequately the losses that 
could arise from non performing exposures could be the reason for which an increase in Loan 
Loss Reserve to Gross Loans is positively correlated with market values. 
These are only some of the arguments that characterize the current debate between 
investors, regulators and bankers; a lot of other inferences are constantly proposed by these 
actors so that it could not be obvious to ascertain if and in which measure a statistical model 
could take into account all of them so that to demonstrate a causal relationship. 
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Annex: Banks in the sample 
 
 
BANK NAME COUNTRY 
Bnp Paribas FR 
Deutsche Bank AG DE 
Crédit Agricole S.A. FR 
Société Générale SA FR 
Banco Santander SA ES 
Unicredit IT 
Intesa Sanpaolo IT 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA ES 
Commerzbank AG DE 
Crédit Industriel et Commercial SA - CIC FR 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena IT 
Banco de Sabadell SA ES 
Banco Popular Espanol SA ES 
Deutsche Postbank AG DE 
Banco Popolare - Società Cooper IT 
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI Banca IT 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG AT 
National Bank of Greece SA GR 
Allied Irish Banks plc IE 
Piraeus Bank SA GR 
Banco Comercial Português, SA-M PT 
Eurobank Ergasias SA GR 
Alpha Bank AE GR 
Banca popolare Emilia Romagna IT 
Bankinter SA ES 
Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL IT 
Raiffeisenlandesbank Oberösterr AT 
Banca Carige SpA IT 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel de Paris et d'Ile-de-France SC FR 
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Banca Popolare di Sondrio SCpA IT 
Credito Emiliano spa IT 
Banca Piccolo Credito Valtellinese IT 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel Nord de France SC FR 
Oberbank AG AT 
Caisse Régionale de crédit agricole mutuel Atlantique Vendée SC FR 
Caisse régionale de credit agricole mutuel d'Alpes-Provence SC FR 
Caisse régionale de credit agricole mutuel Sud Rhône -Alpes SC FR 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel de Normandie-Seine FR 
Banco di Desio e della Brianza IT 
Banco di Sardegna SpA IT 
Caisse régionale de credit agricole mutuel de la Touraine et du Poitou SC- FR 
Vseobecna Uverova Banka a.s. SK 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel de l'Ille-et-Vilaine SA FR 
Tatra Banka a.s. SK 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel Loire Haute-Loire SC FR 
Bank für Tirol und Vorarlberg AG-BTV AT 
Caisse régionale de Crédit Agricole mutuel du Morbihan SC FR 
Caisse Régionale de Crédit Agricole Mutuel Toulouse 31 SC FR 
Hellenic Bank Public Company Li CY 
HSBC Bank Malta Plc MT 
BKS Bank AG AT 
Attica Bank SA GR 
Volksbank Vorarlberg e.Gen. AT 
Prima banka Slovensko a.s. SK 
Siauliu Bankas LT 
OTP Banka Slovensko, as SK 
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